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Abstract 
POLICY PARNTERS IN THE NEOLIBERAL AGE: 




Advisor: Professor Ira Shor 
This dissertation is a comparative policy study of changes in education and incarceration 
of the past 40 years. Following national and global trends, New York City saw public 
school and carceral policies converge as the city experienced massive deindustrialization 
and governmental cutbacks while its political economy shifted to one driven by finance, 
investment, real estate, and the growth of a low-wage service sector. These changes 
dramatically increased economic inequality across racial lines, and spurred the intimate 
linkage of public education and state incarceration as institutional tools for the mass 
management of low-income communities of color. Following from a growing policy 
debate in education and criminal justice around the “school-to-prison pipeline,” this study 
analyzes the emergence and structure of correspondence in these two major social 
sectors. This multiscalar research draws on critical policy analysis and critical discourse 
analysis to examine federal and state policy vis-à-vis case studies of local charter school 
and drug court reforms. Findings include correspondence in the implementation of data-
driven managerial practices and representations, the extension of private nonprofit and 
foundation influence on policy, and the (re)production and circulation of what Melamed 
(2006) terms official antiracisms- knowledge systems which deracialize inequality on the 
one hand, while constructing neoliberal subject positions amenable to racialized 
processes of disinvestment, dispossession, and discipline on the other. 
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Doing Political Economy 
“There's always more to it. This is what history consists of. It is the sum total of the 
things they aren't telling us.” – Don DeLillo, Libra 
Introduction 
When my good friend died of a heroin overdose seven years ago, I wanted to 
understand. At that time, grief and a vague desire for revenge were the feelings 
underlying my need for illumination. In the weeks and months that followed his death, 
two themes arose among the bereft to explain his passing: poor choices and bum luck. 
But my friend’s death was not simply the result of some doomed and chance interaction 
of chemical and body, nor could it be reduced to personal irresponsibility and self-
destructiveness. These available explanations failed to speak adequately to what had 
happened, and my temporary embrace of them did not orient me toward any kind of 
growth or healing. The talk of ‘bad luck’ was a dead end, as luck lies beyond the reach of 
human meddling (though the practiced gambler might argue otherwise). The talk of 
‘individual responsibility’ was similarly disempowering. It stirred up anger and 
blamefulness at my friend’s failure to make good choices; it left me embittered and 
cynical, edging towards despair. These narratives failed to illuminate the conditions of his 
demise; rather, they mystified and obscured them. We, his friends and family, were 
drawing on these readily available notions to craft a history that hid more than it revealed.  
Several years before my friend’s death, as a novice English teacher in a sprawling 
New Jersey suburb, I found myself wanting to understand things I was seeing and 
experiencing in school, and, once again, the dominant narratives concealed more than 
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they clarified. I wanted to understand why we spent so much time on test prep, when this 
work so clearly constrained and diminished the interests, passions, and curiosity of my 
students. I wanted to understand why so much was attached to student test scores that, it 
seemed to me, measured so little of the complex interactions that went on in my 
classroom everyday, let alone the vast knowledge and experience my students brought 
with them to school. Why were these test scores filling my “basic skills” classes with 
bilingual students, immigrants, and working class White, African American, and Latino 
students, while my “college prep” classes were predominantly middle and upper middle 
class White students who drove to school in nicer cars than I could ever hope to own? 
Why did we use an alienating curriculum, and who decided that this was best?  
The answers to my questions, of course, were the common ones that we hear all 
too often today: We need a neutral curriculum and objective instruments to measure 
student learning in order to develop best practices and improve our schools. We need to 
hold teachers and youth accountable. Students who score poorly on these tests do so 
because of some kind of behavioral, cognitive, cultural, and/or linguistic deficit. They 
don’t have the right skills or knowledge. Good teachers are those who use “best 
practices” to effectively treat or fix the deficit, teach the knowledge and skills, and 
thereby improve the test scores. End of story. 
I came to see that I was living through a history without context- a period with no 
real sense of its temporality or place, no roots, no structures, no struggles, no interplay of 
forces. I was living in a present history that was, it seemed, suffering from what Cornel 
West calls “historical amnesia” (West, 1999). This dissertation emerges out of a desire to 
join a rich tradition of critical scholars, artists, and activists who have made it their life’s 
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work to disrupt “amnesia” by bringing to light and critically engaging with what West 
calls the “radical historical conditionedness of human existence” (ibid, p. 5). We are 
indeed born into conditions that are neither of our making nor our choosing. These 
conditions shape the way we think and act, but, because they are neither natural nor 
inevitable, they are not immutable, and so they are not our fate. By naming, describing, 
and critically analyzing the conditions of existence, we can identify spaces for resistance 
and transformation. The social sciences in general, and my field of urban education in 
particular, can be these kinds of critical interventions. In the spirit of Dewey (1938) and 
Freire (1970), inquiry can shed light on the conditions of existence. As critical educators 
and scholars, we can pay special attention to the forces and power relationships that 
produce material and the ideological conditions, and reflect upon the ways they shape 
understandings of the world and our place in it.  
This dissertation is in many ways an experiment in confronting what physicist 
Fritjof Capra (1996) refers to as a “crisis of perception,” in which we view the “global 
problems which are harming the biosphere and human life” as being disconnected from 
each other (p. 4). In the social sciences, this disconnection means that particular problems 
of social life can end up isolated under the gaze of specific disciplines and their 
credentialed experts, resulting in a lack of interdisciplinarity and collaboration. Capra 
contends that, to offset the myriad destructive forces at work in the world, we need to 
begin by “seeing the world as an integrated whole rather than a dissociated collection of 
parts” (p. 6). Returning to Dewey and Freire, we must consider West’s (1999) “radical 
historical conditionedness of human existence” and seek out webs and nodes where we 
can investigate the interconnectedness and interdependence of political, economic, social, 
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and cultural forces across time and space. By choosing to research and analyze the 
conjuncture of education policy and drug policy, my goal is to work across disciplines 
and lenses in order to better understand how these two institutional spheres come together 
as they produce, and are produced by, the dynamics of racial capitalism and 
neoliberalism. By doing so, I hope to uncover some of what history has been hiding.  
This dissertation considers how education reform, drug policy, and the neoliberal 
restructuring of New York City are woven together within “an integrated whole” (Capra, 
1996, p. 6), come together to form a “single organizational mesh” (Wacquant, 2010, p. 
199), or are constitutive of the “single reality” of capitalist creative destruction (Tabb, 
1982). To do so, I am asking how the neoliberal restructuring of New York City since the 
mid-1970s is related to developments in education policy and drug policy in general, and 
how charter school and drug court reforms, as case studies, reflect this relationship. As 
drug policy is part of the discursive terrain of mass incarceration, and education policy 
that of schooling, I set out to understand how and why schools and prisons came to be 
imagined and presented as solutions to economic problems and crises, and the ways in 
which these representations are mutually reinforcing. Finally, as this dissertation will 
show, neoliberal restructuring has not created a more just society as its proponents claim; 
rather it has exacerbated inequality and produced a highly volatile economic system 
whose periodic crises disproportionately harm poor and working class people of color, 
while further empowering and enriching elite classes. As education and drug policy are 
bundled together with these disequalizing political economic shifts, this project asks what 
has been the impact of this mix of education and drug policy reforms along lines of race 
and class? Who benefits, who is harmed? How, and why?   
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Growing a Study 
 In May of 2012, I began my study of education and drug policy in New York City 
since the mid-1970s. Over the last 40 years, New York City has been a laboratory for 
experiments in both education reform and criminal justice, giving birth to policies and 
practices that have since been exported to cities around the globe. It has also been a site 
for experimentation with what has come to be known as neoliberal restructuring- a form 
of creative destruction in which the urban political economy is reworked in order to 
create conditions for increased profit accumulation and the restoration of elite class 
power (Harvey, 2007). The creative and the destructive are two sides of the same coin. 
The creative aspect of neoliberalization involves opening new markets and spaces for 
investment, yet such efforts to stimulate growth in New York City have emerged out of 
the destruction or repurposing of existing institutions, built space, and social/cultural 
practices. 
Neoliberal creative destruction in New York City is intimately tied to processes of 
austerity, abandonment, disinvestment, and dispossession that have resulted in the even 
greater maldistribution of wealth, resources, control over built space, and institutional 
power to the city’s mostly White upper class. At the same time, the vulnerabilities, 
harms, and social costs associated with these processes are disproportionately visited 
upon working class and poor people of color. Therefore, my conjunctural analysis of 
New York City’s education and drug policy reforms since the mid-1970s required 
relating them to the racial capitalist dynamics of neoliberal creative destruction that 
transformed the city’s political economy over this same period of time. In the chapters 
that follow, I intend to show how education policy, drug policy, and the political 
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economy have fused into a “condensation of forces” that has given rise to the highly 
racialized “new social configurations” of neoliberal New York (Hall, 2011, p. 9).   
 I am interested in how education policy, drug policy, and the political economy in 
New York City are braided together, both materially and ideologically, and how this 
relationship is productive in terms of the unequal distribution of wealth and harm along 
lines of race and class. My research was inspired by a small body of radical literature on 
the political economy of education (Anyon, 1981, 1997, 2005, 2011; Lipman, 1998, 
2006, 2011). I found similarly moving work in critical or cultural criminology (Beckett, 
2000; Garland, 2001; Gilmore, 2007, 2008; Parenti, 2008; Wacquant, 2001, 2010; 
Young, 2007). What these two bodies of literature share, in the most general sense, is an 
attempt to describe the links between political and economic institutions and entities, and 
analyze how these historical and ongoing relationships shape the society we live in. 
Political economic analysis, broadly conceived, is an effort at understanding education or 
criminal justice that starts its explanations by looking at economic processes and 
criticizes “capitalist outcomes primarily on the basis of their impacts on the welfare of 
relatively deprived groups” (Fainstein, in Merrifield, 1996, p. 19). Such an analysis 
evaluates “the outcomes of actions as they affect social groupings and judge the process 
that produces these results primarily in terms of its contribution to equality” (ibid, p. 22). 
Political economic analyses of education and criminal justice tend to critically analyze 
certain federal, state, and local policies and practices in order to “attack schemes that 
enhance capital accumulation to the detriment of ordinary residents” (ibid, p. 21). Part 
exposé, part social science, part polemic, these analyses foreground the structural causes 
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of oppression and inequality in order to “speak truth to power” by challenging and 
debunking popular tropes around the individualized and cultural causes of poverty.   
This political economic analysis seeks to illuminate the continuity between 
current struggles and those of the past, as well as contribute to the developing critical 
frameworks we need in order to analyze policy as the City continues to change before our 
eyes. For instance, K-12 public schools in New York City are currently embroiled in 
bitter battles over public-private partnerships in education and the place of the private 
sector more generally in influencing educational policy and practice. Mayor DeBlasio’s 
recent battle and subsequent defeat in Albany by charter school proponents and Governor 
Cuomo has resulted in a windfall for charters. Cuomo passed legislation that requires the 
city to find and pay for space for new and expanding charter schools. If the city can’t 
provide space of its own, i.e. through co-locating charters within public school buildings 
that it already owns, it will have to pay the charters’ rent itself. Only after the city has 
spent more than $40 million on rent will the state begin to contribute (Hernández, 2014).  
The future of public schools is uncertain. According to Julie Cavanagh of the 
Movement of Rank and File Educators (MORE) caucus within the UFT, once the city’s 
charter school student population grows from its current 6 percent to 10 percent in the 
coming years, the city may well find itself in the midst of a financial crisis, as the amount 
of public money funneled into charters will prevent the city from being able to fund its 
traditional public schools (2014). A political economic analysis of this situation would 
seek to understand such policy’s place within the logic and historical dynamics of 
capitalism. How do Cuomo’s protections for charter schools relate to the economic 
organization of New York, and U.S. society more generally? How are these mandates 
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related to neoliberal projects of capital accumulation of the past and present?  How might 
this move advance the interests of the elite classes over those of the working class and 
poor? How are charter school co-locations and the policies that mandate and implement 
them complicit in the creation and maintenance of inequality? Who benefits? Who 
harmed?   
These same questions could be asked about recent developments in crime control, 
such as the decrease in “stop and frisks” and the resurgence of “broken windows” 
policing under Mayor DeBlasio and Police Commissioner Bratton- a tactical realignment 
that has resulted in a 300 percent increase in the arrests of panhandlers and peddlers in 
New York City’s subways (Goldstein & Goodman, 2014). How do political and 
economic power converge around recent austerity measures by Cuomo to close (and try 
to sell) 7 state prisons, while at the same time increasing the use of solitary confinement 
and boosting funds for ‘alternatives to incarceration’? Is the culture of policing and mass 
incarceration changing? How do we think about these realignments within the context of 
the Great Recession?  
In Radical Possibilities, Jean Anyon (2005) used political economy to look at 
how the government allocates resources in society through various laws and policies, the 
impact this has on education and the limits it places on education reform. Educational 
opportunity, she argued, is structured within a broad policy landscape: 
Macroeconomic policies like those regulating the minimum wage, job 
availability, tax rates, federal transportation, and affordable housing create 
conditions in cities that no existing educational policy or urban school reform can 
transcend. Thus…low achieving urban schools are not primarily a consequence of 
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failed education policy, or urban family dynamics, as mainstream analysts and 
public policies typically imply. Failing schools in cities are, rather, a logical 
consequence of the U.S. macroeconomy- and the federal and regional policies and 
practices that support it (p. 2). 
Jean Anyon’s Radical Possibilities and Pauline Lipman’s (2011) The New Political 
Economy of Urban Education: Neoliberalism, Race, and the Right to the City were each 
important influences on my work. These authors showed how education policy and 
practice are enmeshed in complex political economic forces and transformations, and 
explored how, because of this connection, education reform is linked to other policy 
arenas like housing and transportation. Both authors provide sweepingly radical visions 
of education, situating it within a web of forces and social issues. Also influential were 
Ruth Wilson Gilmore’s (2007) political economy of California’s prison-building boom, 
The Golden Gulag, and Loïc Wacquant’s (2001, 2010) writing on the relationship 
between the dismantling of welfare and the rolling out of mass incarceration in the U.S. 
Gilmore and Wacquant’s political economic analyses of prisons, like those of Anyon and 
Lipman on education, uncover the material and ideological machinery behind mass 
incarceration, situate it historically and geographically, and relate it to transformations in 
other facets of society, like agriculture, migration, the military, and welfare. This 
dissertation seeks to expand on the important work of these scholars by extending the 
political economy of education to look specifically at the conjuncture of education 




“Doing Political Economy”: Bricolage 
In November of 2013, I was invited to give a talk at the CUNY Graduate Center for a 
group of new urban education students, where I discussed my dissertation and fielded 
some questions about my work and ideas. When someone asked me what my method was 
for “doing political economy,” the best I could come up with at the time was to reply, 
half-jokingly, that I was a “hodgepodgist,” or one who engages a hodgepodge of methods 
as a tool for inquiry. According to the Oxford American Dictionary, a hodgepodge is “a 
confused mixture.”  
 On the one hand, I think I misrepresented myself to those students. I was not so 
much confused in my approach to method as I was varied. On the other hand, 
hodgepodge is an appropriate term, but more because of its etymological origins in the 
archaic British word hotchpotch, which refers to a kind of stew made with mix of sheep 
meat and an assortment of vegetables. That is, like the cook behind the hotchpotch, I was 
engaged in what Dewey (1938) might call “purposeful activity” in my inquiry into the 
political economic conditions of New York City, and I was deliberately using a mix of 
what was readily available to me to make it as rich as possible.  
 Bricolage is perhaps a more adequate academic term to describe the way I 
approach “doing political economy.”  Kincheloe (2001) traces this term to Claude Levi-
Strauss (1966) and the French word bricoleur which “describes a handyman or 
handywoman who makes use of the tools available to complete a task” (Kincheloe, 2001, 
p. 680). Rogers (2012) defines bricolage as a “critical, multi-perspectival, multi-
theoretical and multi-methodological approach to inquiry” (p. 1). Bricolage for me meant 
engaging in an interdisciplinary project grounded in the belief that there was no single 
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approach or method that was best suited to the kind of inquiry I wanted to do.  Following 
Kincheloe (2001), bricolage means using “multiple methods of inquiry but with diverse 
theoretical and philosophical notions of the various elements encountered in the research 
act” (p. 682). It supports interdisciplinarity, eclecticism, and flexibility in research.  
“Doing political economy” through bricolage meant a) seeking out an eclectic 
mix of data from a wide variety of sources; b) using a blend of critical policy analysis and 
critical discourse analysis to draw out, describe, and analyze the ways policy and political 
economy converge; c) synthesizing my own analysis with multiple theoretical 
perspectives to unpack the conjuncture of education policy, drug policy, and the political 
economy.    
As a novice bricoleur, I drew on a mix of critical policy analysis and critical 
discourse analysis to situate education policy, drug policy, and political economy at the 
intersection of the structural and the discursive, at multiple scales. Critical policy analysis 
is not a “technocratic form of policy analysis,” measuring the inputs and outputs, and 
evaluating the efficiency of certain reforms and instruments (Orsini & Smith, 2006, p. 3). 
Rather, it examines policy as an expression of historically situated political and economic 
power, as well as an instrument for protecting and/or enhancing that power (ibid). It 
looks at how power operates through policy, across geographic scales, as a means of 
advancing and protecting economic and racial hierarchies. Such analysis is also 
‘dialectical’ insofar as it sees outcomes as an unpredictable and even negotiated result of 
conflicting as well as contradictory agents and conditions. Critical policy analysis was, 
for me, a way of locating education and drug policy within the formation of what David 
Harvey (2005, 2007) and Loïc Wacquant (2010) call the neoliberal state- that cluster of 
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institutional apparatuses used by elites to restore their class power, open new areas for 
profitable investment, and unleash new forms of discipline and control. Speaking 
broadly, critical policy analysis involves considering how the “organization of the 
economy” shapes the form and intent of policy (Graefe, in Orsini & Smith, p. 20). 
Because policy is constructed, articulated, and enacted in multiple spaces and 
temporalities, bricolage provided the flexibility I needed in order to locate and explore 
different junctures where policy converges with political economy.  
In addition, at certain points in the dissertation, I look at particular instances 
where points of convergence can be found in discourse that embodies “particular ways of 
representing the world” (Fairclough, 2003, p. 26). At times, these lie within the text of the 
policy itself, for as Lipman (2011) points out, “policy is an expression of values arising 
out of specific interests and relations of power” (p. 15). At other points in this 
dissertation, policy converges with political economy within the dominant discourses of 
elites themselves and/or texts produced and circulated by public and private organizations 
and the mass media. These speeches, websites, publications, reports, articles, etc. embody 
and advance the interests of elites by representing the world in certain ways. They 
articulate powerful visions of what is good (and bad), possible (and impossible), and 
what exists (and does not exist) (Therborn, 1980); such powerful or dominant 
representations and initiatives encounter material conditions and oppositional agents 
whose alternative intentions and resistant subjectivities interfere with hegemonic designs. 
I unpack these visions, identifying and analyzing important points of conjuncture.  
Coupling critical policy analysis with critical discourse analysis allowed me to 
situate policy at the intersection of the material and the ideological forces at work within 
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the political economy. For example, connecting census data on child poverty levels in 
New York City, analyses of flexible accumulation and transnational capitalism (e.g. 
Harvey, 1989), and the racially-coded ideological content of A Nation at Risk required 
what Lincoln (in Kincheloe, 2001) describes as “interdisciplinary border-crossing.” The 
researcher “looks for not yet imagined tools, fashioning them with not yet imagined 
connection” and searches “for the nodes, the nexuses, the linkages, the interconnections” 
(p. 694). Importantly, this approach allowed me to situate policy at the intersection of 
race and political economy, and consider policy as a site where systemic racism and 
hegemonic racial representation converge with the structural dynamics of capitalism.   
Bricolage, then, involved putting my own imagination into radical dialogue with 
Marxism, cultural studies, critical geography, racial analysis, Foucault, Gramsci, Freire, 
and other critical theorists. I needed to construct an interdisciplinary and flexible 
conceptual architecture that I could use to interpret and make connections among of a 
variety of data sources- policy texts, newspaper and magazine articles, speeches, reports, 
studies, policy briefs, funding schemes, census data, websites, network analysis, mission 
statements, organizational protocols, as well as a wide variety of secondary sources. 
Drawing on diverse theories highlighted different aspects of, or relationships among, the 
data.  
Structure of the Dissertation and Chapter Overview 
 The dissertation is essentially organized into three main parts. Part I includes 
chapters 2 and 3, and is focused on drug policy. Part II consists of chapters 4 and 5, and 
examines education policy and reform. Part III concludes the dissertation and includes 
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only chapter 6, a largely theoretical analysis that examines some specific conceptual 
areas of conjuncture.  
 Part I begins with Chapter 2, a historical political economic analysis of drug 
policy and mass incarceration in New York State. It provides background information on 
the Rockefeller Drug Laws, and situates them within the context of the attacks on the 
welfare state and the backlash against the palpable threats to white supremacy and 
capitalist class power unleashed by the turmoil of the 1960s and early 70s. The chapter 
goes on to trace the emergence and growth of the carceral state, focusing on New York’s 
prison building and filling projects of the 1980s and 90s, and concludes by making 
connections between the carceral state and the neoliberal restructuring of New York City. 
 Chapter 3 zooms in to examine New York City’s drug court reforms as a case 
study to examine how the carceral state was able to adapt and expand, in spite of the 
political, racial, and economic crises in which it was implicated. Drug courts are usually 
cast by their critics and proponents alike as a response to mass incarceration and the drug 
war. In contrast, this analysis looks at how drug courts proliferated as part and parcel of 
the fine-tuning of the drug war and its regime of mass incarceration. It concludes with a 
critical analysis of recent drug court reforms to the Rockefeller Drug Laws, looking at 
how they reproduce race, class, and gender inequality within the criminal justice system. 
 Chapter 4 marks the shift to Part II of the dissertation, as I examine federal 
education policy starting with the Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA) of 
1965. The chapter looks at how and why education policy and reform were imagined and 
presented as solutions to poverty, in spite of evidence that growing poverty rates were 
being caused by profound changes in the global economy. It critically analyzes the so-
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called literacy crisis of the late 1970s and the A Nation at Risk report, and the roles their 
racial representations played in establishing a new discursive terrain for education 
reform, as well as the emerging neoliberalization of the city.   
 Chapter 5 zooms in once again to look at education reform in New York City by 
situating school decentralization within the context of the fiscal crisis of the mid-1970s 
and the “structural adjustments” visited upon the city in its aftermath. The chapter 
explores how the charter school movement in New York emerged out of this 
restructuring, and provides a Marxian analysis of school choice in New York City and the 
marketization of education more broadly by federal policies like No Child Left Behind 
and Race to the Top.  
 Chapter 6 is Part III of the dissertation, and it identifies and theorizes on three 
main strands of conjuncture. First, I analyze what I call “managerial simplifications” in 
education and criminal justice- technocratic ways of seeing and representing that mask 
and obscure issues of race and class. Second, I draw on the work of INCITE! (2007) on 
the Nonprofit Industrial Complex (NPIC) to consider how drug courts and charters, 
through their permeation by the private nonprofit sector, are “reformist reforms” that, 
contrary to their progressive claims, actually protect status quo power relations and 
advance private interests. Finally, the chapter concludes with an analysis of what 
Melamed (2006) refers to as the “official anti-racism” of the neoliberal state as manifest 
in drug court and charter school reforms. I look at how such discourses merge hegemonic 
racial representations with market ideologies to orient neoliberal subjects away from 
collectivity and radical critique, and towards taking individual responsibility for the risks 
and harms created by the dynamics of racial capitalism.   
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 This dissertation is, at heart, an attempt to spark a multi-perspectival dialogue 
about inequality and power by inviting readers to explore and reconsider boundaries. I 
situate myself historically in the aftermath of Occupy Wall Street. At protests, and at the 
Zuccotti Park encampment, I’d see picket signs, t-shirts, pamphlets, and activists from 
grassroots radical education organizations as well as prison abolitionists and “Stop stop 
and friskers.” Each of these issues is important in its own right and warrants, or 
necessitates, its respective experts, organizers, and constituents. But to rebuild the broad-
based social movement that Occupy was perhaps so close to being, we need to work 
harder to identify, to critically analyze, and to articulate links among the forces and 
energies at work from both above and below. In that spirit, this conceptual dissertation is 
an attempt to unpack, connect, and rethink some aspects of the vast and complex 














The Growth of the Carceral State in New York 
The Rockefeller Drug Laws 
 This chapter provides an overview and political economic analysis of the 
Rockefeller Drug Laws and New York’s prison building and filling boom. It situates 
these developments at the juncture several forces: of the dismantling of the welfare state, 
attacks on the gains of the civil rights movement, the emergence of the drug war and the 
growing carceral state, and the neoliberal restructuring of New York City. The 
Rockefeller Drug Laws were a set of narcotics control statutes put into law in New York 
State in 1973 that established markedly punitive sentencing guidelines and mandates for 
drug offenders. This chapter argues that the laws were not simply a response to rising 
crime or drug addiction rates, but rather part of a discursive and structural process of 
criminalization as policing and incarceration emerged as responses to cultural and 
racialized political economic transformations and upheavals. The chapter will trace how 
the drug laws, adrenalized by the federal war on drugs, produced a prison building and 
filling boom in which a fiscally strained city and state struggled to develop the 
infrastructure needed to police, remove and contain “dangerous” surplus populations of 
poor people of color living in disinvested urban neighborhoods. It will explore how the 
growing carceral state, "the totality of this spatially concentrated, more punitive, 
surveillance- and punishment-oriented system of governance" (Weaver, 2010, p. 2), 
accompanied neoliberal restructuring, as New York City was transformed to 
accommodate the changing dynamics of racial capitalism. 
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Criminalization, race, and the attack on welfare 
Crime control in the 1970s was an important part of the larger interlocking 
projects of reasserting racial hierarchies and the dismantling of the welfare state. In the 
1950s, developments in agricultural production and the unemployment that followed 
spurred a mass migration of poor, uneducated African Americans from rural and southern 
areas to the segregated Northeast seeking work in manufacturing, ports, and other 
industries. Similar agricultural and economic transformations brought large numbers of 
Puerto Ricans to New York around the same time, also seeking industrial work. New 
York, however, did not have as much to offer as other industrial cities did post-WWII, for 
industries had already begun to flee the city due to high costs of production. Thus migrant 
workers arriving in New York in the 1950s arrived to a city already in a state of gradual 
industrial decline (Weil, 2004). This drastic change in New York’s demographics, 
coupled with growing economic insecurity as the city was increasingly deindustrialized, 
meant not only an industrial exodus but also an exodus of revenue as upper and middle 
class ‘white flight’ to the suburbs gained momentum (Moody, 2007). At the same time, 
African Americans and Puerto Ricans in New York faced institutionalized discrimination 
as they sought jobs, education, and housing. Though the New Deal and the creation of the 
U.S. welfare state in the aftermath of World War II had brought about increased 
economic security for working class and middle class whites, it “reinforced racial 
segregation through social welfare programs, labor policy, and housing policy” 
(Quadagno, 1996, pg. v). Thus poor people of color living in New York City in the 1950s 
and much of the 1960s were cut out from the benefits of the welfare state and found 
themselves increasingly segregated into highly concentrated impoverished 
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neighborhoods, excluded from much unionized work and other decent industrial labor, 
denied educational opportunity, and with unequal access to the social welfare programs 
enacted by the state to create a floor beneath poverty.  
In the mid to late 1960s, civil rights groups shifted their focus to the economic 
problems faced by African Americans, linking socioeconomic inequality and racism as 
the sources of poverty and social problems and advocating for an expansion of Johnson’s 
Great Society programs (Beckett, 2000). The urban uprisings and civil rights movements 
of the 1960s, coupled with a Cold War-inspired need to appear equitable, created a 
mounting pressure on politicians to merge the social, economic, and political benefits of 
the welfare state with the democratic ideals of racial justice. Johnson’s War on Poverty 
rearticulated the economic goals of the welfare state in racial justice terms as it sought to 
create opportunities for impoverished minority groups. The War on Poverty funneled 
federal resources into creating a social infrastructure amenable to equal opportunity. It 
helped develop community action programs, and brought African Americans into local 
politics as it created job-training programs to bring them into unions. Affirmative action 
and fair housing legislation emerged as mechanisms for upward mobility and 
desegregation. Working class solidarity and mobilization for economic justice, however, 
were weakened and eventually undermined by racial divisions (Quadagno, 1996). 
These social programs threatened white privilege, and reductions in government 
intervention gradually emerged as an organizing principle that united the various interests 
threatened by the impending shakeup of the racial and economic status quo. The War on 
Poverty of the late 1960s brought about important political victories for minority groups, 
including the growth of a black middle class, increased representation in congress, and 
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more black and Latino mayors (Marable, 2007, pgs. 2-3). Furthermore, the surge in 
welfare benefits, job training, and affordable housing produced increasing stability for the 
city’s minority poor. The swelling welfare rolls, and the increasing number of African 
Americans on those rolls, however, produced a backlash from fiscal and social 
conservatives who sought to cut government spending on services and push back against 
civil rights gains. Furthermore, opposition to social and racial justice was pervasive 
among middle class and working class whites who, in an increasingly economically 
precarious city, felt threatened by the potential integration of African Americans and 
Latinos into the social, economic, and political mainstream.    
Racial fears mixed with economic concerns as unions, homeowners, and an 
increasingly economically unstable and poor white working class resisted integration, 
affirmative action, and fair housing laws. As the struggle for racial justice became 
increasingly embedded within social policy, both white supremacy and white privilege 
were reconstructed in relation to social welfare programs. That is, if one supported the 
social programs, one supported racial integration and equality- and its corollary: if one 
opposed government regulation for fiscal or political reasons, one had to also oppose the 
social programs that promoted racial justice. As such, the “positive liberties” the welfare 
state extended to African Americans (welfare, job training, affirmative action, and fair 
housing) were viewed by the white middle and working class as infringements on their 
“negative liberties” (discrimination in unions, excluding people of color from local 
politics, maintaining segregated neighborhoods). Republicans capitalized on these racial 
conflicts and “forged racial hostility with conservative economic policy into a New Right 
coalition” (Quadagno, 1996, pg. 195). The rising New Right of the 1970s embarked on 
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the ideological task of reframing working class economic and social insecurity as well as 
racial concerns in free market terms by marrying fiscal conservatism to notions of white 
supremacy and white privilege (Quadagno, 1996; Beckett, 2000). Establishing powerful 
links among crime/criminality, the social and cultural deficits of the poor, and the 
entitlements of the welfare system emerged as an integral discursive and material 
undertaking that would be essential to the neoliberal restructuring of New York.  
The marriage of anti-welfare/neoliberal politics to the rolling back of the social, 
economic, and political gains made by minority groups during the War on Poverty 
necessitated the delegitimization of the very claims to entitlement that underpinned civil 
rights. For neoliberal hegemony to work, its proponents needed a way to dislodge the 
discourse of racial and economic justice from the state, manage it in the streets, and 
neutralize or discredit it in public consciousness. It also needed to drive a wedge between 
poor and working class whites and people of color. The neoliberal project at this point in 
time was a grand one: in order to dismantle the welfare state and reassert the class power 
of economic elites, elites and their political allies needed to build a vast political base of 
working class whites by casting their economic instability and racial concerns onto the 
welfare state. To do so required the targeting, by the state, of African Americans and 
Latinos. Criminalization and mass incarceration worked to: a) discredit the claims of 
minority groups by casting them as criminals and parasites enabled by the welfare state; 
b) manage and contain the surplus population and increasing insecurity produced by 
neoliberal economics; c) undermine solidarities among poor minorities by destabilizing 
their communities; d) contribute to the amelioration of periodic crises by absorbing 
surplus capital and land; e) resolve issues of “surplus state capacity” (Gilmore, 2007) by 
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providing a site for the legitimate exercise of state power. The Rockefeller Drug Laws of 
1973 were not the beginning of this process, as conservatives used crime to criticize 
welfare as early as 1964 (Beckett, 2000). The laws were, however, the crystallization of 
this discursive strategy in terms of legal infrastructure.  
The 1970s in New York were characterized by the growth of urban unemployed 
and low wage workers, primarily people of color, living out their lives in poor material 
conditions (Marable, 2007, pp. 2-3). Alongside this growth in inequality and the 
discrediting and gradual dismantling of the welfare state came a “punitive turn” in state 
policy and criminal justice practice (Garland, 2001). State sponsored treatment, though 
often coercive and backed with the muscle of the criminal justice system, came to be 
viewed as “soft on crime,” enabling deviance, costly, inefficient, and generally 
ineffective. A more punitive approach to crime control became politically desirable, and 
by casting criminality onto race, it produced the conditions necessary to both roll back 
welfare and reassert racial hierarchies. Criminalization provided the ideological mantle 
that made the structural shifts towards mass incarceration possible, as drug use and low-
level dealing were increasingly criminalized behaviors, and this criminality was inscribed 
upon African Americans and Latinos through the racially coded ‘law and order’ rhetoric 
of politicians and the mainstream media, as well as the direct targeting by the police of 
the inner city neighborhoods where people of color lived. The Rockefeller Drug Laws 
signified a drastic sea change in the state’s approach to dealing with deviance. The laws 
simultaneously constructed poor people of color as criminal subjects and provided the 
legal infrastructure to police, convict, and incarcerate them. In what follows, I will 
attempt to describe how the Rockefeller Drug Laws not only contributed to the 
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production of the institutional framework of mass incarceration in New York State, but 
also the ways in which these laws produced the criminalized human subjects who came to 
fill the prisons. 
Constructing the new punitive terrain 
In 1973, Governor Nelson T. Rockefeller advanced a profound paradigm shift in 
New York State’s approach to managing drug use and drug dealing. Framing drug 
treatment programs as a failure, Rockefeller advocated a shift to a more punitive 
approach to deterrence: 
I, therefore, will ask for legislation making the penalty for all illegal trafficking in 
hard drugs a life sentence in prison. To close all avenues for escaping the full 
force of this sentence, the law would forbid acceptance of a plea to a lesser 
charge, forbid probation, forbid parole and forbid suspension of sentence 
(Rockefeller, 1973; as reprinted in Kohler-Hausmann, 2010).  
The therapeutic, treatment-oriented approach, however, was never race or class neutral. 
Furthermore, the transition from therapeutic to punitive was not immediate, total, or 
evenly distributed. Julilly Kohler-Hausmann (2010) captures the race and class dynamic 
of this relationship well, pointing out that in the 1970s: 
these strategies coexisted almost symbiotically as the growing medicalization of 
addiction and mental illness for the middle and upper classes has been conjoined 
with persistent criminalization of the same problems for the working classes, and 
especially poor people of color. Rehabilitative intent in policy is theoretically 
democratizing, committed to reabsorbing marginalized citizens into the polity (on 
elite's terms) (pg. 73).  
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That is, therapeutic models of intervention fostered social reproduction and control by 
distributing the criminalization of drug use along lines of race and class. When these 
rationales for intervening upon marginalized populations lost their legitimacy alongside 
the sweeping decline of the welfare state, "policy makers changed the definition of 
success for state intervention" (ibid, p. 74). During the period of neoliberal ascendancy, 
the shift from the therapeutic to the punitive, as embodied by the Rockefeller Drug Laws, 
became central to maintaining the racial status quo, reasserting the class power of elites, 
and legitimizing politicians as the welfare state fell into disrepute in the 1980s and on.  
As the welfare state was systematically dismantled and delegitimized, 
punitiveness emerged as a form of conservative political currency. The Rockefeller Drug 
Laws were not Governor Rockefeller’s first foray into the politics of punishment; 
motivated by a desire to appear more conservative in anticipation of a possible run 
against Ronald Reagan in the 1976 Republican primary election, the punitive turn of 
1973 was intimated by Rockefeller’s violent suppression of the Attica uprising in 1971 
(Gangi, p. 49 in Marable, 2007). The Rockefeller Drug Laws of 1973, though not unique 
in the context of national drug policy of the 80s and 90s, were in many ways the model 
for social control within the drug war as it unfolded and escalated nationally: harsh, fixed 
prison sentences for drug users, low level dealers, and especially for repeat offenders. 
They took as their target the most vulnerable of the state’s population: black and brown 
minority groups living in conditions of highly concentrated, precarious, and potentially 
explosive urban poverty. The Rockefeller Drug Laws based punishment on the amount of 
drugs the offender was caught carrying; kingpins, however, do not tend to carry drugs on 
their person. As such, the laws’ targets were drug users and low-level dealers. Because 
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impoverished users and dealers tend to use and deal in public areas, they were easy 
targets for surveillance and intensified street policing, and their lack of resources made 
them easier for prosecutors to convict than white middle class drug users and dealers. The 
ready availability of a surplus population vulnerable to policing, conviction, and 
imprisonment provided officials with incentives to expand their police forces and reap the 
political benefits of mass arrests and convictions (ibid, p. 50).  
In the 1970s, debates raged about the state's capacity to address social problems 
and "liberalism's therapeutic government interventions" were not only discredited as 
ineffective (Kohler-Hausmann, p. 71) but also delegitimized as a form of state action 
altogether by being framed as inefficient and overly permissive. There was a vacuum in 
terms of the role of the state in managing everyday life, and the state faced a legitimacy 
crisis. The Rockefeller Drug Laws helped to fill that vacuum by reconceptualizing and 
redirecting surplus state capacity (Gilmore, 2007) in a way that was coherent with the 
rolling back of social welfare policies. First, the theory of the “culture of poverty” 
emerged in political and popular rhetoric as a way to explain away the socioeconomic 
roots of inequality and shift the blame onto the behaviors and values of the poor 
themselves. Drug use and low level drug dealing were framed as bad lifestyle choices 
that were encouraged by the permissiveness of the welfare state. Second, emphasizing the 
pathologies of the poor signified their immorality and unworthiness as recipients of 
public aid (Beckett, 2000). Third, this conceptualization of poor people of color as 
pathological, dangerous, and unworthy legitimized the slashing of social welfare policies 
while simultaneously necessitating some form of proactive intervention by the state upon 
the pathology itself. The Rockefeller Drug Laws articulated this new vision of 
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government via a cohesive set of laws and policies that mobilized state power to target 
poor African American drug users and dealers.  
As part of the conservative backlash against the gains made by minority groups 
during the 1960s, criminalization rationalized race and class inequities and allowed for 
state power to mobilize in novel ways to dominate (for exploitation) and manage (control, 
remove, contain) poor people of color. The Rockefeller Drug Laws, then, are an example 
of how “crime policy is actually designed to maintain dominance and cultural hegemony 
over those categorized as the ‘dangerous’ classes” (Jordan-Zacherys, p. 102 in Marable, 
2007). Crime control, in this lens, is an important part of an array of “efforts to protect 
and advance powerful interests that maintain the racial status quo” (ibid, p. 103). For the 
Rockefeller Drug Laws to do so required that officials produce not only the legal, 
political, and economic infrastructure needed to expand policing and incarceration, but 
also the discursive conditions necessary to frame African American and Latino drug users 
and low level dealers as the root causes of social problems. By drawing on and expanding 
the “culture of poverty” theory, the drug laws shifted the subject position of drug users 
and dealers such that they were no longer part of the public, and they could be 
constructed as deviant or dangerous “others” who needed to be surveilled, policed, 
removed, and contained. The casting of this position onto African American and Latino 
subjects occurred through the concrete practice of targeting impoverished urban spaces. 
The criminalization of these New Yorkers delegitimized civil rights demands and 
naturalized their status as poor, marginal, policed individuals. The Rockefeller Drug 
Laws, by targeting street level drug crime in poor urban areas, “helped naturalize highly 
political assumptions as social fact” (Kohler-Hausmann, p. 74), and thus produced not 
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only legal infrastructure but also a knowledge base which pushed back against the civil 
rights gains of the 1960s, facilitated the dismantling of the welfare state, and helped pave 
the way for the encroaching neoliberal counterrevolution which would take New York by 
storm in the late 1970s and 1980s. 
The Rockefeller Drug Laws, like the neoliberal ascent, were not inevitable. They 
were produced by a constellation of structural and discursive forces that crystallized into 
a new form of political hegemony. Politicians used the Rockefeller Drug Laws as a 
political spectacle (Smith, 2004) to mobilize support and “reshape the political terrain” in 
the interests of powerful elites (Kohler-Hausmann, p. 73). That is, the laws enabled a 
cohesion of interests among profit-seeking economic elites, the political officials who 
represent their interests, and an activist white middle and working class who felt 
threatened by increased economic instability and the civil rights claims being made by 
minority groups. The laws were used to advance the varied interests of the groups now 
united under the “hegemonic umbrella” (Apple, 1996) of criminalizing and incarcerating. 
If working class whites felt they had been abandoned to deal with problems in the city as 
elites and industrial jobs fled, they were encouraged to see the welfare state itself, rather 
than the maneuvers and failures of capital, as responsible. At the same time, if the Right 
could frame the welfare state as generally indulgent and overly permissive, it could also 
blame it for encouraging criminality. By invoking a drug crisis centered on poor people 
of color, who were also the recipients of welfare expenditures, the Rockefeller Drug 
Laws linked welfare to deviance and thus provided “pretext for radical actions offered by 
policy makers to correct the alleged conditions” (Smith, 2004, p. 14). The Rockefeller 
Drug Laws contributed to the dismantling of the welfare state in so far as they were 
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"performative and creative; they were instrumental in producing the 'common sense' and 
worldviews they purported to reflect" (Kohler-Hausmann, pg. 73). They provided a 
discursive and material foundation for neoliberal hegemony and mass incarceration to 
emerge as correctives to the failures of the welfare state and the deviance it produced and 
enabled.  
In New York State, this took shape as expansion, for "as opposed to shrinking 
government, punishing programs were actually state building enterprises" (ibid, p. 73), 
similar to how education, welfare, military, and regulatory institutions expanded the state 
in the period after World War II. The neoliberal state which the drug laws were helping 
to build was very different, however, from the Keynesian or “welfare warfare” (Gilmore, 
2007) state of the post-WWII era. Through mobilizing race and class antagonisms in the 
casting of criminality upon poor people of color, by creating “political dividends” for 
“tough on crime” officials, and by reconstructing the parameters of state intervention and 
expenditure, the Rockefeller Drug Laws made possible what Gilmore (1994) refers to as 
a “double displacement.” First, the Rockefeller Drug Laws reinforced the notion of an 
“enemy within” who could be blamed not only for their own problems, but for economic 
crises and social instability in general, thus displacing economic precariousness and 
social disorder from the political economy and onto the behaviors and values of poor 
people of color. Second, the Rockefeller Drug Laws allowed for the displacement of 
public dollars “from social investment” to social control (Gilmore, 2007, p. 17), 
facilitating the transfer of wealth from the public sector to private development as the 
state froze welfare services and grew its carceral archipelago (Foucault, 1977). That is, 
the drug laws provided the legal and institutional infrastructure, as well as the necessary 
 29 
criminalizing discourses, to legitimize the funneling of public money to shift from 
welfare-oriented projects to economic development projects and tax abatements. This 
displacement of public dollars benefited elites at the expense of New York’s poor, for 
whom it created increasing instability that would not be managed by welfare state 
apparatuses, but rather by its expanding carceral state apparatuses. 
 
The New York Prison Building Boom of the 1980s and 1990s 
The emerging carceral state 
Loïc Wacquant (2001) argues that mass incarceration has grown in relationship to 
the dismantling of the welfare state and the rolling back of the redistributive functions of 
the state. Complementing this is Manning Marable’s (2007) assertion that along with the 
dismantling of welfare supports, expanded militarism, and the breaking of labor, there 
emerged a need for a “fresh approach” in confronting minority groups’ claims on the 
state. This section will explore how that “fresh approach” took for its shape the war on 
drugs, and how the drug war expanded and reinforced the carceral state. What then is the 
carceral state, how did it develop, and what does it produce? As public goods and 
services are increasingly privatized or eliminated altogether, what is the carceral state’s 
role in the management and exploitation of dispossessed minority groups? How does it 
advance the interests of capital?  
Weiman and Weiss (2009) describe mass incarceration, the hallmark of the 
carceral state, as a way of framing: a) the vast scale and reach of the criminal justice 
system, as an estimated 7.1 million people or 3.6% of the U.S. population are under 
correctional supervision today; and b) the disproportionate targeting by the criminal 
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justice system of urban minority communities (pg. 75). What Wacquant refers to as the 
carceral state, they call the regime of mass incarceration: “the complex of punitive 
criminal justice policies that have diffused across all levels of the criminal justice system 
and all levels of government” (pg. 76). What this suggests, then, is that the carceral state 
permeates, or at the very least, implicates, all of the institutional appendages of the state 
and, following Wacquant, the carceral state itself is composed, in part, of political and 
economic institutions, ideologies, and practices not typically considered part of the 
criminal justice system. It also suggests that as neoliberalism, as opposed to the welfare 
state, comes to characterize more and more aspects of state activity, this transformation 
itself is facilitated by the regime of mass incarceration. Most importantly, it raises the 
questions of how and why the carceral state takes for its target poor people of color in 
urban neighborhoods, and what the implications of this targeting are for the unequal 
distribution of wealth and harm. 
Bernard Harcourt (2012) provides a rich genealogy of what he calls “neoliberal 
penality,” a discourse which legitimizes state funding of the regime of mass incarceration 
while delegitimizing other forms of public expenditure and state regulation (e.g. 
environmental regulation, or certain regulations around prices, markets, and wages). As 
legitimate and desirable state activity within the neoliberal rubric, mass incarceration as a 
mode of both economic development and social control emerged not only to restore racial 
hierarchies, but also as a solution to “the disinvestment by the federal government and the 
experience of job loss for working-class New Yorkers” (Morrell, 2012, pg. 46). The New 
York experience, though unique in terms of New York City’s role in the global economy 
and the forms of uneven development that have shaped the state’s regions (Sassen, 2001), 
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follows national trends, as it was subjected to the same economic crises and waves of 
restructuring that hit the rest of the country in the 70s, 80s, and 90s (Weiman and Weiss, 
2009, pg. 76; Moody, 2007). 
The carceral state emerged gradually alongside shifts in the U.S. political 
economy as welfare spending was curbed and spending on militarization, policing, and 
incarceration surged. The reallocation of public money via the war on drugs allowed for 
increased funding of local police precincts and the funneling of public funds towards 
prison building and maintenance. The resulting increase in arrests and imprisonment gave 
the carceral state its raison d'être. The U.S. incarceration rate remained steady from 1925 
through the early 1970s. During that time, there were approximately 107 prisoners per 
100,000 people. The number of prisoners, however, doubled in the 1980s, and then 
doubled again in the early 1990s to a total of 500 prisoners per 100,000 people. By 2000, 
.5% of the total U.S. population was imprisoned (Weiman and Weiss, 2009). Though the 
Rockefeller Drug Laws were adopted in 1973, the drug war and mass incarceration did 
not gain steam until the early 1980s. The reason for this is that incarceration rates 
depended on decisions made by powerful actors at the local level, such as mayors, police 
commissioners, district attorneys, and judges. These individuals were empowered to 
implement and enforce state and federal sentencing policies (ibid). The time lag between 
the adoption of the Rockefeller Drug Laws in 1973 and the surge in arrests and 
imprisonment that occurred in the 1980s and 90s was a result of political economic shifts 
engendered, in part, by the war on drugs, not changes in the Rockefeller Drug Laws 
themselves. That is, though strict and punitive federal and state drug laws were in place 
in New York and elsewhere in the 1970s, their implementation and enforcement were not 
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guaranteed at the local level and did not become status quo until the 1980s when a 
constellation of macro level political and economic forces coalesced around expanding 
policing and incarceration at the micro, local level.  
As Michelle Alexander (2012) points out, it was not until Reagan took office and 
fully mobilized the war on drugs that there emerged the substantial political and 
economic incentives needed to drive the implementation and enforcement of the 
Rockefeller Drug Laws at the state and local levels. Reagan rose to power in the 
aftermath of the Watergate scandal that scandalized the Right and the withdrawal from 
Vietnam which humiliated the political status quo while activists celebrated the end of 
the war. Lingering labor and social movement militancy vexed corporate elites and 
challenged white supremacy. ‘Law and order’ rhetoric emerged as a racially coded 
reframing of social control and became a central theme of the conservative counter-
insurgency led by Reagan (ibid), along with the revitalization of the economy via attacks 
on unions and cuts to social programs. The Reagan administration pumped billions of 
federal money into fighting the drug war at the local urban level, and the resulting 
deployment of the Rockefeller Drug Laws in the 1980s and 1990s fed tens of thousands 
of people of color into the growing carceral state.  
One important way the drug war contributed to the growth of the carceral state 
was providing the ideological and material base needed for the institutionalization of 
determinant sentencing for drug related offenses. Determinant sentencing (the 
implementation of standardized sentencing guidelines as opposed to the discretion of 
judges) was initially designed to curb race and class biases of judges, and had some 
flexibility built in. However, the conservative political environment of the 1980s, coupled 
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with the new material incentives driving policing, convictions, and sentencing, produced 
a shift towards a “rigid and mechanical sentencing regime” (what is referred to as the 
‘front end’ of imprisonment) and stricter conditions and terms for release and parole (the 
‘back end’), both of which contributed to the growth in incarceration rates for drug users 
and dealers and thus the expansion of the carceral state (Weiman and Weiss, 2009, pg. 
77). That is, political incentives, the availability of funding, and the increased 
criminalization of drug related behaviors, made it easier for poor people of color to get 
into prison and harder for them to get out. With more people entering prison and less 
people leaving, the stage was set for mass incarceration and prison overcrowding, leading 
to the building of more jails and prisons. These twin pillars supported the growth of the 
carceral state in terms of producing the increasing need for built space and the capital to 
pay for it, an expanded nexus of crime control apparatuses, and a deeper interpermeation 
of political, economic, and criminal justice institutions.   
Furthermore, as Ruth Gilmore (2007) argues, prison building and the expansion 
of the carceral state in the U.S. were mutually productive. The growth of the carceral 
state produced the need for more prisons; at the same time, prison building itself and the 
mix of private and state capital it required gave rise to a host of policies and practices 
which would fill those prisons. For example, federal policy helped to marry the 
economics of prison construction to increasingly punitive practices of fixed sentencing 
for drug users and dealers via the 1994 Federal Crime Act, which provided conditional 
funding for prison construction based on prisoners serving 85% of their term (a practice 
known as ‘truth in sentencing laws’). As a result, between 1994 and 1996, the number of 
states adopting truth and sentencing laws increased by 60%, from 5 to 31 states (Weiman 
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and Weiss, 2009). As with current education policies like Race to the Top, tougher 
standards and punitive accountability meant increased federal aid, which, in this case, 
could be used by states like New York to finance prison construction. The federal 
government also helped to enact what Gilmore refers to as the “prison filling project,” as 
city governments across the country received federal aid to buy increasingly sophisticated 
surveillance technology and hire additional police to be deployed in the streets for 
purposes of aggressive, ‘proactive’ policing of drug users and dealers (e.g. stop and frisk 
and ‘broken windows’ policing) and targeting specific neighborhoods (e.g. ‘hot spots’ 
like Crown Heights in Brooklyn).  
Intensified policing of drug users and dealers in urban areas brought about a surge 
in arrests across the nation, feeding hundreds of thousands of people into the grim 
machinery of the carceral state. Once arrested, political pressure, racial discrimination, 
and the lack of legal recourse available to poor people of color coalesced to bring about 
higher rates of conviction and incarceration for longer terms. Funding also manifested in 
better surveillance and direct evidence from police officers, which, when combined with 
harsh minimum sentences, could be used as leverage by prosecutors to get plea 
agreements where they might not otherwise- a practice which contributed to increased 
rates of imprisonment and longer stints in prison or jail (Weiman and Weiss, pg. 79). As 
will be explored in greater detail in the subsequent chapter on reform of the Rockefeller 
Drug Laws, this practice is similar to a central tenet of drug court strategy whereby 
judges use the availability of harsh sentences as leverage to extract guilty pleas from 
clients and coerce, or to use their language, “motivate,” compliance with the mandated 
treatment regimen and other court-ordered lifestyle changes.  
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In conclusion, the drug war, as exemplified in New York by the Rockefeller Drug 
Laws, was a massive and multifaceted policy apparatus central to feeding poor people of 
color into the machinery of the carceral state, altering everyday life in urban 
neighborhoods and radically disrupting the social environment that had given rise to the 
Civil Rights and Black Power movements. Between 1982 and 1999,the number of people 
committed to state and federal prison for drug related offenses increased by 985% 
(Gilmore, 2007, pg. 18). During this same time period, most crime rates decreased except 
drug related crime, which jumped up by 80%, even though rates of drug use and dealing 
remained steady. Furthermore, white, black, and Latino drug users and dealers use and 
deal at similar rates, yet black and Latino users and dealers are disproportionately 
stopped, arrested, incarcerated, and often face longer sentences than whites convicted of 
the same crime (Raphael and Stoll, 2009; Alexander, 2012). While rates of drug use have 
remained fairly stable, rates of incarceration increased drastically across the nation, and 
New York was certainly no exception. The ‘heroin epidemic’ faded in the 1980s and 
crack use diminished after 1990, but incarceration rates continued to grow throughout the 
1980s and 90s (Raphael and Stoll, 2009). In New York State, the prisoner population in 
1971 was 12,500, by 1999 it was 71,000. In 1979, African Americans were 39% of new 
prisoners; in 1990 they were 53% (Marable, 2007). The drug war, to quote Manning 
Marable, is a “race conscious war” on people of color (pg. 4). It expanded the carceral 
state by producing the bodies needed to fill prisons, legitimizing the demand for prison 
expansion, and developing a vast and pervasive regime of mass incarceration which 
colonized more and more arenas of government and everyday life. Returning to 
Wacquant (2010), the drug war and the expanding carceral state helped to further 
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dismantle welfare by criminalizing those who depended on it the most and by reinforcing 
the transition from an emphasis on therapeutic “caring” state apparatuses to punitive 
neoliberal ones. Thus, the shift to the carceral state transformed the economy of inner city 
life. As will be explored in the following sections, the growing carceral state also 
produced new relationships between financial capital and state and city governments and 
institutions. To understand the emergence of the carceral state in New York at this 
historical moment given the evidence about lower crime rates and the stability of drug 
use, to understand why it took the shape it did, and why the human beings whom it took 
as its targets were disproportionately poor people of color facing drug related charges, it 
is necessary to look deeply into New York’s prison building boom to understand how 
prisons were used to address economic and social problems whose roots lay in the 
political economy, not in the poor choices and deviance of drug users and dealers.  
Political economic conditions upstate 
New York State’s prison population exploded between 1980 and 2000, tripling 
from 21,929 to 70,112 incarcerated men and women (Morrell, 2012). Most prisoners are 
poor people of color from New York City, contained in facilities in predominately white 
communities upstate. New York State had 32 prisons up until 1982, and another 38 were 
built between 1982 and 2000, almost entirely in these largely white, rural areas upstate. 
Poverty in these nonmetropolitan rural areas is higher than “metro area” (i.e. suburban) 
rates and only slightly lower than that of central cities (The Sentencing Project, 2003). 
Thus, prisons were imagined to solve various social, political, and economic problems in 
both rural and urban areas. The late 20th century brought on devastating poverty in rural 
areas as agriculture, manufacturing, tourism, timber, and mining declined. At the same 
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time, as the drug war escalated, New York State’s prison population increased by 8.1% 
annually from 1985 through 1995. Politicians upstate and down saw the fattening of the 
carceral state as an economic development tool: the growing prison population in New 
York State, beginning in the late 1970s and reaching full stride in 1980s and 1990s, 
created demand for the built space with which to contain and manage this surplus 
“dangerous” population, and prison hosting emerged as a possible “catalyst for economic 
growth.” Thirty-five jobs, the story went, would be created for every 100 inmates housed 
(ibid, pg. 1).  
Prison building was a “state project of urban governance and economic 
development” and, during the 1980s, prison construction in upstate areas resulted from a 
direct infusion of state capital that was explicitly framed by both Hugh Carey and Mario 
Cuomo’s administrations as an economic development program (Morrell, 2012, pg. 43). 
Mass incarceration in New York reconfigured the geography of race relations, as people 
of color from urban areas were forcibly relocated to prisons in White rural towns with 
White prison guards, staff, and political constituencies. Competing economic and racial 
ideologies among working class and poor Whites upstate challenged officials promising 
the economic benefits of prison hosting. At its early stage during the late 1970s and early 
1980s, site selection was highly controversial. Many people upstate didn't want prisons in 
their neighborhoods. There was strong resistance from communities designated as sites; 
however their representatives, seeking the political dividends economic development 
would bring, typically requested consideration from the legislature regardless (Jacobs, 
1983). In spite of prison’s unpopularity with the public in the 1970s, there were strong 
political incentives for officials to support prison expansion. Republicans who supported 
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expansion typically represented impoverished counties upstate. Prison hosting as 
economic development would allow them to make claims of progress in a time of 
widespread fiscal crisis. These republicans held important positions related to prison 
expansion: in the New York State Assembly, upstate republicans presided over the Codes 
Committee, which makes crucial decisions about prison expansion, as they have 
jurisdiction over civil and criminal justice issues. Republican control over the Ways and 
Means committee was also important- it has jurisdiction over almost all appropriations. 
Furthermore, in the New York State senate, two important committees related to prison 
expansion are the Finance Committee and the Crime and Corrections Committee. All of 
the committee chairmen were Republicans, and supported prison expansion. Most 
legislators gave full support to the general expansion program and to bond issuing in 
particular as a finance scheme. Lastly, the commissioner of the powerful New York State 
Department of Correctional Services (NYSDOCS) and his staff toured the state making 
pro-bond speeches and launched a massive PR campaign touting the benefits of prison 
hosting (ibid). Therefore, in spite of resistance from upstate communities, political 
officials, while dominating the official policy instruments of expansion, simultaneously 
mobilized en masse to ‘sell’ prison hosting as the means to economic recovery.  
New York was not unique in its targeting of rural areas for prison development. 
Nationwide, since 1980, approximately 350 rural areas have sited prisons.  From 1980 to 
1991, 213 adult facilities were opened in rural areas. Between 1992 and 2002, another 83 
prisons opened in rural areas, constituting 60% of new prison construction during that 
period. New York State is one of the leaders in rural prison construction, as all 38 of its 
prisons that opened since 1982 are upstate, in rural counties (The Sentencing Project, 
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2003). The state closed a prison in the New York City area in 1984; after that, all prison 
siting happened upstate in rural areas (ibid). Land there was cheaper, and the powerful 
real estate industry in New York City wanted vacant land there for high-profit 
commercial development. As the prison building boom gained steam in the mid-1980s 
and 1990s, local officials upstate lobbied vociferously to have their districts sited for 
prison hosting while real estate elites vied for city land and subsidies for private 
development projects. The legislature, weighing costs and potential political dividends, 
would decide where to build them.  
In the early 1980s, prison building was full of promise, however false it would 
later turn out to be, and this rhetoric of promise was accompanied by the mobilization of 
political power. For instance, the NYDOCS estimated that the construction of the Upstate 
Correctional Facility in Malone, NY would bring in $56 million in wages. It eventually 
opened in 1999 with 367 jobs and another 55 expected to be created in the community, 
bringing in an annual payroll of $13 million. NYSDOCS also pledged to spend $11 
million upgrading water and sewer systems in the city (The Sentencing Project, 2003). 
Eventually, the rhetoric for expansion as economic development won over, and rural 
towns themselves came to compete and offer incentives to the state to develop there, such 
as free space, building infrastructure, and housing. Meanwhile, officials lobbied and 
wielded their influence to advantage their districts, which resulted in an uneven 
distribution of prison sites. There was a concentration of prisons in three Republican 
Senator's districts (4 in 10 of New York prisons). Senior State Senator Ronald Stafford- a 
key player in prison development upstate- gained over 12 prisons in his district of 6 
counties along Canadian border (The Sentencing Project, 2003). What the politicians and 
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prison towns did not know at the time, however, is that prison hosting would not in fact 
pay off in jobs or higher wages for the host community and that the costs of prison 
building, filling, and maintenance would be borne by the working class and poor for 
years to come. 
How prison building was funded 
Prior to the prison building boom upstate of the 1980s and 1990s, the state 
managed increased incarceration rates for some time by adding beds to existing prisons 
and renovating facilities like mental institutions into prisons (Jacobs, 1983). This reached 
its peak in 1978 when, facing a looming prison overcrowding crisis and increased 
pressure from the New York State Department of Correctional Services (NYSDOCS) to 
improve the work conditions of corrections officers, New York State sought to purchase 
Rikers Island from New York City. The city resisted (desperately in need of jail space 
itself) and the deal collapsed in 1980. As a result, the state sought out acquisitions and 
new construction elsewhere (ibid).  
In the late 1970s and early 80s, construction of a new prison cell in New York 
State cost approximately $70,000- no small sum for a state still recovering from the fiscal 
crisis of the mid-70s. Thus, prison building was extremely expensive and the state needed 
additional money beyond its own revenues to fund the construction and maintenance of 
prisons. The first proposal to issue bonds to finance prison construction surfaced in the 
New York State legislature in 1978, but was not passed until 1981 when they approved a 
$500 million bond issue by overwhelming majority in both the Senate and Assembly. The 
cost of construction would be spread over many years, minimizing the need for 
immediate cuts to other public programs- an aspect of such debt financing that appealed 
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to local officials struggling to balance local demands for public support with diminished 
revenues. Citizens groups, however, rallied against the proposal, and it was ultimately 
defeated by referendum vote in November. The bond was more successful in New York 
City, where it received 60% (ibid).  
The state faced a crisis in 1981 when 12,445 new people were admitted to prison 
due to more punitive ‘front end’ policies (criminalization, policing, adjudication 
processes), and releases declined due to stricter ‘back end’ policies regarding parole and 
probation, creating a net increase of 3,983 bodies- triple that of the previous year. To 
make matters worse, neither existing revenue nor the massive influx of private capital 
needed to construct new prisons were available. As a temporary fix, two abandoned air 
force bases, a closed college, and several mental health facilities were targeted for 
conversion into prisons. Because these transformations would only cost $24 million, the 
legislature approved the allocation and the move did not require vote by referendum, as 
the state would not be incurring a substantial long-term debt (ibid).  
In 1981, Governor Hugh Carey (governor of New York from 1975-1982) and the 
state legislature increased state investment in criminal justice capacity at state and local 
levels, tapping into money made available by cuts to various social programs, including 
CUNY and SUNY. He allocated more funding for prison construction, as well as more 
money for state prosecutors and local law enforcement (Weimann and Weiss, 2009). 
What emerges here is a picture of more or less simultaneous increased investment in 
prison building and renovation, the funding and expansion of policing apparatuses, and 
shifts in the social meaning of deviant behavior as drug use and dealing were increasingly 
criminalized. For instance, while Governor Carey increased state funding for prison 
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construction projects by cutting social welfare expenditures, he also rolled out a new state 
and local police initiative focused on targeting drug trafficking in cities, particularly in 
public spaces. He even developed a special police unit targeting low-level users. There 
followed an increased allocation of funds and resources towards misdemeanor offenses, 
which previously had been punishable by fines, or at most probation (ibid). This 
increased emphasis on policing and punishing drug misdemeanors in impoverished urban 
neighborhoods translated to the increased criminalization of poor people of color and the 
proliferation of criminalization’s requisite racist ideologies. A clearer image emerges of 
how political economic projects walk hand in hand with racial projects of control, as the 
increasingly carceral New York State not only sanctions but contributes, by way of an 
interlocking nexus of economic and crime control policies, to impoverishment, 
community disinvestment, segregation, criminalization, unequal education, and 
disenfranchisement- in short, the unequal distribution of harm along lines of race and 
class. 
Accommodating the new populations brought into the system required built 
space, and Governor Carey’s reallocation of public funds did not provide sufficient 
capital to create the new physical infrastructure required to support the emerging carceral 
state. Thus most prison expansion, prior to 1983, continued to involve the conversion of 
existing state facilities (Jacobs, 1983). To transform this surplus infrastructure, the 
NYSDOCS relied on existing state revenues for prison expansion, but, due to limited 
funds and the temporary unpopularity of prison expansion, they had to find creative ways 
to move money around in order to make the project feasible. The NYSDOCS needed 
legislative approval to acquire a site for a prison; however they could move funds around 
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without approval, from one account that was full into another that might be empty. For 
example, in 1978 the state legislature appropriated $1.9 million for capital improvements 
to permit NYSDOCS to expand prison capacity by 3000 beds. NYSDOCS used this 
money to purchase new sites like mental hospitals, and renovate them into penal 
facilities. When the money ran out, they were able to transfer capital appropriations 
designed for other purposes to refill this fund, and continue expansion without needing 
further legislative approval (ibid). In this way, the NYSDOCS was able to grow prisons 
by reallocating funds, and thus bypass legislative approval and the tumultuous politics of 
prison expansion.  
As mentioned earlier, in the spring of 1981, the Security Through the 
Development of Correctional Facilities Bond Act of 1981 was introduced in the New 
York State Senate. It proposed to sell bonds for construction of 3 new prisons to house 
1500 inmates upstate, in Wallkill, Woodburne, and Coxsackie, as well as allocating 
additional money for state troopers and juvenile correction facility expansion. It was 
narrowly defeated in a referendum vote that November (The Sentencing Project, 2003; 
Morrell, 2012). After the defeat of the bond, the New York State legislature agreed to 
fund the construction of three maximum-security prisons out of its own general revenue- 
revenue accrued by way of cuts to other social expenditures. Once that money ran out, 
they funded a large-scale acquisitions program, as acquiring and renovating existing 
infrastructure was far cheaper than building new prisons and circumvented the racial 
politics of prison siting (Jacobs, 1983). This kind of maneuvering, however, would not 
last long- both the state and the city were on the verge of a prison overcrowding crisis.  
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Prisons in New York State are generally used for people sentenced to a term 
longer than one year. Prisons are state run; jails are county or city run. The prison 
crowding crisis that New York State faced in the late 1970s and early 1980s meant the 
state had to figure out how to: a) ensure safe, tightly controlled prisons, which becomes 
difficult with too many prisoners; and b) provide enough beds for those sentenced to 
prison terms. The state then can either send less people to prison, sentence offenders to 
shorter terms, and/or expand prison capacity. The outcome depends on power struggles 
over how the crisis is constructed, and who or what is blamed as the crises’ author. There 
emerges a struggle between the state and city, as the state blames the city for the 
prisoners it produces and whom the state must act as custodian for, and the city blames 
the state for not taking on its share of prisoners. There also emerges a conflict between 
the state and the counties, as the state seeks to use county jails to house its prisoners 
because of overcrowding (Jacobs, 1983). Thus, the prison building boom is in part a 
product of intergovernmental political-economic conflicts, and expansion becomes an 
increasingly viable and desirable solution to social, political, and economic problems. 
For example, in 1975 a conflict emerged between New York State and New York 
City. Inmates at Rikers Island, a city jail, sued the city saying it was unconstitutionally 
overcrowded. The city had to reduce the prison population and drew the state into the 
lawsuit, blaming it for not taking custody of felons who would normally be the state’s 
responsibility. New York State, however, wouldn't take them because state prisons were 
already too crowded. Finally, the federal court ordered the state to take those inmates for 
whom it had actual beds, leaving the surplus to languish in crowded and dangerous 
conditions at Rikers (ibid). The pressure for prison expansion at the state level thus rises 
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in part out of the complex relationship among fiscally and spatially strained city 
governments. One can see how New York City, emerging from the fiscal crisis of the mid 
1970s, would seek to alleviate public expenditures by freeing up prison space in Rikers, 
shifting responsibility for inmates onto the state. One can also imagine how such a fiscal 
strain could incentivize harsher sentencing in the city’s courts, as sentencing more people 
to longer terms would force the state to take custody of a greater share of the city’s 
prisoners. These ongoing intergovernmental conflicts gave way to short-term, surplus 
infrastructure acquisition and renovation-oriented solutions as New York State, housing 
more and more prisoners and with limited funds and space to do so, sought out a cheap 
fix to the problem of prison overcrowding. These tactics, however, would not be able to 
sustain the swelling prison population for long. The inchoate carceral state needed a way 
for built space to keep pace with the influx of human bodies, and to do so would require a 
rethinking of prison funding schemes. 
There were 29 new prisons built under the leadership of Mario Cuomo (governor 
of New York State 1983-1994) (Schlosser, 1998; Morrell, 2012). During the prison 
building boom of the mid 1980s and 1990s, the New York State Urban Development 
Corporation (UDC) was the main vehicle for capital investment in the state. The UDC, 
though framed as a vehicle for the renewal of disinvested, deteriorating urban space, was 
generally used as a gentrification apparatus to fund the development of urban space for 
middle class, upper class, and business elites’ use and interests, e.g. the “revitalization” of 
Times Square and Bryant Park, as well as the “renewal” of neighborhoods like the Lower 
East Side and Park Slope in Brooklyn (Smith,1996; the Sentencing Project, 2003). The 
Cuomo administration, desperate for novel ways to deal with prison overcrowding, 
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managed to transform it into an instrument for financing economic development in rural 
areas upstate via prison construction 
 Following the defeat of the bond Act in 1981, Cuomo exploited a loophole in the 
UDC structure which allowed him to use it as a tool for selling municipal bonds without 
popular approval via referendum
1
. In the 1970s, legitimate use of UDC was broadly 
defined; however in the early 1980s Vincent Tese took over as director and set a new 
agenda for NYS: the UDC was to be a vehicle for advancing the interests of businesses 
elites via facilitating tax abatements and relaxed labor regulations as a solution to fiscal 
crisis. In a classic example of Harcourt’s (2011) concept of neoliberal penality, Tese and 
Cuomo emphasized the use of the deregulated private sector to improve the economy, 
yet, at the same time, one of the main functions of the UDC in early 80s was the debt-
financed public funding of prison construction (Morrell, 2012). In 1983, the legislature 
approved the initiative to fund prison expansion by selling UDC bonds and the prison 
building boom was born (The Sentencing Project, 2003). 
The economic bubbles and bursts of the 1990s did little to slow prison expansion 
and in fact were part and parcel of the expanding carceral state. Economic changes that 
produced fewer and fewer entry level jobs, at the same time that neoliberal rollbacks of 
the welfare state were taking place, ushered forth a staggering increase of urban poverty 
and incarceration. Financed by increased borrowing, from 1988 to 1998, New York 
State’s prison expenses surged, while social expenditures for the state and city’s working 
                                                        
1 The New York State constitution had required referendum vote to approve the state 
taking on large scale, long-term debt, which resulted in the defeat of the Security 
Through the Development of Correctional Facilities Bond Act of 1981. Cuomo’s use of 
the UDC to sell bonds for prison construction allowed him to bypass the political 
resistance of white voters upstate. 
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class and poor suffered devastating cuts. For instance, while public university operating 
budgets decreased by 29%, funding for prisons increased by 76%. NYSDOCS saw a 
$761 million increase during that time while funding for SUNY and CUNY declined by 
$615 million. In 1988, New York State spent more than twice as much on universities 
than prisons, and by 1998 it was spending $275 million more on prisons than on SUNY 
and CUNY. This increase in prison spending, however, reflects only existing corrections 
operating costs- it does not count an additional $300 million of the 1998 state budget 
approved for developing 3,100 new prison spaces that year (Center on Juvenile and 
Criminal Justice, 1998). The trend of cutting public educational expenditures while 
expanding prison funding started with Cuomo, before Pataki took office in 1995, 
however it accelerated greatly during Pataki’s term. For instance, in 1995, as Pataki was 
taking office, New York State ranked 45th of all states in terms of per capita state 
appropriations for higher education, even though it has the 4th highest per capita income 
in the nation. However, during Pataki’s years as governor, New York State saw spending 
on prisons exceed that of higher education for the first time in its history (ibid).  
During Pataki’s term as governor, New York State saw a decrease in violent 
offenders from 35 percent to 27 percent. 62.5 percent of people sent to prison in New 
York in 1997 were convicted of nonviolent offenses, mostly drug related. There were 
22,670 drug offenders in New York State prison system- one third of the entire prison 
population (Center on Juvenile and Criminal Justice, 1998). The fiscal incentives for cuts 
in social expenditures were powerful, as it cost the state over $680 million/year to keep 
these non-violent offenders in prison. As such, Pataki raised SUNY tuition by $750 per 
year. With tuition rising above the rate of inflation, the following year SUNY enrollment 
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dropped by 10,000 students. Today, there are more African American (34,809) and 
Latino (22,421) prisoners than there are students at SUNY (27,925 and 17,845 
respectively). Furthermore, the state shifted more of the costs of running CUNY to New 
York City and its students. The state’s share of the CUNY budget dropped from 76.7 
percent to 49 percent, while the share of CUNY budget covered by tuition and other fees 
increased from 18 percent to 47 percent. From 1988 to 1998, tuition at CUNY had nearly 
doubled (ibid).  
In conclusion, the fact that disinvestment in public higher education coincided 
with massive increases in investment in prison building and maintenance is but one 
example of the interconnectedness of the growing carceral state and the neoliberal 
restructuring of New York that occurred in the 1980s and 1990s. I explore this 
interconnectedness in more detail in the following chapters. This period also saw 
extensive cuts to healthcare, welfare supports, public housing, fire departments, and 
public k-12 education. Unemployment, low wage work, and homelessness increased. As 
New York City was increasingly transformed into a financial economy, inequality grew 
to new proportions. Why did social problems and their solutions come to take the shape 
they did? Why did the city and state seek to expand prisons rather than address the root 
problems of criminalization and poverty that were landing so many people behind bars in 
the first place? Why was poverty managed by policing and incarceration rather than 
increased investment in urban and rural communities? If offenders were primarily 
underemployed and unemployed poor people of color, why didn’t the state and city seek 
to create jobs with livable wages for this surplus population, rather than pursuing 
strategies of criminalization and incarceration? The following section seeks to explore 
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these questions by looking at the political economy of New York City in the aftermath of 
the 1975 fiscal crisis to tease out how expanding mass incarceration in New York State 
was part and parcel of its neoliberal restructuring.  
Crime Control and Restructuring in New York City 
In his influential study of gentrification in New York City and abroad, Neil Smith 
(1996) describes how “frontier discourse” made gentrification possible by drawing on the 
criminalization of inner city drug use to construct a mythically wild urban landscape that 
could be legitimately “conquered” by investors and developers. Just as criminalization 
naturalized urban poverty and the dismantling of welfare supports, it also produced the 
ideological conditions that made the dispossession and displacement of poor people of 
color possible. Furthermore, policing and incarceration were used to manage and contain 
displaced populations while elites sucked massive profits out of newly renovated 
properties. Gentrification is just one example of how neoliberal practices of 
dispossession, privatization, austerity, and social control transformed everyday life in 
New York City beginning in the mid-1970s. This shift to neoliberalism was neither 
sudden nor inevitable- rather, it was an ongoing process of what Mollenkopf and Castells 
(1997) describe as “restructuring.” As changes in global capitalism pushed post-industrial 
New York City further away from manufacturing, the city’s political economy became 
increasingly characterized by economic competition with other “global cities” (Sassen, 
2001), global flows of capital, knowledge, and labor (Appadurai, 1996), technological 
innovation, especially in telecommunications, real estate speculation and development, 
and, perhaps most importantly, the incredible power of FIRE (finance, investment, and 
real estate) to reshape the politics, built environment, and everyday life of the city 
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(Mollenkopf and Castells, 1997; Sassen, 2001; Moody, 2007). The restructuring of New 
York City transformed urban (and consequently rural) space and place and involved new 
prescriptions as to whose space and place it was, and what kinds of activities and 
behaviors would be promoted, tolerated, or punished. These political economic changes 
and their spatial iterations had profound effects on the unequal distribution of wealth and 
harm, by and large along lines of race, as disproportionate numbers of African Americans 
and Latinos were excluded from the occupations that emerged in the post-industrial 
economy, wages fell, and public resources and services were slashed. Furthermore, 
restructuring was part of a wider reassertion of class power, as elite interests colonized 
political processes and came to dominate the thrust of social policies in multiple arenas 
(Harvey, 2005). What then was to become of the swelling numbers of the dispossessed, 
the unemployed, the homeless? How would neoliberalism’s discontents be neutralized or 
managed? How would the city balance the instability and periodic crises caused by profit 
extraction with capital’s need for a modicum of social stability and control? This section 
traces the neoliberal restructuring of New York City back to the fiscal crisis of 1975, and 
explores the roles of criminalization and mass incarceration in the political economic 
transformations that facilitated the reassertion of elite class power. This will set the stage 
for the analysis of drug courts in the next chapter, as I consider how neoliberal solutions 
to problems caused by neoliberal restructuring are dreamt up and deployed.  
The role of the state under neoliberalism is to “create and preserve an institutional 
framework” that protects the free market and property rights, and that opens up new 
markets where previously there were none (Harvey, 2005, pg. 7). The framework 
required to do this work is vast and ranges from financial institutions, arrangements, and 
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laws to infrastructure like schools, roads, bridges, and police. Neoliberalization involves 
what Harvey (2005, 2007) refers to as “creative destruction,” as old institutional 
frameworks, powers, and social relations are destroyed or remade and new ones are 
developed. The New York City fiscal crisis of the mid-1970s engendered a massive 
project of creative destruction, setting the stage for a wide scale restructuring of the city 
according to a new political economic agenda, and, as such, a massive overhaul in the 
way the city was run. 
New York City has always been an important part of the overall political 
economy; it’s embedded in it, regionally, nationally, globally. In capitalism, the structure 
and functioning of cities are “rooted in the production, reproduction, circulation, and 
overall organization of the capital accumulation process” (Child Hill in Tabb, 1984, pg. 
214). These processes give the city its overall shape in terms of built environment and 
geographic patterns, and the relationships of capital accumulation mix with racial 
dynamics and conflicts to create an urban landscape where wealth and harm are 
distributed by and large along lines of race. New York City’s vitality in the 1960s and 
1970s rested on its location and role in the geographic circulation of surplus capital and 
labor, as well as its ability to balance the needs of capital for profit and social control 
with the demands of organized labor and the civil rights movement for a more equitable 
distribution of wealth. To maintain its vitality, a certain kind of city emerged- a welfare 
state characterized by certain kinds of relationships, policies, and infrastructure that 
would, ideally, facilitate profit-making while working towards racial and economic 
justice. 
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 Similar to Harvey’s description of the role of the neoliberal state, welfare-era 
New York provided a production site for capital accumulation by elites as labor was 
reproduced, commodities circulated and were consumed (creating profit while 
reproducing labor), and government provided the infrastructure and social controls 
needed to maintain and manage these relationships. Included in the physical and social 
infrastructure, however, were a host of regulations, protections, resources, and public 
services that sought to incorporate minority groups into the city’s economic and political 
life and draw on the city coffers to meet the basic needs of its poorest and most 
marginalized individuals and families. As such, the city government did not lend itself 
completely to capital accumulation, tempered as it was by the powerful unrest, activism, 
and unionism of the 1960s, nor could it lend itself wholly to economic and racial justice, 
dependent as it was on the private sector for revenue, political support, and employment. 
Because the tendency for capital is to foist as many costs as possible onto the state and to 
keep as much profit as it can, a contradiction emerges within urbanization as expenditures 
outpace revenues. That is, the fiscal crisis emerged in part because of increased demand 
for social expense outlays (e.g. social services to the poor) which do not directly or 
indirectly generate increased profits for capital, while at the same time the city lacked the 
revenue needed for social capital outlays that would help increase profits, such as tax 
abatements and subsidies (ibid). 
As Tabb (1984) points out, the New York City fiscal crisis was not caused by 
swelling welfare rolls and money-hungry municipal unions; rather it was produced by the 
movement of capital and jobs out of the city, as well as the effort by elites to transform 
New York into “the world corporate capital” (p. 241). Increases in imports grew in the 
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1960s and this worked against New York-based firms. Many clothing shops in Manhattan 
closed, as did factories and breweries in Brooklyn, and even the Brooklyn Navy Yard 
shut down in 1966. Furthermore, the role of the port diminished, as there was greater and 
cheaper space for warehouses and port-based industries in Newark, New Jersey. As a 
result, tens of thousands of dockworkers and warehouse employees lost their jobs in the 
1970s. To add insult to injury, the decline in port and other industries led to a fall in 
employment for both rail and highway transportation jobs, and warehouse work in 
general (Weil, 2004). Summarizing Tabb’s (1984) analysis, the crisis took shape as 
follows: First, though their power grew exponentially after the crisis, bankers were 
already in control of the city’s political economy. They encouraged debt throughout the 
1960s because it was profitable. The money the city borrowed, however, did not go to 
welfare or unions, but rather was funneled into the corporate transformation of New York 
into a global city in terms of financialization, central business district (CBD) 
development, and infrastructural development like telecommunications, highways, and 
public transportation hubs which facilitated capital accumulation. Second, as deregulated 
industries moved to areas with lower rents and cheaper and more docile labor, 
unemployment surged. The city lost 542,000 jobs between 1969 and 1976, which, 
coupled with the flight of the white upper and middle classes to the suburbs, caused a 
drastic loss in revenues. Third, federal aid to the city dwindled as funding moved into 
developing the Sunbelt and the suburbs, encouraging industries and people of means to 
move there. Revenues dried up just as the need for services was exploding. The city was 
borrowing to cover its operating expenses and to pay interest on existing loans. As New 
York spiraled into insolvency, the banks cut it off as the risk of further loans outweighed 
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their potential profit and, as Harvey (2005) puts it, “ in 1975, a powerful cabal of 
investment bankers… refused to roll over the debt and pushed the city into technical 
bankruptcy” (pg. 45). 
By blaming the fiscal crisis on welfare recipients and municipal unions, banks and 
business elites were able to accomplish multiple goals. First, they were able to shift the 
blame for the crisis onto its victims, exonerating themselves and externalizing the social 
and economic costs. Second, this framing of the crisis allowed elites to push the city and 
state to enact austerity measures which would funnel even more money away from the 
public and into the private sector, whether it be for paying off interest or for subsidizing 
private development. Third, the austerity measures and mass unemployment disciplined 
labor and, as racial justice was married to the welfare state, austerity in the name of 
reducing welfare costs further aggravated the racial tensions that undermined working 
class solidarities. Finally, following Harvey (2005), the city’s overwhelming debt 
provided further political leverage for the banks as “the bail-out that followed entailed the 
construction of new institutions that took over management of the city budget…This 
amounted to a coup by the financial institutions against the democratically elected 
government of New York City” as “wealth was distributed to the upper classes in the 
midst of a fiscal crisis” and the class power of elites was restored (pgs. 45-46).  
Criminalization of low level drug users and dealers was part of a constellation of 
strategies undertaken by the city and state as it created the conditions needed to restore 
class power of elites and maintain private capital accumulation. As neoliberal 
restructuring increased unemployment, low wage precarious work, and poverty in 
general, there was the threat of a restive surplus population to deal with. As Child Hill (in 
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Tabb, 1984) notes, “Expansion in central-city government has been, among other things, 
a safety valve. It has been a sponge absorbing part of the relative surplus population 
fostered by the dynamics of monopoly capital accumulation” (pg. 225). One form taken 
by the surplus population absorption made possible by criminalization was a surge in the 
police force. Between 1981 and 1988, Mayor Koch expanded the NYPD by 19% using 
state and federal assistance, and a tax base funded by economic recovery and fiscal 
reforms (Weimann and Weiss, 2009). The hiring of 12,000 new officers provided a 
number of working class whites, but also an increasing number of African Americans, 
Latinos, and Chinese, with stable, full time employment (White, 2011). This absorption 
also took for its form the “prison-filling project” described by Gilmore (2007). That is, 
imprisonment physically removed the surplus population from the city and contained 
them in prisons upstate. Thus, in the aftermath of the New York City fiscal crisis, the 
“sponge” that once was municipal employment in the welfare state was transformed into 
the sponge of policing and mass incarceration.  
Second, the criminalization of poor people of color provided an important 
ideological buttress for the neoliberal transformations of urban space of the 1980s and 
90s, which were essential to the reassertion of elite class power. The criminalization of 
African Americans and Latinos was an important building block constructing the 
discourse of urban decline- a discourse which “functions ideologically to shape our 
attention, provide reasons for how we should react in response, and convey a 
comprehensible, compelling, and reassuring story of the fate of the twentieth-century city 
in the United States” (Beauregard, 1993, pg. xi). As Neil Smith points out, this discourse 
was the dominant way of representing urban space and life in the 1980s and 1990s, and 
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provided the discursive foundation for the “renewal” promised by gentrification. Smith 
defines gentrification as “the process… by which poor and working-class neighborhoods 
in the inner city are refurbished via an influx of private capital and middle-class 
homebuyers and renters- neighborhoods that had previously experienced disinvestment 
and a middle-class exodus” (Smith, 1996, pg. 32). The reassertion of elite class power, as 
it manifested vis-à-vis investment in and control over built space as described by Smith, 
required a discursive foundation that would a) entitle elites to the space; b) delegitimize 
or crowd out the claims of those who were already living in soon to be gentrified areas; c) 
obfuscate the political economic sources of the disinvestment that devalued property and 
made gentrification possible (ibid); and d) legitimize the shift in municipal spending 
away from welfare supports for the poor and towards subsidizing real estate renewal and 
development projects.  
The movement of the unregulated private sector into low-wage areas, the flight of 
upper and middle class whites to the suburbs, and the re-orienting of municipal finance 
priorities left in their wake a host of social problems and a dwindling tax base with which 
to deal with them (Tabb, 1982, 1984). The construction of the African American and 
Latino drug user and dealer, rather than the political economy, as the cause of these urban 
social problems positioned them as central players in the pervasive discourse of “urban 
decay” (Smith, 1996) that legitimized urban renewal and other real estate development 
projects. In other words, drug users were figured as “the problem” at the heart of urban 
decay, not disinvestment. In the 1980s, as federal drug war money poured into the NYPD 
and New York State re-tooled its borrowing capacity to construct new prisons, mass 
incarceration emerged as an imagined “geographic solution” (Gilmore, 2007) to this 
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problem. The targeting by police of drug users and low level dealers and their removal 
from urban spaces obfuscated and displaced the political economic roots of deteriorating 
urban spaces while simultaneously bolstering the “frontier discourse” which legitimized 
the conquest of this urban “wilderness” by elites, entitling them to the potential profits 
that lay waiting to be extracted (Smith, 1996, pg. xiv).   
Furthermore, criminalization facilitated the dispossession of poor people of color 
of public housing and of tax money as public funds were increasingly used to help 
finance private development. In 1979, 38.5% of subsidized housing recipients were 
African American. In 1982, Reagan terminated most federal funding for new construction 
of subsidized housing and raised the price of existing housing by 5% (Quadagno, 1996). 
As federal aid for public housing fell, the city increasingly turned to privatization 
schemes to convert public housing into profit generating real estate. The city owned 60% 
of the housing stock in Harlem, for example, which Mayor Koch targeted for 
redevelopment as reductions in federal aid led to increased private sector investment and 
public private partnerships (Smith, 1996). In addition, federal urban development funds 
fell from $19.8 billion in 1980 to $8.7 billion in 1990. In 1980, one out of every five 
dollars the city spent came from the federal government; by 1990 it was one out of every 
ten. As a result, central business district (CBD) development was funded by a mix of 
public money (tax breaks and subsidies) and private dollars directed at projects initiated 
by developers, bankers, finance, and corporations (Moody, 2007). New York City’s poor 
faced massive cuts to public housing at the same time that more and more public money 
was being funneled into subsidizing the CBD development that, alongside gentrification, 
would confer the dominance of elites over built space in the city throughout the 1980s 
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and 1990s and into the new millennium. At the same time, the expansion and 
empowerment of the NYPD resulted in the emergence of new policing tactics like 
“broken windows,” stop and frisk, and hot spots (White, 2011) which brought more and 
more poor people of color into the criminal justice system, packing the courts and filling 
prison beds. These developments in policing, coupled with the criminalization and 
incarceration of African Americans made possible by the legal infrastructure of the 
Rockefeller Drug Laws and the physical infrastructure of the prison building projects 
upstate, produced a discursive and structural nexus which enacted the “revanchism” 
described by Smith (1996), allowing the punishment of the poor for the problems created 
by their poverty to be construed as “just deserts” and producing the physical means of 
harassing and containing them (pg. 213).  
Following Smith (1996), criminalization provided an “enemy within,” whose 
existence could be drawn upon to create an urban mythology that justified the dominance 
of elites over built space in particular, and the city’s political and economic agenda in 
general. Furthermore, the acceleration of spatial dispossession in the city, accompanied 
by intensified CBD development, required the increased impoverishment and exclusion 
of the dispossessed. The varied institutions, practices, and discourses that make up the 
regime of mass incarceration provided novel ways to manage surplus populations, 
neutralize discontentment and resistance, and legitimize dispossession. The regime of 
mass incarceration enacted a multifaceted victim-blaming complex that constructed its 
subjects with one hand while pursuing and punishing them with the other. It eroded white 
working class and middle class empathy for poor people of color by treating them as 
what it said they were in a profoundly dehumanizing conferment of criminality, 
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aggravating white supremacy as it broke up working class solidarity. The regime of mass 
incarceration reconstructed criminality in a way that was ideologically useful to elites as 
they reclaimed their entitlement and privilege by mobilizing an alternative vision of the 
state based on increased social control (Beckett, 2000) and embodying a neoliberal 
hegemony that economically polarized the city and distributed wealth up the social ladder 





















Refining the Carceral State: Drug Court Reform and the Expanding Drug War 
This chapter examines the emergence of New York City’s drug court reforms as a 
case study to examine how the carceral state was able to adapt to the political, racial, and 
economic crises that accompanied mass incarceration of the drug war. It begins with an 
overview of drug courts and the “drug court paradigm,” and situates them within the legal 
and discursive architecture of the expanding carceral state. Drug court reform is usually 
framed by its critics and proponents alike as a response to the mass incarceration brought 
on by the drug war. In contrast, this analysis looks at how drug court proliferation has 
been part and parcel of the drug war as the machinery of the carceral state was realigned 
and fine-tuned. It concludes with a critical analysis of recent drug court reforms to the 
Rockefeller Drug Laws, examining how they reproduce race, class, and gender inequality 
within the criminal justice system. 
Beginning in the late 1970s, federal, state, and private sector political economic 
pressures coupled with a renewed and reinvigorated discourse around the punitive, 
incapacitating functions of prison as a way of managing criminalized poor minorities. 
This resulted in a massive prison-building project and a prison-filling project 
characterized by mass arrests and incarceration for low-level drug related offenses 
(Garland, 2001, Gilmore, 2007). A tactic corollary to these projects was the emergence 
and expansion of ‘tough on crime’ rhetoric bolstered by zero-tolerance, minimum 
sentencing guidelines for offenders (Alexander, 2010). The war on drugs ushered in a 
period of crime control reform that repudiated rehabilitative ideals and approaches to 
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managing the deviance of the poor at the same time that neoliberal politics “hardened” 
social divisions and reinforced stratification (Garland, 2001, p. 101). Drug courts 
emerged in the mid-1990s within an increasingly neoliberalized state, rife with inequality 
and marked by an expanding drug war, a growing crisis of prison overcrowding, and 
alarm at the fiscal burdens of mass incarceration.  
Though merely punitive incarceration was the primary strategy of the drug war, 
rehabilitation did not disappear altogether; rather it entered into an era that sociologists 
Jonathan Simon and Malcolm Feeley (1992) termed the new penology. In this phase, 
managerial and actuarial discourses and practices dominated, characterized by the 
efficiency-oriented categorizing and punishing of deviants according to their perceived 
level of risk. The goal of rehabilitating the individual was transformed into the goal of 
identifying and managing unruly groups. Under the new penology, rehabilitation, 
alongside incarceration, served to expand the scope and reach of the criminal justice 
system, allowing for an increasing number of people to be controlled, normalized, and 
punished in a more efficient way. Though drug courts do indeed expand the regime of 
mass incarceration, they do not fit neatly within the conceptual apparatus of the new 
penology because they embody a pair of important contradictions. First, they manage 
group categories constructed by risk assessment while at the same time seeking to treat 
and transform individuals. Second, they draw on a notion of rehabilitation that is 
simultaneously punitive and therapeutic. As Rebecca Tiger (2013) put it in her 
ethnography of drug court proponents, “We are in a moment of dual and contradictory 
approaches to punishment” (p. 56). These contradictions have not undermined the drug 
court movement; rather they have allowed drug courts to gain the bipartisan political and 
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economic support needed to proliferate in the harsh neoliberal terrain of the last few 
decades.   
James L. Nolan (2001) problematically frames drug courts as a “social 
movement,” even though it was spearheaded by privileged, insider judges who were 
frustrated with prevalent models of adjudicating drug addicts. The drug court reform 
movement, Nolan argues, gained steam as activist judges pushed for a new model that 
would mitigate flooded courtrooms, overcrowded prisons, and reverse the 
disempowerment of judges that resulted from drug policies like New York’s Rockefeller 
Drug Laws and their mandatory sentencing for drug offenses. According to the New 
York State Unified Court System (2013), New York State “leads the nation in the 
expansion and implementation of drug courts into daily court operations” with 148 drug 
courts in operation statewide. Since New York’s first drug courts arrived in Rochester 
and Brooklyn in the mid-1990s through March 2013, an estimated 77,209 offenders have 
participated in New York State drug courts, and 33,477 have graduated (Feinblatt et al., 
2000; nycourts.gov).   
This chapter will draw on a mix of critical theory and political economy to look 
beyond Nolan’s (2001) emphasis on the efforts of activist judges to focus instead on how 
social forces and transformations converge within the representation of drug courts. I will 
analyze how such reform is imagined and presented as a solution to social problems 
caused by poverty and criminalization. What is the relationship between drug courts and 
the racialized political economy of neoliberal New York? How do they fit? Eschewing 
Nolan’s notion of drug courts as a “social movement,” I will instead focus on the 
relationship between drug courts and the expansion of the drug war that took place in the 
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1990s. I will explore the role of drug courts in supplementing and refining the carceral 
state, and the ways in which they contribute to the unequal distribution of harm along 
lines of race, class, and gender.  
The Drug Court Paradigm 
The first drug court opened in Dade County, in Miami, Florida, in 1989. Drug 
courts are now in every state, and there are over 2,100 in operation (Drug Policy 
Alliance, 2011). Spearheaded in part by then Florida State Attorney Janet Reno, drug 
courts spread as powerful judges and other proponents organized, tapped into federal 
funding, and embarked on massive PR campaigns and “blitzes.” Drug court proponents 
see the courts as revolutionizing the criminal justice system, addressing the social 
problem of drug abuse while providing an alternative to the failures of mass 
incarceration. Drug courts sought to address, in novel ways, the failure of traditional 
approaches in addressing the “underlying problem,” as New York State Chief Judge 
Judith Kaye puts it: 
Not surprisingly, in many of today’s cases, the traditional approach yields 
unsatisfying results. The addict arrested for drug dealing is adjudicated, does time, 
then goes right back to dealing on the street… Every legal right of the litigants is 
protected, all the procedures followed, yet we aren’t making a dent in the 
underlying problem. Not good for the parties involved. Not good for the 
community. Not good for the court (Chief Judge Judith Kaye, Second Annual 
State of the Judiciary Address, February 8, 1999, as quoted in Feinblatt et al., 
2000). 
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Drug courts appeared to be a sensible alternative to the unpopular aspects of mass 
incarceration: incarceration was not necessarily getting people off of drugs, nor did its 
ever-looming threat work to prevent drug use; mandatory sentencing laws were bloating 
prisons and straining the economy; and mass incarceration was damaging poor minority 
communities (O’Hear, 2009). Imprisonment, drug court proponents claim, has merely 
increased the prison population without stemming the number of drug-related crimes and 
drug law violations. The drug court model, in comparison, is a self-proclaimed 
progressive, even radical departure from the punitive status quo of the criminal justice 
system (Tiger, 2013). Drug courts are essentially “designed to ameliorate the impact of 
drug sentencing policy on individual drug users” by providing a “safety valve for the 
cycle of incarceration-release-recidivism that filled prisons with low-level drug users” 
(Miller, 2009, pg.101). By steering some drug users away from incarceration, and using 
therapeutic jurisprudence instead of traditional criminal justice approaches to addiction, 
drug courts claim great success at reducing recidivism (repeat offenses) and thereby 
easing prison overcrowding and mitigating the fiscal burdens of mass incarceration. The 
Center for Court Innovation, a prominent criminal justice reform organization and 
vociferous advocate of drug courts, provides a typical framing of how these justifications 
are mobilized to advance drug court proliferation: 
An emerging body of evidence credits them with keeping offenders in treatment, 
substantially reducing drug use and rates of re-arrest during the period of program 
participation, and generating large savings in avoided jail and prison costs. 
Though less conclusive, there is also strong evidence to suggest that drug courts 




Therapeutic jurisprudence involves the use of legal actions (rewards, the threat of 
imprisonment) to elicit a cognitive, emotional, and behavioral re-orientation from the 
participant, ultimately resulting in abstinence and a crime-free lifestyle (Nolan, 2001). 
Therapeutic jurisprudence lies at the heart of drug court practice and is grounded in a 
hybrid version of the medical and criminal models of viewing addiction, where addiction 
is seen as a disease, and crime as its symptom. According to drug court advocates and 
judges Peggy Hora and William Schma (1998), the “traditional criminal justice 
paradigm” views addiction as “a willful choice made by an offender capable of choosing 
between right and wrong.” The drug court paradigm, by contrast, views addiction as a 
“biopsychosocial disease” whereby biological, psychological, and social factors interact 
in the construction of the addicted person (ibid, pg.13). Therapeutic jurisprudence is 
based on “the extent to which substantive rules, legal procedures, and the roles of lawyers 
and judges produce therapeutic or antitherapeutic consequences for individuals involved 
in the legal process” (ibid, pg. 442). In this model, instead of going to prison as per the 
traditional paradigm, defendants report regularly to a drug court that oversees the 
treatment of their disease and monitors them for any suspected criminal activity. The 
court acts as a therapeutic state agent: the disease of addiction will be cured by a 
treatment team headed by an all-powerful judge who combines rewards and punishments 
to incentivize the drug user to complete court-mandated treatment. Completion of the 
mandated treatment regime results in “graduation” from drug court. Failure to comply 
can result in a variety of sanctions, including extensive prison time.  
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Drug courts generally adhere to a shared core of principles, practices, styles, and 
structures (Nolan, 2001). Drug courts merge medical, therapeutic, and punitive models of 
constructing and handling the social problem of addiction, which results in increased 
criminal justice oversight of defendants. That is, where traditional criminal justice is by 
and large limited to the punitive domain, drug courts expand the reach of the criminal 
justice system into more areas of a person’s life, surveilling and managing medical and 
therapeutic aspects of life that are not typically targeted by the policing functions of 
criminal justice agencies, such as attitudes and language, educational achievements, 
employment, and even one’s style of dress (Brooklyn Treatment Court Policies). This 
expansion is predicated on the notion that the disease of addiction causes crime, and as 
such the coercive power of the court needs to be used to treat the disease (Tiger, 2013). 
The main idea, as echoed by the Center for Court Innovation (2000), is that “coercion 
works” (pg. 283). Because drug addiction is viewed as a chronic disease that obstructs 
self-control of behavior (Drug Policy Alliance, 2011), and addiction is all encompassing, 
“treating the disease” means that the court must address “broad swaths” of defendants’ 
lives. Furthermore, because relapse is seen as a natural part of recovery within this 
model, there is a need for sustained intervention (usually at least a year) (Tiger, 2013, pg. 
4). The result, then, is a protracted and deep intervention by the drug courts into the 
everyday lives of defendants, such that intervening in “the offender’s anti-social lifestyle” 
becomes “the drug court’s core feature” (Miller, 2009, pg. 115). The drug court process, 
from referral to graduation, is structured around the organizing principle of therapeutic 
jurisprudence, and a defendant’s eligibility, as well as success or failure, hinges upon his 
amenability to the workings of this particular approach.  
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The therapeutic jurisprudence approach is centered on a judge who heads a 
treatment team (including psychologists, social workers, and lawyers) whose function is 
to intervene in the pathology of the disease of drug dependence. Typically, in exchange 
for a guilty plea, defendants found eligible will enter a drug court program as an 
alternative to a prison sentence. The drug court participant will be mandated to treatment 
(e.g. 12 steps, cognitive behavioral therapy, therapeutic community) that will be overseen 
by the judge and the treatment team. Under therapeutic jurisprudence, the judge’s job is 
not to determine guilt or innocence, but rather to heal the “perceived pathology” of drug 
addiction (Drug Policy Alliance, 2011, pg. 5) as it manifests in multiple spheres of a 
client’s life- education, work, family relationships, housing, and general attitudes. The 
goal of therapeutic jurisprudence is to “induce self-control and personal responsibility” 
through accountability and the motivating power of the judge (Miller, 2009, pg. 116). 
Within this framework, the judge’s power to heal stems from her position to mandate 
treatment and punish noncompliance with sanctions, and therefore, central to therapeutic 
jurisprudence is the understanding that fear of imprisonment motivates addicts to stay in 
treatment longer, as a Q&A handbook from the Misdemeanor Brooklyn Treatment Court 
Brooklyn reminds participants: 
Remember- You will need to do the hard work to change your lifestyle, but we 
will help you any way we can.  
And…Keep in Mind- If you continue to lead the lifestyle that led to your arrest, 
you put your sobriety and freedom at risk. You are likely to wind up in jail. 
  Incarceration then is a tool the court can use to support the addict’s recovery 
(“Brooklyn Treatment Court,” n.d.).  
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Crime is not simply some act to be punished, but rather is an opportunity to 
coerce addicts into treatment and push them towards recovery. By wedding treatment and 
coercion in this way, crime is construed as a chance for the court to have an impact on the 
addict’s future (Tiger, 2013). As will be explored in greater detail later in this chapter, the 
ongoing criminalization of drug use, then, provides the discursive and structural supports 
that make drug courts possible. 
Eligibility, structure, and sanctions 
Drug courts deal mostly with adult offenders, but there are some juvenile courts 
and family courts (ibid). Drug court participants are typically arrested for both drug 
related crimes and drug law violations (Drug Policy Alliance, 2011; Tiger, 2013), e.g. a 
property violation or possession of an illicit drug. Most participants are there for low-
level drug law violations (such as petty possession). The majority of arrestees must plead 
guilty to the charges against them as a prerequisite for drug court eligibility (Drug Policy 
Alliance, 2011). Drug courts typically allow only nonviolent offenders and follow 
eligibility protocols that dictate how many prior nonviolent offenses arrestees can have 
and still be eligible (Nolan, 2001). As a general rule, courts admit only those amendable 
to treatment instead of prison, or, in other words, those found to be most likely to succeed 
within the drug court model. Though many defendants are rejected for capacity reasons, 
the prosecutor has the most power in determining who gets referred to drug court (Drug 
Policy Alliance, 2011). The Drug Policy Alliance (2011) has critiqued drug courts for 
“cherry picking,” choosing only those clients most likely to succeed (a small fraction of 
the people arrested for drug related offenses). Thus, drug courts focus on individuals who 
use drugs but have little to no history of serious offenses. Many are in for marijuana drug 
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law violations. Drug courts also tend to exclude people with prior treatment history and 
those with a mental illness.  
Once eligibility has been determined, there are two models for entering a drug 
court: pre-plea and post-plea. Pre-plea (also known as deferred prosecution) is when 
defendants enter mandated treatment before pleading guilty. Upon completion of 
treatment, the original charges are dismissed. Failure to complete treatment results in full 
prosecution for the original offense. Post-plea, the more common drug court protocol, is 
when defendants plead guilty before entering treatment: 
Eligible defendants are offered the opportunity to plead guilty to either a felony or 
a misdemeanor… with the promise that the sentence will be deferred to allow 
them to participate in treatment. Those defendants who comply with the court-
mandated treatment will have their guilty pleas vacated and the charges against 
them dismissed. Those defendants who fail to comply with the Court mandate 
will receive a sentence of incarceration. At the time of the plea, the Judge and the 
defendant sign a contract affirming this agreement 
(http://www.nycourts.gov/courts/2jd/brooklyntreatment/). 
Upon completion of the mandated treatment, the original sentence will be waived, or 
their record might be expunged. Failures to comply, however, result in increasingly 
severe sanctions that can add up to a substantial amount of time in jail while under the 
supervision of the drug court. For instance, in the Brooklyn Treatment Court, a client’s 
first sanction can get them 1-7 days in jail, the second sanction 1-14 days, third sanction 
8-14 days, fourth sanction 15-28 days, and with the fifth violation, “participation ends” 
and “jail sentence [is] imposed” (ibid). Thus, prior to even being kicked out and serving 
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the full sentence for the original offense, a drug court client can spend up to 63 days in 
jail. In addition, failure to complete treatment and expulsion from the drug court program 
often leads to a long prison sentence because, under the post-plea model, they have 
pleaded guilty to the original offense, as opposed to the shorter sentence the person might 
have received if they had had the chance to plead guilty to a lesser crime (Nolan, 2001; 
Drug Policy Alliance, 2011; Tiger, 2013). The majority of drug courts require 
participants to enter post-plea because the fear of the longer sentence can be leaned on as 
a powerful incentive to complete treatment (Tiger, 2013). 
James Nolan (2001) argues that the drug court model represents a fundamental 
transformation of traditional adjudication process. First, the relationship between 
defendant and judge involves direct communication and engagement, encouragement, 
and asking personal questions. Second, the role of attorneys is significantly altered from 
that of the traditional court. The relationship between the defense attorney and the 
prosecutor is not adversarial, and neither plays a large role in the overall process. 
Sometimes they do not even show up for drug court sessions, and when they do, they 
don’t participate much. The judge leads and drives court process by controlling the 
treatment team, which consists of the judge, prosecutor, defense attorney, probation 
officer, and treatment personnel. The Drug Policy Alliance (2011), taking a more critical 
perspective of this shift, points out that, under such a model, the defense lawyer is no 
longer an advocate for defendant, but rather is a part of the team trying to get him to 
comply with the judge’s mandates. Drug courts, in this sense, enact a neoliberal erosion 
of state protections, as the traditional due process rights of offenders are stripped away 
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and replaced by a top-down model of individual accountability wherein the defendant 
defends his or herself by making good decisions in the marketplace of lifestyle choices. 
Under this model, the judge has a great deal of control over the entire process, 
starting with his or her capacity to mandate treatment. Clients participate in various 
treatment modalities including Alcoholics Anonymous, Narcotics Anonymous, 
therapeutic communities, individual and group counseling, methadone maintenance, and 
even acupuncture. Where the treatment team sends them depends in part on resources 
available to the court, the level of community support, and personnel. The addict’s 
progress in treatment is monitored by medical doctors as well as the court system 
(probation and parole officers, the judge, other court staff). Oversight includes periodic 
urinalysis testing, reports from treatment facilities, and attending regular weekly meetings 
reporting back to the judge (Nolan, 2001). The judge ultimately makes all decisions about 
both treatment and punishment (Drug Policy Alliance, 2011). Success at following the 
judge’s mandates yields rewards, like moving up a level closer to graduation and various 
awards (applause, prizes, t-shirts, key chains, stickers, candy). Failure can result in 
incarceration, but also other sanctions like community service, sitting in the jury box for a 
few days, increased participation in treatment (Nolan, 2001). Drug courts do not value 
other measures of progress besides abstinence, such as decreased usage, holding a job, or 
maintaining relationships. The emphasis on abstinence, coupled with the naturalness of 
relapse, means that drug court participants are highly vulnerable to the consolidated 
power of the judge to administer sanctions, and thus, drug court participants often wind 
up spending as much if not more time in jail than if they had taken the traditional route of 
adjudication (O’Hear, 2009; Miller, 2009; Drug Policy Alliance, 2011; Tiger, 2013).  
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The Emergence and Proliferation of Drug Courts 
While federal and state drug policies throughout the 20
th
 century became 
increasingly focused on criminalization and incarceration, there emerged, alongside these 
developments, a transformation of the rehabilitative paradigm of viewing and handling 
addiction that rendered it more consistent with these overarching goals. In the decades 
leading up to the drug war of the 1980s, coercive treatment regimes developed as 
adjuncts to incarceration. Federal and state policies of the 1960s and 1970s helped lay the 
groundwork for the emergence of drug courts in the 1990s. The section that follows will 
sketch out two significant policy developments in the second half of the 20
th
 century that 
helped set the stage for New York’s drug courts by establishing powerful connections 
between the institutional spheres of criminal justice and private sector drug treatment. I 
will explore some of the political economic forces of the 1990s and 2000s that lent 
further impetus to the development and proliferation of drug courts, with particular 
emphasis on how drug courts were in fact part of the expansion and intensification of the 
drug war that occurred in the mid-1990s, rather than a response to it. This section will 
conclude with a critical look at drug courts in New York City vis-à-vis the city’s 
racialized political economy, the policing practices of the NYPD, and the recent reforms 
to the Rockefeller Drug Laws that funnel an increasing number of offenders into drug 
courts. I will look at how drug courts distribute harm down the social ladder along lines 




The Narcotic Addict Rehabilitation Act (1966) and TASC 
Efforts to coerce addicts into treatment came to the fore in 1966 with the Narcotic 
Addict Rehabilitation Act (NARA), the first federal legislation that merged therapeutic 
notions centered on the disease model with the punitive capacity of state power (Musto, 
1999). NARA established long lasting links between criminal justice and treatment 
facilities, particularly therapeutic communities, as evidenced by the fact that drug courts 
currently refer some defendants to therapeutic communities like Daytop Village in New 
York. This move to link punishment and treatment grew out of California’s Civil Addict 
Program of 1961, which permitted the state commit offenders to extended stays at 
inpatient drug treatment facilities (Tiger, 2013), and the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Robinson v. California in 1962, which deemed narcotics addiction an illness, and not a 
crime in and of itself (The Yale Law Journal, 1967). The state or condition of being an 
addict was decriminalized and reframed as a disease; however, it was framed as a disease 
whose symptoms were crimes (e.g. drug possession, dealing, theft), and therefore it 
needed to be managed by the policing powers of the state. NARA, following on the heels 
of these developments, vowed to use the coercive power of the law to divert the flow of 
diseased addicts from increasingly crowded prisons into residential treatment facilities 
known as therapeutic communities where they could be better controlled and cured: 
It is the policy of the Congress that certain persons charged with or convicted of 
violating Federal criminal laws, who are determined to be addicted to narcotic 
drugs, and likely to be rehabilitated through treatment, should, in lieu of 
prosecution or sentencing, be civilly committed for confinement and treatment 
designed to effect their restoration to health, and return to society as useful 
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members…in order that society may be protected more effectively from crime 
and delinquency which result from narcotic addiction (NARA, Subchapter 1: 
General Provisions, 1966). 
NARA instituted a realignment in the management of addiction that linked privatized 
treatment and publicly administered punishment by sentencing addicts to long term stints 
in therapeutic communities. Therapeutic communities are mostly private inpatient 
facilities where convicted addicts are mandated to stay and participate in treatment. The 
groundwork for this realignment was laid discursively by the rise of the disease model 
and its increasing colonization of the penal sphere beginning in the early 20
th
 century, as 
Progressive Era reformers developed a typology of drug users, medicalizing addiction for 
the middle and upper classes and criminalizing it for the poor (Acker, 2002; Tiger, 2013). 
The treatment paradigm gained steam in federal government during the 1960s as 
increased drug use by the middle and upper classes created a demand for a less 
stigmatized framing of addiction. The government responded by expanding funding for 
treatment (Acker, 2002). In this way, important structural transformations occurred: 
federal money was made available for the development of private sector treatment 
facilities as congress “authorized appropriations for grants to States and political 
subdivisions thereof and to private organizations and institutions for development of 
narcotic addict rehabilitation and treatment programs” (NARA, Subchapter 3: 
Rehabilitation and Post-hospitalization Care Programs and Assistance to States and 
Localities, 1966).  
The availability of federal funds made possible by NARA “helped establish a 
system of drug treatment programs that was virtually nonexistent before this time” 
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(Tiger, 2013, p. 27).  Medicalization and criminalization intertwined as complimentary 
models of constructing addiction in a way that encouraged public-private partnerships 
between the state and private sector treatment facilities. Addiction was framed as a 
medical problem necessitating both criminal justice and treatment-oriented solutions, 
both of which were consistent with existing federal policy centered on criminalization 
(Acker, 2002). Furthermore, connecting the rehabilitative implications of the disease 
model with the muscle of criminal justice held political appeal as it merged “tough on 
crime” rhetoric with modern, scientific discourses around treatment that appealed to 
middle class sensibilities and politicians on both the left and right. NARA linked criminal 
justice and therapeutic practices in a way that gave rise to a new treatment modality- one 
that employed the threat (and, when needed, the practice) of prolonged incarceration, yet 
couched this coercive element within the friendlier discourse of ‘treatment’ and ‘care,’ 
thus setting the stage both discursively and structurally for the drug court movement 
which would follow decades later.  
A second development that laid the groundwork for the drug court model was the 
establishment of the non-profit organization Treatment Alternatives to Street Crime 
(TASC) in 1976. To this day, TASC provides services that help courts take convicted 
offenders out of prisons and place them in private treatment programs not run by the 
criminal justice system. In New York City, TASC oversees five treatment sites and 22 
treatment programs (http://www.oasas.ny.gov/cj/alternatives/TASC.cfm). In addition to 
overseeing these sites and programs, TASC provides services connecting various actors 
within the criminal justice system with treatment service providers, coordinating 
treatment and services for offenders under the supervision of the criminal justice system. 
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A primary difference in the TASC model compared to the drug court model is that 
offenders return to court upon completion of treatment, but have no contact with the 
judge while in treatment (Nolan, 2001), whereas the drug court model is hinged upon 
regular interaction with and oversight by the judge.  
TASC helped to lay the groundwork for drug courts by carrying forward the 
hybrid therapeutic-punitive model of handling addiction, but it also was indicative of the 
increasing shift from government to governance (Lipman, 2011) as public-private 
partnerships in the management of drug related offenses proliferated in the late 1970s and 
1980s. TASC exemplified the increasingly central role played by the non-profit agency in 
coordinating criminal justice and treatment related activities. The development of TASC 
extended the realignment of the state initiated by NARA, as private non-profit 
organizations began to take leading roles in mediating the relationship between criminal 
justice and drug treatment agencies. In the decades that spanned the 1970s to the 1990s, a 
new coalition of intersecting institutional spheres was developing to help manage the 
influx of addicts into the criminal justice system. As the welfare state waned and the 
carceral state expanded, mass imprisonment was increasingly supplemented by a 
developing nexus of discourses and institutions that linked criminal justice, medicine, and 
the private sector in novel ways. The development of this nexus, alongside the 
Rockefeller Drug Laws and New York’s prison building and filling project, was how the 
regime of mass incarceration helped to manage the social costs and risks engendered by 
New York’s shifting political economic terrain in ways that were consistent with 
neoliberal ideology. This institutional nexus was part of the neoliberal restructuring of 
New York City, as elites and the state increasingly relied on the tax-exempt nonprofit 
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industrial complex to divert public money into the private sector, to “fund the intellectual 
projects that…develop a comprehensive framework for presenting its issues to the 
public,” manage dissent by defanging revolutionary movements like Drop the Rock and 
incorporating them into the capitalist state apparatus, and “expand punishment, and 
proliferate market economies under the veil of partnership between the public and private 
sectors” (INCITE! 2007, p. 9). In what follows, the development of drug courts in New 
York City will be examined as part of a constellation of neoliberal approaches to crime 
control that emerged in the 1990s.  
New York’s Drug Courts and the Expanding Drug War 
In the 1980s, as the Rockefeller Drug Laws were mobilized by the influx of 
federal and state money to local jurisdictions by the war on drugs, crime became the 
dominant lens through which the mass media and politicians ranging from Ronald 
Reagan to Ed Koch represented the poor of the city. Criminalization functioned as a 
rhetorical technique (Garland, 2001) that reframed blame for urban poverty, explaining 
away the systemic production of surplus populations of African Americans and Latinos in 
New York. In doing so, it legitimized the expansion of prisons, as well as the mix of 
public and private sector carceral state apparatuses needed to manage and punish these 
groups. This section will explore the political economy of drug courts in New York City. 
What kinds of broader transformations made them possible? How did the neoliberal 
restructuring of New York provide further impetus for the growth of drug courts? The 
expansion of the carceral state was, as Wacquant (2001) points out, central to the 
dismantling of welfare and the neoliberalization of politics, urban space, and everyday 
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life. How were drug courts, contrary to their progressive claims, actually part of the 
expansion of the carceral state that accompanied the neoliberal hegemony of the 1990s?  
In 2000, the Fordham Law Journal published an article by John Feinblatt, Greg 
Berman, and Aubrey Fox, called “Institutionalizing Innovation: The New York Drug 
Court Story.” Berman is the Director of the Center for Court Innovation, and Fox is its 
Director of Strategic planning. The Center for Court Innovation has been instrumental in 
the spread of drug courts in New York, and co-founded the city’s first drug court in 
Brooklyn in the mid-1990s. Feinblatt was the founding director of the center, and has 
served under Mayor Bloomberg from 2002 to 2013 as the Chief Advisor to the Mayor for 
Policy and Strategic Planning and Criminal Justice Coordinator (nyc.gov). Like the 
majority of studies and literature about drug courts, this one was produced by its 
powerful proponents. “The New York Drug Court Story” (2000) provides a narrative 
about a city drowning in a “rising tide of drug arrests” and “a particularly vivid example 
of a court system grappling with the consequences of drugs and crime” (pg. 277). The 
problem, as the authors see it, is neither criminalization itself nor the role of racism and 
the political economy in shaping the distribution of the harms that result from 
criminalization and drug addiction. Rather, the problem is “New York’s surge in caseload 
volume” which prevents drug users from receiving “meaningful treatment” (pg. 281). 
This “surge” increases recidivism, re-arrest, and imprisonment- the exorbitant costs of 
which place untenable financial burdens on the city and state. Drug courts in New York, 
the story goes, “have demonstrated that they are capable of achieving significant 
results…Drug courts have succeeded in reducing drug use and recidivism among 
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offenders” and “the retention rates for defendants in mandated treatment are about double 
the rates for those who pursue treatment voluntarily” (pg. 279). 
By framing the problem as “the crushing increase in drug-related cases in New 
York Courts over the past generation” (pg. 279), the authors ensure that drug courts, 
which promise to relieve this congestion of the court dockets, are indeed the solution. 
This “technocratic rationalization” operates by “measuring outputs as indicators of 
performance” (Simon & Feeley, 1992, pg. 456).  That is, an institution is evaluated in 
terms of its own outputs, rather than its impact on broader social issues. This results in a 
fundamental “decoupling” of “performance evaluation from external social objectives” 
which “tends to insulate institutions from the messy, hard-to-control demands of the 
social world” (ibid). As a result, the roles of race and class-based inequality are under-
addressed, if not silenced altogether. In New York City, however, the “messy” social 
world argues otherwise. Racial and economic inequality in the city are strongly correlated 
with the distribution of harms associated with drug use:  between 1991 and 1995, a study 
of 2000 deaths from drugs showed that it is more likely in areas of high unemployment 
and low income. These factors are the strongest predictors after gender (Stevens, 2011, 
pg. 29). Felony drug indictments and incarceration occur with the greatest frequency in 
the poorest parts of the city (New York State Division of Criminal Justice Services 
Report #1, 2010); in New York State, two thirds of all male prisoners come from seven 
communities in New York City (Sokoloff, in Marable, 2007). Furthermore, commitments 
for drug offenses in New York City are overwhelmingly African American, at 49.1%, 
and Hispanic, at 46% (New York State Division of Criminal Justice Services Report #2, 
2010). By reframing “the problem” as the criminalization of poor people of color and the 
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disequalizing tendencies of capitalism (Bowles, 1972), how then do we rethink the 
emergence of drug courts in New York City? 
As federal drug war money greased the wheels of the Rockefeller Drug Laws, 
New York’s prisoner population exploded, increasing from 12,500 prisoners in 1973, to 
22,000 in 1980, to over 70,000 in 2000. Drug commitments to state prison made up a 
substantial number of these new prisoners, increasing from 834 in 1973 to 11,225 in 
1992. In 1996, the number peaked at 23,511 drug offenders in state prison; by 1999 the 
number dropped to 22,266- still approximately 27 times the number of incarcerated 
people in 1973 (Division of Criminal Justice Services Office of Justice Research and 
Performance, 2012). These numbers do not include the tens of thousands of individuals 
residing in federal prisons, municipal jails, or otherwise under the supervision of the 
criminal justice system. The statistics for arrest are similarly grim: in 1980, there were 
27,000 drug arrests in New York; in 1999, there were 145,000 drug arrests. Furthermore, 
many individuals arrested for crimes that are not explicitly drug-related are often drug 
users and addicts- eight out of every ten defendants arrested in New York City in 1998 
tested positive for drugs at the time of their arrest (Feinblatt et al., 2000, pg. 281).  
The average cost of incarcerating an inmate is $62,595 per year. Alternatives to 
incarceration, like drug courts, report costs ranging from $1,400 to $13,000 per offender 
(Weissman, 2009). When New York City’s first drug court, the Brooklyn Treatment 
Court, opened in the mid-1990s, it was framed as a solution to the skyrocketing costs of 
incarceration and the fact that as arrests increased 430% from 1980 to 1999, there was 
only a 15% increase in the number of judges (ibid). Drug courts therefore emerged to 
supplement mass incarceration in New York, not replace it. Drug courts could help the 
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regime of mass incarceration function more efficiently by mobilizing categories of 
different types of deviants who necessitated varied forms of management and 
punishment. Drug courts promised to “enhance the system of control” (Tiger, 2013, pg. 
42). They offered a network of institutions, public-private partnerships, and nonprofit 
private sector support that could “expand the boundaries of dominant criminal justice 
practice by defining drug use simultaneously as a criminal, medical, and behavioral 
problem amenable to court-monitored therapeutic interventions and traditional criminal 
justice sanctions” (ibid, p. 57). As the neoliberal restructuring of New York City 
progressed, it required, as Harvey (2005) points out, a certain kind of institutional 
framework, of which the myriad institutions of the regime of mass incarceration were an 
integral part. Drug courts expanded the scope, reach, and capacity of that regime while 
advancing race and class blind neoliberal ideologies around efficiency and the individual 
management of risk. As the neoliberal state of the 1990s shifted further away from 
welfare and regulation and was increasingly reconfigured as a policing apparatus, drug 
courts were part and parcel of neoliberal strategies whereby the state, as it shrunk on the 
one hand, was able to expand on the other.  
The Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994 
One way federal policy under President Clinton further reconfigured the 
neoliberal state was by funding drug courts and linking them to the drug war’s goals of 
increased policing and incarceration, as well as neoliberal privatization schemes. Drug 
courts in New York emerged then not as an alternative to mass incarceration, but as a 
control apparatus that extended and supplemented it. In the mid 1990s, The Omnibus 
Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 was amended as the Violent Crime Control 
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and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, which, in Title V, “authorized the attorney general to 
make federal dollars available to states, local governments, and court systems to establish 
drug courts” (Tiger, 2013, pg. 21). The Act, written by then Senator Joe Biden, was 
passed with the goal to “allow grants to increase police presence, to expand and improve 
cooperative efforts between law enforcement agencies and members of the community to 
address crime and disorder problems, and otherwise enhance public safety” (“Violent 
Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994 (1994H.R. 3355),” n.d.). This 
“bipartisan product of six years of hard work” was the largest crime bill in U.S. history, 
and indicated a significant ratcheting up of the drug war, as it provided funds for 100,000 
additional police officers, $2.6 billion in additional funding for the FBI, DEA, and INS, 
and $9.7 billion in funding for prisons (“NCJRS Abstract - National Criminal Justice 
Reference Service,” n.d.).  
The Act forbid the participation of violent offenders in drug courts, and mandated 
intense oversight of participants, including regular drug testing, court-supervised 
treatment, and “prosecution, confinement, or incarceration based on noncompliance with 
program requirements or failure to show satisfactory progress” (“Violent Crime Control 
and Law Enforcement Act of 1994 (1994H.R. 3355),” n.d.). It authorized $100 million in 
funds for 1995 and 1996, $150 million for 1997, $200 million for 1998, 1999, and 2000 
(ibid).  Policies can increase and enhance state capacity. The funneling of millions of 
federal dollars into the development of drug courts was not a curtailing of the carceral 
state, but rather was an important component of its growth. The net-widening abilities of 
drug courts “indirectly expanded the reach of state punishment” (Lynch, 2012, pg.184). 
Recent studies by the Drug Policy Alliance (2011) and the Sentencing Project (2009) 
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have shown that drug courts actually “increase the number of people arrested for drug 
crimes, instead of decreasing in the long term the number of people processed in the 
criminal justice system” (Sentencing Project, 2009, pg. 19). As Lynch (2012) points out, 
drug courts provide a means of managing and intervening upon drug users and low level 
dealers that braces up and encourages the increased policing and surveillance of 
impoverished public urban spaces. As with the drug war writ large, the net-widening 
effects of drug courts enable white privilege and disproportionately target African 
Americans. As police increasingly focus on these “hot spots,” they enact “law 
enforcement policies and practices that systematically result in higher arrest risks for 
black drug offenders than white, for instance the tendency to focus on open-air drug 
markets and crack” (O’Hear, 2009, pg. 471).  
Federal funding of drug courts promised to be an inexpensive and efficient way of 
handling the mass arrests that would result from the billions of dollars that this policy 
channeled into local policing and surveillance. At the same time as providing funds to 
expand drug courts, the policy earmarked billions in federal money to “substantially 
increase the number of law enforcement officers interacting directly with members of the 
community (`cops on the beat'),” as well as to “encourage the development of new 
technologies to assist State, Indian tribal government, and local law enforcement agencies 
in reorienting the emphasis of their activities from reacting to crime to preventing crime” 
(ibid). Crime prevention, for the NYPD of the mid-1990s, meant the increased targeting 
of open-air spaces in “hot spot” neighborhoods using surveillance technology and 
proactive policing techniques like “stop and frisk” (White, 2011). The federal 
government provided economic incentives and accountability mechanisms to 
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operationalize and monitor these local policing efforts. The Act set aside $1.3 billion in 
1995, $1.85 billion in 1996, and $1.95 billion in 1997 for local police departments. To 
renew a grant, police departments had to “demonstrate significant progress in achieving 
the objectives of the initial application,” that is, provide quantitative data indicative of 
increased arrests and convictions. In New York City, this took shape as COMPSTAT, an 
organizational change that decentralized responsibility for producing arrests, shifting it 
from Headquarters to precinct commanders, thereby assessing the impact of policing at 
the precinct level and holding individual precincts and officers accountable. The data 
gathered by the COMPSTAT approach was used for “geographic mapping to identify 
problem places and to target polices resources to those specific places, known as ‘hot 
spots policing’” (White, 2011, pg. 19).  Furthermore, states and localities were 
encouraged to “use assets received through the Assets Forfeiture equitable sharing 
program to provide the non-Federal share of the cost of programs, projects, and activities 
funded under this part” (“Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994 
(1994H.R. 3355),” n.d.). That is, police departments were encouraged to use funds gained 
by the asset forfeiture of convicts to supplement federal money, providing further 
economic impetus for precinct commanders to produce more arrests and convictions. As 
police targeted impoverished neighborhoods, arresting thousands of low level drug 
dealers and users, drug courts braced up this intensified policing by helping to manage 
the influx of addicts who otherwise might not have been brought into the system and who 
might be amenable to a more efficient form of discipline.  
Second, the Act helped expand the carceral state by setting aside funds “to 
individual States and to States organized as multi-State compacts to construct, develop, 
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expand, modify, operate, or improve correctional facilities, including boot camp facilities 
and other alternative correctional facilities that can free conventional prison space for the 
confinement of violent offenders, to ensure that prison cell space is available for the 
confinement of violent offenders and to implement truth in sentencing laws for 
sentencing violent offenders” (ibid). The Act authorized $175 million in 1995, $750 
million in 1996, $1 billion in 1997, $1.9 billion in 1998, $2 billion in 1999 and $2.1 
billion in 2000. To receive funds, the Act mandated that states had to implement Truth in 
Sentencing laws that ensured “persons convicted of violent crimes serve not less than 85 
percent of the sentence imposed” (ibid). This requirement made explicit the goals of 
increasing convictions that resulted in prison time, lengthening prison sentences, and 
ensuring that people convicted would serve the majority of their sentence. Thus, states 
could gain funds to build and expand prisons contingent on their ability to fill them and to 
keep people in them for longer periods of time. Between 1979 and 1984, the NYPD hired 
12,000 new officers. This expansion continued into the 1990s and was accompanied by a 
shift to “broken windows policing” which targeted low level street crime and disorder. 
Between 1993 and 1996, arrests increased by 23%, including a 40% increase in 
misdemeanor arrests and a 97% increase in drug arrests (White, 2011). The expansion of 
the NYPD in the 1990s, and the tactical shifts instituted by Mayor Giuliani and Police 
Commissioner Bratton, produced more arrests and convictions than the state prisons and 
city jails had beds. Drug courts supported the prison building and filling projects by 
mobilizing a typology of drug offenders that tracked them into appropriate levels of 
surveillance and containment. This tracking or sorting of offenders helped New York 
State meet the stringent demands of federal policy and get the funding it needed to 
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continue the prison-building and filling enterprise that began in the early 1980s. Prisons 
could be built and filled, policing of impoverished urban neighborhoods could continue 
to intensify, and overcrowding could be mitigated by the mobilization of medico-
scientific theories of addiction to construct categories of drug users and low level dealers 
who could be controlled by the criminal justice system outside the prison, but in the 
shadow of its walls.     
Drug courts were the purportedly “progressive” or “enlightened” (Tiger, 2013) 
buttress that helped brace up a massive policy initiative to intensify the drug war and 
advance the interests of the prison industrial complex in the 1990s (Schlosser, 1998). In 
addition to its overall expansion of the drug war, the Violent Crime Control and Law 
Enforcement Act of 1994 was quintessentially neoliberal in that it set aside funds to 
facilitate privatization, commercial development, and public-private partnerships on the 
one hand, while narrowing rights and benefits for prisoners on the other. For instance, it 
mandated the creation of a Task Force on Prison Construction Standardization and 
Techniques that would be “composed of Federal, State, and local officials expert in 
prison construction, and of at least an equal number of engineers, architects, and 
construction experts from the private sector with expertise in prison design and 
construction, including the use of cost-cutting construction standardization techniques 
and cost-cutting new building materials and technologies” (“Violent Crime Control and 
Law Enforcement Act of 1994 (1994H.R. 3355),” n.d.). Prison building, whenever 
possible, was to involve the productive “use of surplus Federal property,” evidence that 
Gilmore’s (2007) argument that prison-building as a way of absorbing surplus land and 
state capacity does not apply solely to California, but rather is indicative of a national 
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initiative with varied local manifestations. At the same time that it linked prison building 
to private interests, the Act placed no upper limit on the prison-filling project, injected 
billions of dollars into local police departments, and created substantial legal obstacles to 
prisoners’ rights, declaring, “A Federal court shall not place a ceiling on the inmate 
population of any Federal, State, or local detention facility as an equitable remedial 
measure for conditions that violate the eighth amendment unless crowding is inflicting 
cruel and unusual punishment on particular identified prisoners”(“Violent Crime Control 
and Law Enforcement Act of 1994 (1994H.R. 3355),” n.d.). The kind of social and 
economic capital “particular identified prisoners” would need in order to build cases 
around cruel and unusual punishment are not available to most inmates. Furthermore, it 
trimmed costs by prohibiting the awarding of Pell Grants to prisoners, substantially 
reducing their educational opportunities while incarcerated. A bleak and dangerous 
picture is painted here: one in which private interests are tied to prison building and 
filling while the state increases policing and makes it harder for people to get out of jail, 
advocate for their rights, or get educated while locked up.  
Finally, the Act set aside over $100 million per year, from 1996 through 2000 to 
facilitate the use of the private sector to expand control when possible, utilizing funds “to 
contract with private, nonprofit entities or community-based organizations,” especially 
“to fund intensively comprehensive crime prevention programs in chronic high intensive 
crime areas” like those in impoverished, disinvested urban centers. The public-private 
partnerships that characterize drug courts exemplify the increasing privatization of 
control via the expansion of the nonprofit industrial complex (INCITE! 2007) and how 
“practices of welfare, treatment, and punishment have been reassembled” (Lynch, 2012, 
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pg. 186) along neoliberal lines. The complicity of drug courts in privatization runs 
deeper, however. Drug courts, by mitigating the harshness of the punitive with the 
enlightenment of the medico-scientific (Tiger, 2013), helped provide the neoliberal 
underpinnings of 1990s crime control with a veneer of benevolence, as public money was 
increasingly funneled out of public welfare supports and into the private sector to “treat” 
not only certain classes of deviant individuals, but “urban decline” itself (Smith, 1996). 
The Act provided grant money to “increase private investment in distressed local 
communities and to build and expand the capacity of local institutions to better serve the 
economic needs of local residents through the provision of financial and technical 
assistance to community development corporations”(“Violent Crime Control and Law 
Enforcement Act of 1994 (1994H.R. 3355),” n.d.). Community Development 
Corporations in New York City, such as the Harlem Development Corporation, the 
Community Development Corporation of Long Island, and the Empire State 
Development Corporation have long played pivotal roles in advancing gentrification, 
privatization, and using public money to subsidize private sector real estate development 
(Smith, 1996; Moody, 2007). The Act goes on to encourage community development 
corporations to partner with private investors to supplement the seed money provided by 
the grant. Though profits generated by the grant itself had to be reinvested in the 
community, there was no regulation of the large sums that came from philanthropic 
organizations and private sector investors.  As Smith (1996) and Moody (2007) have 
shown, private investors are far more likely to inject capital into a development project if 
the state is there to assist and encourage that investment, lowering the risk, subsidizing 
the initial outlay of capital, providing needed infrastructure, and increasing the overall 
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profitability of the venture. Crime control policies like this one indicate that the federal 
government was complicit in gentrification projects not only through the revanchist 
policing described by Smith (1996), but also by linking crime and poverty in such a way 
as to promote publicly subsidized private economic development as the solution.  
It is not merely coincidence that federal funding for the development of drug 
courts was part of this constellation of drug war initiatives. The Brooklyn Treatment 
Court, opened in 1996 by a partnership between New York State and the nonprofit Center 
for Court Innovation, was part and parcel of the neoliberal approach to crime control, as 
embodied and enacted by The Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994. 
This approach was multifaceted: states and municipalities would be provided with 
substantial amounts of federal money to develop drug courts at the same time as they 
were funded to a) increase their police force; b) increase surveillance of neighborhoods; 
c) incentivize arrests, convictions, and lengthy sentences; d) develop actuarial systems of 
managing risk and standardized, outcomes-based accountability measures for police 
departments, courts, and other institutions; d) partner with the private sector to design and 
build prisons; e) subsidize private real estate and business development via community 
development corporations.  
The expansion of the drug war in the 1990s distributed harms down the social 
ladder, along lines of race and class. As the previous chapter explained, the Rockefeller 
Drug Laws, and the drug war in general, were instrumental to the eroding of the welfare 
state and advancing the conservative pushback against the claims and gains made by 
minority groups during the Civil Rights Movement and the War on Poverty. Drug court 
development in New York City supplemented this project, and the sanitized version of its 
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history, as told by its proponents, ignores this context in favor of a race and class blind 
narrative of a “movement” that provided a solution to the problem of crowded 
courtrooms packed with deviant drug users. In what follows, I will analyze the further 
institutionalization of drug courts that occurred as a result of the Rockefeller Drug Law 
reforms of 2009. I will synthesize demographic data from recent studies of drug courts 
with more general data on the demographic impact of the drug war in order to sketch out 
in greater detail how the emergence of drug courts was part of the expansion of mass 
incarceration in New York State, and the impact of these developments along lines of 
race, class, and gender in New York City.  
Drug Court Reforms and Inequality 
 As the drug war escalated in the 1990s and early 2000’s, incarceration became 
even more expensive, and its social and economic costs became more apparent to the 
general public. In New York, grassroots opposition to the Rockefeller Drug Laws began 
to mount. In 2000, the Correctional Association incorporated a mix of reform advocates, 
community members and groups, grassroots coalitions, and nonprofit organizations to 
develop a forum for working towards reforming drug policy in New York. Their stated 
goal the repeal of the Rockefeller Drug Laws 
(http://www.correctionalassociation.org/cp/coalition). The Drop the Rock Coalition grew 
out of these efforts and, over time, was able to create sufficient political pressure to 
generate some reforms to the laws. The first round of reforms was passed in 2004 and 
2005, reducing some mandatory sentences and easing the requirements for parole (ibid). 
In 2009, the Drop the Rock Coalition pushed then Governor Paterson to amend 
the controversial Rockefeller Drug laws by signing in Criminal Procedure Law Article 
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216: Judicial Diversion Program for Certain Felony Offenders. This reform removed 
mandatory sentences for some drug felonies, restoring judicial discretion for many first 
and second time offenses. It also, to the boon of the drug courts, allowed for some 
convicted drug felons to be eligible for alternatives to incarceration (ibid). This reform 
prompted the New York State Unified Court System (UCS), funded by a federal stimulus 
package, to mobilize a large-scale research and expansion project. They sought to 
examine drug court outcomes in order to assess the potential impact of implementing 
drug courts as a statewide judicial apparatus to channel newly eligible offenders into 
court supervised treatment. Their “2009 Annual Report” provides a recent snapshot of 
New York State and New York City drug court participant demographics, summarized 
below:  
Drug of Choice: In keeping with national data on drug use, marijuana was the most 
popular drug of choice among drug court participants. 32% of drug court participants 
reported marijuana as their drug of choice, whereas only 16% reported heroin, 12% 
reported crack, and 9% reported cocaine. In New York City, 40% preferred marijuana, 
20% heroin, 16% crack, and 12% cocaine. Outside of New York City, marijuana use tied 
with alcohol at 20%, followed by heroin, crack, and cocaine.  
Top Arrest Charge (most serious charge) for participants: Statewide, felony drug 
charges came in at 34%, followed by felony non-drug (24%), misdemeanor drug (23%), 
and misdemeanor non-drug (18%). In New York City, felony drug charges overwhelmed 
at 61%, followed by misdemeanor drug (21%), felony non-drug (10%), and misdemeanor 
non-drug (8%). Outside New York City, felony non-drug was the most common top 
arrest charge at 30%, followed by misdemeanor drug (24%), misdemeanor non-drug 
 92 
(23%), and felony drug (22%). Across the board, probation violations for drug use came 
in at 1%.  
Race/Ethnicity: Drug court participants, statewide, were 51% Caucasian, 29% 
Black/African American, and 15% Latino/Hispanic. In New York City, they were 44% 
Black/African American, 32% Latino/Hispanic, and 18% Caucasian. Outside New York 
City, participants were 69% Caucasian, 20% Black/African American, and 6% 
Latino/Hispanic. 
Gender: Drug court participants were overwhelmingly male, at approximately 78-
80% across the board. 
Drug court participants in New York City are mostly Black/African American and 
Latino male marijuana smokers who face a felony or misdemeanor drug charge. 
Complimenting this data is a recent multi-site study (2011) by the Urban Institute’s 
Justice Policy Center, RTI International, and the Center for Court Innovation, which 
surveyed drug court participants around the country 18 months after completion. They 
found that the average annual income for drug court graduates, including earnings from 
employment, family and friends, and public assistance, averaged only $17,172. Only 61 
percent of graduates were employed, and 11 percent were in school. Thus, many of those 
entering and leaving drug courts are living at or below the poverty line. Furthermore, 
Lynch (2012) notes that drug courts are less effective with women, which explains the 
gender demographic, as drug courts only admit those who are amenable to its particular 
brand of discipline. The interventions mandated by drug courts are particularly difficult 
for women to meet, as “women are less likely than men to have the social and structural 
supports needed to succeed” (ibid, pg. 185). Although drug court proponents claim to 
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promote “healthy families…with fewer ‘crack babies’” (Feinblatt et al, 2000, pg. 286), 
Lynch points out that “mothers, in particular, are impeded by inadequate childcare 
resources and other competing parenting demands and the majority of treatment 
programs do not serve pregnant women” (pg. 185).  
The Urban Institute’s study (2010) claims that drug courts save money by reducing 
recidivism, re-arrest, and re-incarceration on the one hand, while on the other hand 
provides evidence that drug court treatment has a “modest effect (mostly non-significant)” 
(my emphasis) on socioeconomic status and no impact on homelessness for participants. 
It claims to be effective in reducing or eliminating drug use and criminal behavior, but 
has no impact on mental health and a mixed impact on family ties. The representation of 
social class and poverty here is telling. It is a concrete example of Simon and Feeley’s 
(1992) notion of the “decoupling” of institutions from larger social goals as they focus on 
measuring outputs in terms of recidivism, efficiency, and savings while at the same time 
functioning to reproduce inequality. This race, class, and gender-blind technocratic 
rationality underpins the drug court reforms in particular, and neoliberalism in general. It 
binds drug court ideology and practice to the rise of the anti-welfarist, racialized carceral 
state that has accompanied the neoliberal hegemony of the last thirty years. This 
rationality and the punitive practices that accompany it situate drug courts as an 
institutional apparatus within and supporting the expansion of the drug war in the 1990s 
rather than merely “a direct response” to its “rapid escalation” (Drug Policy Alliance, 





In April of 2009, the Drop the Rock coalition, along with increasing number of 
empirically driven academic critiques, influential organizations like the Association of 
the Bar of New York, as well as state bodies like The New York State Commission for 
Sentencing Reform, pressured Governor Paterson and the legislature into instituting 
further reforms to the Rockefeller Drug Laws (Mancuso, 2010). These reforms 
eliminated some mandatory sentences, reduced others, and, via CPL Article 216, 
expanded judicial discretion to use drug courts and established a law allowing offenders 
and/or prosecutors to request a judicial hearing to see if the offender is eligible for drug 
court. In 2011, The New York State Division of Criminal Justice Services (DCJS) 
published a study of the results of this reform, titled “Felony Drug Court Activity Among 
Offenders Eligible Under 2009 Drug Law Changes 2008-2010” (henceforth referred to as 
DCJS, 2011). What follows is a summary and analysis of some of the demographic data 
on those screened and admitted to drug courts as a result of Article 216. That is, these are 
individuals convicted of specific felonies who were eligible for drug court because of this 
particular reform to the Rockefeller Drug Laws, as opposed to the general population of 
New York’s drug court participants who would have been eligible regardless.  
In New York City, drug court eligibility screenings under Article 216 increased 5 
percent from 2008-2010 and admissions to drug courts doubled. Screenings and 
admissions increased despite a 21 percent decrease in the number of felony drug arrests 
in New York City between 2008-2010. In the entire state, 41 percent of those screened 
were admitted into drug court programs. CPL Article 216 allows defendants and/or 
prosecutors to request a judicial hearing to see if the defendant is eligible for participation 
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in a substance abuse treatment program. Between 2009 and 2010, in 67 percent (268) of 
these hearings, the defendant was found eligible for drug court. An overwhelming 
number (81 percent) of individuals admitted to drug courts, however, were convicted 
felons who were not facing a mandatory prison sentence (DCJS, 2010). The implications 
here are twofold: First, this means that the majority of offenders facing mandatory 
sentences under the Rockefeller Drug Laws are still being served those sentences, and 
that most of those found eligible for diversion are lower-level offenders. Compared to 
drug using and dealing whites, African Americans have a higher arrest rate, conviction 
rate, and face harsher penalties when sentenced (Marable, 2007; O’Hear, 2009; 
Alexander, 2012). As a result, African Americans arrested for drug charges are more 
likely to face multiple charges and have criminal histories. Under a drug law that takes 
into account the “role in the offense, drug type, drug quantity, and criminal history” 
(O’Hear, 2009, pg. 469) racial bias in policing and at all levels of criminal justice mean 
that African Americans are more likely to face mandatory sentences and be ineligible for 
drug court. If 81 percent of those admitted to drug courts under these reforms are not 
facing a mandatory sentence, such a reform works to the advantage of whites and 
maintains the uneven distribution of harm along lines of race.  
 Second, as the Sentencing Project’s (2009) meta-study indicates, it remains 
unclear whether “drug court participants would have ended up in the criminal justice 
system if not for the drug court.” The increased number of felons entering drug courts 
could be a result of the “net-widening effects of the drug court” (pg. 19) whereby an 
increasing number of those brought into the criminal justice system are people who 
would not have otherwise been there if not for the supplementary impact of the drug 
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courts. There was a decline of 21 percent (from 28,764 in 2008 to 22,784 in 2010) in 
felony drug arrests in NYC, yet, under Article 216, screenings for participation in drug 
court increased 5 percent from 3,703 in 2008 to 3,896 in 2010. Drug court admissions 
more than doubled between 2008 and 2010, from 470 to 1,022. 90 percent of these 
individuals were indicted on drug offenses. Research indicates that the presence of drug 
courts, coupled with the existence of a legal framework for facilitating the diversion of 
addicts into them, “increases the number of drug offenders arrested in a given 
jurisdiction” (Lynch, 2012, pg. 185). Although felony drug arrests have decreased in New 
York City, the majority of those ending up in drug courts are low-level offenders who 
would not have faced a mandatory sentence anyway. Therefore, it is likely that an 
increasing number of those arrested who are ending up in drug courts would not have 
been arrested in the first place if not for the positive correlation between the presence of 
drug courts in a jurisdiction and proactive policing tactics like “stop and frisk” and “hot 
spots”. One cannot assume that the decrease in felony arrests and lower incarceration 
rates in New York City are due to drug courts; rather, it is just as likely that these rates 
would be even lower if drug courts were not there to provide additional support for 
policing. Furthermore, a recent survey of 2,000 retired police officers indicated that it is 
common practice among the NYPD to downgrade crimes to less serious offenses in order 
to make the crime statistics in a given precinct look better (New York Times, June 28
th
, 
2012). As a result, New York City has seen a spike in misdemeanor drug offenses, up 
from 59,671 in 2004 to 80,462 in 2011 (nyc.gov). 
When comparing the demographic data on drug court participants in general and 
those eligible as a result of Article 216, a striking racial disproportionality between black 
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and white offenders emerges. In 2010, Article 216 participants in New York City were 
39.6 percent white and 11.5 percent black, whereas the general population of drug court 
participants were 44 percent Black/African American and 18 percent Caucasian. Thus, 
among Article 216-eligible offenders, there is a 21.6 percent increase in white 
participants and a decrease of 32.5 percent in Black/African American participants 
(DCJS, 2010). Based on this data, one can conclude that African American offenders are 
a) less likely to be eligible for diversion because of additional charges or criminal 
histories; b) are less likely to be eligible because they face more serious felony charges; 
and c) are more likely to receive the mandatory minimum sentence. Conversely, whites 
are more likely to a) lack a criminal history, and thereby be eligible for drug court 
participation; b) face less serious felony offenses which increases the likelihood of 
eligibility; and c) are less likely to receive mandatory minimum sentences. This 
distribution of access to diversion and exposure to the harms of felony charges and prison 
time indicates that drug courts, contrary to being progressive institutions 
“revolutionizing” criminal justice, are in fact reproducing and expanding the 
systematized racism of a criminal justice system that targets African Americans, in which 
they are more likely to be arrested, charged with more serious crimes than their white 
counterparts, more likely to do time in general, and harsher sentences when they do.  
The Unequal Distribution of Harm 
Drug court reforms to the Rockefeller Drug Laws maintain racial bias in the 
prison system by disproportionately diverting white felons out of prisons and into drug 
courts and keeping black felons in prison. At the same time, drug courts encourage net-
widening (The Sentencing Project, 2009; Lynch 2012; O’Hear 2009, Drug Policy 
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Alliance, 2011). Net-widening results when the presence of a drug court increases the 
number of drug arrests in a jurisdiction, bringing people under the supervision of the 
criminal justice system who might not otherwise be there, as the police “are more likely 
to arrest in low-level cases where they otherwise would not have bothered, on the 
assumption that drug courts will provide positive intervention” (Lynch, 2012, pg. 185). 
This takes shape as an increased, proactive (e.g. “stop and frisk”) targeting by the NYPD 
of spaces already identified as high-crime (“hot spots”), which contributes to the racial 
disproportionality in arrests, convictions, and sentencing. Structural inequality shapes the 
way individuals navigate drug policy (Acker, 2002), as some of those living in poverty 
participate in open-air drug markets, which increases their vulnerability to policing. “Hot 
spots” are constructed based on surveillance of this activity and inform law enforcement 
resource allocation, as police focus their efforts on arresting people in impoverished 
neighborhoods that “lack the kinds of spatial and social barriers to outsiders (even police) 
that often characterize wealthier areas” (Lynch, 2012, pg. 192).  
This results in disproportionate arrests and incarceration of African Americans 
and Latinos, material and discursive practices that “systematically form the objects of 
which they speak” (Ball, 1994, pg. 21, cited in Lipman, 2011, pg. 11), reinforcing the 
inscription of criminality onto poor people of color as stereotypes are produced and 
circulated to the wider society. These stereotypes in turn are mobilized by the media and 
political elites to justify policing practices, incarceration, and to delegitimize the welfare 
state and claims for racial justice. In a context where drug courts are a “softer” form of 
punishment, diverting convicted felons away from the harms associated with a felony 
record and imprisonment and into court supervised treatment instead, they privilege 
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Whites. To the extent that drug courts function as net-widening adjuncts to the carceral 
state, they, like prisons, are managing disproportionate numbers of African Americans. 
Furthermore, they facilitate racial profiling by providing a supplementary form of social 
control to the prison system. Drug court reforms are part of a realignment of the carceral 
state which makes it possible for the police to continue bringing disproportionate 
numbers of poor people of color under the supervision of the criminal justice system.  
Drug courts’ embrace of medico-punitive and “bloated courtroom” ideologies 
around drug use and dealing do not explain the social distribution of the harms associated 
with these behaviors. If they did, these harms would be evenly distributed throughout the 
city rather than concentrated among poor people of color (Stevens, 2011). Instead, drug 
courts reproduce and aggravate the unequal distribution of harms along lines of race, 
class, and gender. Further evidence is found in the fact that New York City drug court 
participants are overwhelmingly male, at 78-80 percent (New York State Unified Court 
System Annual Report, 2009). This fact exacerbates the structural inequalities faced by 
poor women of color, and does little to stem their disproportionate representation in 
prison. In 1997, African American women were eight times more likely to go to prison 
than white women, even though they were vastly outnumbered by white women who sold 
and used drugs. Most of these new female convicts were in prison due to the mandatory 
sentences of the Rockefeller Drug Laws. Between 1986 and 1996, the number of women 
incarcerated for drug charges rose 888 percent (Marable, 2007). In New York State in 
1995, 91% of all women sentenced for drug offenses were black and Latina (even though 
they make up only 32% of population). Two out of three black women (65 percent) 
sentenced to prison were convicted of drug charges, as were four out of five Latinas (82 
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percent). In 1997, 59 percent of women in New York State prisons were serving drug 
convictions, 77 percent of Latinas, and 34 percent of white women (Sokoloff, in Marable, 
2007). The mass incarceration of women of color has a major impact on families, with a 
disproportionate number of African American children ending up in foster care or 
juvenile corrections (Marable, 2007). Sokoloff (in Marable, 2007) points out that this is 
largely an issue of caring for children while their mothers are in jail, as only 28 percent of 
fathers take care of children of imprisoned mothers- this work is mostly done by 
grandmothers and other female relatives. 10 percent of kids end up in foster care or 
agencies when the mother is incarcerated (ibid).  
Furthermore, poor women of color who are felons face incredible challenges 
reintegrating into the community upon release, as the stigma of their felon status are 
compounded by their low socio-economic status. Because Black and Latina women are 
disproportionately represented in welfare system, they suffer harms due to their 
ineligibility for welfare assistance that results from a felony conviction. For instance, 
women convicted of drug felonies are not allowed food stamps and cash assistance, they 
are denied government funding for higher education, and are not allowed to live in public 
housing. Furthermore, in New York State, these women are excluded from work as home 
health aides, nursing attendants, and nursery school assistants- jobs that are primarily 
held by working class women of color. Finally, women felons often find themselves 
ineligible for services that provide addiction treatment, mental health and other 
healthcare, and other resources because these organizations are prohibited from serving 
drug offenders due to the terms of their funding (Sokoloff, in Marable, 2007). These 
problems are not targeted by race, class, and gender blind drug court reforms. The 
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structural inequalities faced by women of color are left untouched as drug courts “cherry 
pick” male offenders who appear more likely to be successful within the therapeutic 
jurisprudence model. 
Because of the criminalization of poor people of color, structural inequality 
determines the distribution of harms associated with drug use and dealing. In New York 
State, as with elsewhere, the ‘disease’ of drug use is evenly distributed among the rich 
and poor, and across lines of race. Poor people of color, however, suffer worse 
consequences in terms of the likelihood of incarceration (Stevens, 2011). The Drug 
Policy Alliance (2011) points out that “by 2003, African Americans were arrested for 
drug law violations at a rate 238 percent higher than whites and African Americans and 
Latinos comprised two-thirds of people incarcerated for drug law violations” (pg. 8). 
Structural inequality and racism are left unaddressed by the drug court reforms, and, in 
fact, drug courts “may actually exacerbate existing racial disparities in the criminal 
justice system” (ibid). This takes shape not only in terms of net widening and the courts’ 
role in the general expansion of the carceral state, but also in terms of the impact of drug 
courts on poor people of color who participate in drug court programs themselves. 
Research has shown that African Americans are 30 percent more likely to be kicked out 
of drug court, and are more likely to spend a greater amount of time in jail both as 
participants and upon being removed from the program (ibid).  In “Rethinking Drug 
Courts: Restorative Justice as a Response to Racial Injustice,” legal scholar Michael 
O’Hear (2009) examines the “curious link between drug courts and racial justice 
concerns” (pg. 464), concluding that drug courts actually exacerbate racial disparities 
precisely because they don’t address criminalization and structural inequality and its 
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impact on African Americans and the impoverished communities where poor people of 
color live. Nor do they address white privilege in drug courts, as “white drug offenders 
are more likely to benefit from this ‘pathway out’ than black drug offenders” (pg. 477). 
The high failure rate of African American participants is correlated with “a variety of 
socioeconomic disadvantages, and blacks are overrepresented among those who face the 
important barriers to successful treatment” (pg. 480).  
Finally, for those who do enter drug courts, whether as felons via the Rockefeller 
Drug Law reforms or for misdemeanor offenses, structural inequalities related to 
healthcare have a profound impact on one’s ability to “graduate.” Much mandated 
treatment is not covered by the defendant’s health insurance. While public spending on 
treatment has increased 7.5 percent annually, private insurance company spending has 
decreased 24 percent between 1987 and 2003 (Drug Policy Alliance, 2011). The Drug 
Policy Alliance (2011) cites federal government data revealing that “37 percent of people 
who want but do not receive treatment simply cannot afford it” (SAMSA, 2008).  
Therefore, many people who want treatment for addiction, but who are doing so outside 
the supervision of the criminal justice system, may face difficulties in obtaining care due 
to lack of health insurance, lack of money, and the overwhelming use of treatment by the 
courts. In addition, once admitted to drug courts, there is no guarantee that one’s health 
insurance will cover the costs of court-mandated treatment. Those defendants who lack 
health insurance coverage for the kind of treatment that might work best for them are 
mandated by the courts to complete an inappropriate treatment regimen that might 
increase the likelihood of recidivism, re-arrest, and jail time. This mismatch increases the 
likelihood of incarceration. This is a social class issue whereby poverty and lack of 
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resources create situations in drug courts that produce an uneven distribution of harm. 
Those with wealth and resources are able to procure treatment in a variety of settings 
ranging from 12 steps to “rehab resorts,” while those without have fewer and fewer 
options outside the criminal justice system. Furthermore, within the criminal justice 
system, health insurance shapes the distribution of access to the most appropriate forms 
of treatment that will increase an individual’s likelihood of graduating from drug court. 
Poverty increases a drug court participant’s chances of incarceration because they are less 
likely to have the kind of health insurance that will get them treatment they need in order 
to successfully meet the mandates of the drug court.  
Drug Courts and Neoliberal Urbanism 
 Neoliberalism is a way of using state capacity to increase opportunities for the 
private accumulation of capital and to manage the various crises inherent to capitalism 
(Lipman, 2011). Lipman provides a useful description of neoliberalism as “an ensemble 
of economic and social policies, forms of governance, and discourses and ideologies that 
promote individual self-interest, unrestricted flows of capital, deep reductions in the cost 
of labor, and sharp retrenchment of the public sphere” (pg. 6). Neoliberal urbanism 
describes the ways these changes have restructured New York City politically, socially, 
and spatially. The social and spatial inequalities that characterize New York City are 
produced by neoliberalism, as “cities of this type require concentrations of high-paid 
professionals and managers and legions of low-paid service workers” (ibid, pg. 4) as well 
as a massive surplus population of poor under- and unemployed individuals and families. 
This inequality and the insecurity that comes with it are indeed problematic for the state 
and for capital, but the role of the neoliberal state is not to promote equity; rather it is to 
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“produce stability and growth in the general political economy” (Gilmore, 2007, pg. 16). 
That is, the role of the state is not to reduce inequality, but rather to manage the 
instability it produces. But the state’s efforts at control are constantly challenged by the 
tendency of neoliberal urbanism, with its hallmarks of disinvestment and dispossession, 
to create even more poverty and disorder. Social control is also challenged by the shifting 
tendencies of capital as it seeks spatial and temporal fixes to slowing rates of profit 
(Harvey, 2005). There’s a contradiction at work here: as the state opens of new spaces for 
accumulation of capital on the one hand, it produces more inequality and exacerbates 
existing social problems on the other, which it in turn must manage and control without 
recourse to the welfare state apparatuses that are continuously being “rolled back,” 
privatized, or eliminated altogether as capital moves around. How can the state resolve 
this contradiction?  
 The drug war was one way the state “rolled out” its capacity for punishment as a 
means of absorbing this dangerous surplus population into the criminal justice system and 
opening up new spaces for the productive investment of surplus capital (Gilmore, 2007). 
The use of the criminal justice system to absorb surplus populations and capital 
happened, in part, through New York’s prison-building project described in the previous 
chapter of this dissertation. But it also took shape as federal and state policies intensified 
the drug war in the 1990s. This escalation of the drug war facilitated gentrification and 
corporate real estate development by funding police departments in a way that 
incentivized the targeting of open-air drug markets in impoverished urban spaces. It 
developed public-private partnerships to expand and enhance the management of this 
increasingly policed surplus population. Furthermore, it funded “urban renewal” projects 
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that created massive profits for the private sector by representing spatial dispossession as 
a development strategy to reduce crime. Neoliberal urbanism in New York City, and the 
criminalization of poor people of color that made it feasible, produced the conditions that 
made drug courts possible. Drug courts in New York City emerged as part of this 
escalation of the drug war as a means of supplementing and enhancing control, extending 
the realignment of the public-private spheres, and buttressing the race and class blind 
ideology that underpins neoliberal social and economic policies. In the chapter that 
follows, I will synthesize the work of critical geography, political economy of education, 
and critical theory to analyze similar developments in education policy and reform. 
Important education reforms accompanied the growth of the carceral state in New York 
City, as public schools too became both targets of and a means of restructuring the city 














Policing the Crisis in Education 
Important education policies and reforms accompanied the growth of the carceral 
state in New York, as public schools, like prisons, became enhanced management 
strategies enmeshed in restructuring the city along new racial capitalist lines in the 
aftermath of the social and economic upheavals of the 1960s and 1970s. The title of this 
chapter comes from Stuart Hall et al.’s (1978) book Policing the crisis: Mugging, the 
state and law and order in which the authors analyze how public anxieties, fueled by an 
“organic crisis” in the British economic base and cultural superstructure, were displaced 
onto immigrants of color through the social construction of the “mugger.” Black 
immigrants, an exploited and marginalized surplus population left behind by Britain’s 
changing political economy, were pathologized as “enemies within.” By framing this 
group as the cause of its social and economic problems, the British state was able to 
contain crises that were in fact structural in nature, without having to alter the distribution 
of wealth and power in society.  
This chapter provides a critical analysis of federal education policy developments 
in the U.S. and some of the powerful discourses that shaped and accompanied them, in 
order to explore how education- like criminalization- emerged as an “imagined policy 
solution” (Anyon, 2011) that pinned structural crises on the supposed deficits of poor 
people of color. As neoliberal social and economic policy disciplined labor and contained 
opposition to status quo power relations, austerity and low-wage jobs exacerbated 
situations of concentrated poverty among poor people of color in urban neighborhoods. 
Deficit ideologies and the educational policies that embodied them rationalized the 
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disequalizing effects of neoliberal restructuring of the political economy. Critiquing 
education as an apparatus of the racialized neoliberal state is central to understanding 
educational inequality, the uneven distribution of wealth and harm in New York more 
generally, and the relationship of education policy to the development of “a new kind of 
urbanism in the United States” (Smith, N., pg. 117, in Merrifield and Swyngedouw, 
1997; Lipman, 2011). In this chapter, I will use a theoretical framework that synthesizes 
critical geography (Smith, 1996; Harvey, 2005, 2007, 2012; Gilmore, 2007; Merrifield 
and Swyngedouw, 1997; Brenner and Theodore, 2002), political economy of education 
(Anyon, 2005; Fabricant and Fine, 2012; Hursch, 2003; Lipman, 2011), critical 
pedagogy/critical theory (Apple, 1993, 1996, 2004, 2006; Bowles and Gintis, 1976; 
Giroux, 2011; Shor, 1986, 1992), and racial analysis (Leonardo, 2007, 2009) to critically 
analyze developments in education policy and reform beginning with the relationship 
between the Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA) and the attack on welfare 
in the mid-1970s.  This will be followed by political economic analyses of the “literacy 
crisis” of the mid- to late-1970s and the subsequent publication of A Nation at Risk in the 
early 1980s. I will show how, by “policing the crisis” in education, these developments 
not only protected elite class power and White privilege, but also paved the way for the 
further neoliberalization of education via the standards, testing, and accountability 
reforms of Goals 2000, Improving America’s Schools Act, No Child Left Behind 
(NCLB), and Race to the Top (RttT). 
Moving from the national level in this chapter to the local level in the one that 
follows, these two chapters will situate the neoliberal restructuring of New York City 
schools within the broader structural and discursive dynamics of racial capitalism. I will 
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ask “Why these policies, here, in these forms and at these times?” and look to the 
political economy for explanations. It will be argued that education policy, like the drug 
war and drug court reforms, emerged as- and continues to be- an important terrain for 
“the economic, cultural, and symbolic transformations” associated with processes of 
neoliberal urbanization, “beginning between the upheavals of the late 1960s and the 
economic crises of the early 1970s” (Smith, N., 1997, p. 117), and into the present. That 
is, education policy in New York City continues to be part of a constellation of broad 
policy shifts and discourses that have characterized the interlocking attacks on the 
welfare state and racial justice, and the concomitant emergence and advancement of 
neoliberal projects of capital accumulation, the restoration and maintenance of elite class 
power, and racial control.  
Towards a Critical Perspective of Federal Education Policy 
Federal education policy since the mid-1970s continues to be a strategic terrain 
for the restoration and maintenance of elite class power and racial hierarchies. It has 
become a policy arena that reshapes governance and finance, smudging the borders 
between the public and private sectors such that the wealth it creates is funneled upwards. 
Education, as critical scholars have noted, is essential to both the reproduction of class 
structures and the ideological management of inequality (Bowles, 1972, Apple, 1996; 
Anyon, 1981; Shor, 1992). Education policy also deploys curricular and pedagogical 
mechanisms for socialization (Shor, 1992), as it teaches us who, what, and how we 
should be as we navigate precarious material landscapes and complex “imagined worlds” 
(Appadurai, 1996). In this sense, federal education policy is both material and symbolic 
in its impact. It is also an end and a means of neoliberalization: It is an end in that the 
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outcomes of the policy instruments of, say, No Child Left Behind (e.g. increased 
technological investment, testing regimes, punitive accountability mechanisms, and 
charter school proliferation) have facilitated the creation of an under-regulated private 
sector in education, creating massive profits for what Diane Ravitch (2011) aptly refers to 
as “the billionaire boys club.” At the same time, education policy is a means- a strategy 
or technique- through which the wealth and influence of elites operates to reshape the 
spatial, discursive, and political-economic dimensions of urban life more generally. 
Federal education policy does not only reshape schooling and alter educational outcomes. 
It plays a crucial role in the ongoing production of urban space and the values, 
orientations, and habits of those who live in it. Education policy works on, and is worked 
back upon by, the built environment and its social meaning, and thus education policy, 
like drug policy, must be critically analyzed when considering the dynamics of capital 
accumulation, urban disinvestment and dispossession, and the uneven distribution of 
wealth and harm along lines of race and class.   
How then does federal education policy education since the mid-1970s fit within 
the interlocking racial and economic logics of neoliberal urbanization? First, education 
policy continues to “contribute to and embody the capitalist dynamic, regardless of the 
programmes of even well-meaning policy-makers” (Fainstein, p. 22, in Merrifield and 
Swyngedouw, 1997). That is, education policy helps produce conditions that reproduce 
and strengthen racial and social class hierarchies. It does this through a variety of 
strategies, including banking pedagogy that socializes students for the workforce (or 
unemployment) (Freire, 1970; Shor, 1992), instituting a hidden curriculum and 
epistemological orientation that reproduces social class (Anyon, 1980), tracking (Oakes, 
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2005), instituting a mono-cultural, Eurocentric, and alienating curriculum (Leonardo, 
2014; Shor, 1992), and through racialized disciplinary practices that feed poor youth of 
color into the carceral state (Ferguson, 2001; Nolan, 2011). Federal education policies 
link the state and capital in unique ways, and in situations of economic crisis, education 
policy, like drug policy, becomes a crucial site- in both material and ideological ways- in 
the “clash between the accumulation and legitimation needs of capital” (ibid, p. 22). In 
other words, capitalism as the extraction and hoarding of surplus value (profit) has 
accumulation needs- it requires certain social conditions, e.g. a low wage work force and 
an unemployed surplus population that helps suppress wages and increase profits. At the 
same time, the inequality and suffering such a system creates can be a threat to 
capitalism, particularly if those suffering under it come to see their conditions as rooted 
in racism and capitalism. Capitalism therefore has legitimation needs, or ideological 
conditions that rationalize and justify human suffering, obfuscating its structural causes.  
Thus, education policies can open new markets and absorb surplus capital and 
infrastructure, while providing an outlet for surplus state capacity (Gilmore, 2007) by 
“regulating” the poor and flexibilizing labor through a variety of disciplinary techniques 
(Piven, 1993; Harvey, 1989a). Furthermore, education policies and even schools 
themselves have taken on new roles in the “creative destruction” of urban space itself, as 
education continues to be intimately linked to processes of disinvestment and 
accumulation by dispossession (Smith, 1996; Harvey, 2003; Fine and Ruglis, 2009). For 
instance, schools are both an instrument for the devaluation of urban neighborhoods and 
part of the infrastructure of gentrification as those neighborhoods are “renewed.” Federal 
 111 
education policy since the 1970s, then, has emerged as an important way that the 
neoliberal state advances and protects processes of capital accumulation. 
Second, like the war on drugs, federal education policies reflect and embody the 
interrelatedness of race and class in society. That is, education is a state apparatus where 
racial ideology converges with economics. Through policy discourses, allocations, and 
mandates, the ideological and the material combine (Leonardo, 2009) to produce certain 
conditions and structures, and to represent them in ways that reinforce existing race and 
class hierarchies. Therefore, a critical policy analysis must situate federal education 
policy within the larger political, economic, and social dynamics that are continually 
reshaping the relationship between capitalism and racism. Schools reflect and perpetuate 
race and class inequality, as they are built from a rhetoric of capitalist logic and racial 
ideology which structures society so as to inextricably link schooling to broader 
inequities in the distribution of goods, services, wealth (Anyon, 2005), and harm. This 
chapter will situate federal education policy historically and theoretically within the 
gradual ascendance of neoliberal hegemony vis-à-vis the dismantling of the welfare state, 
the restoration of elite class power (Harvey, 2005), and the emergence of new forms of 
racial control (Alexander, 2012; Leonardo, 2014).  
Third, federal education policy is not a thing but rather a discursive agency for 
shaping reality. As Ball (1993) notes, policies, like all discourses, “exercise power 
through the production of ‘truth’ and ‘knowledge.’” Similarly, education policy, like all 
discourse, is ideological, addressing and interpellating (Althusser, 1971) those both inside 
and outside of the school walls, similar to Foucault’s (1977) analysis of the symbolic 
power of the prison. Critical policy analysis must therefore combine with critical 
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discourse analysis to identify and analyze the ideologies that dominate the policy 
discourse. Education policy works as a constellation of variegated symbolic expressions 
that embody modes of domination. Policies are tools for shaping human consciousness by 
structuring time, physical space, and action in order to discipline people into certain ways 
of thinking, doing, and being, constraining what Dewey (1938) calls our “purposeful 
activity.” Couching policy discourse in a rhetoric of equal opportunity, efficiency, human 
capital, and global competitiveness, policymakers at the same time construct a discourse 
that engages neoliberal subjects and orients them towards new forms of precarious labor, 
prolonged unemployment, individualism, consumption, and cultural politics.  
Like drug policies, federal education policies are top-down strategies for the 
ideological management of low-wage workers and surplus, marginalized populations. 
Furthermore, education policies act as “policy substitutes for economic reform- reforms 
like the creation of good jobs for low and middle income workers, including the 
requirement that employers pay decent wages, provide healthcare, and pensions” (Anyon, 
2011, p.67). That is, educational policy is lodged within a larger discourse that represents 
mass education as a solution to poverty. It is situated within an array of social policies 
that assert themselves as anti-poverty measures yet fail to include reforms that would 
actually produce a sustained decline in urban poverty (ibid). Instead, it operates 
discursively to engender “new racial subjects, as it creates and distinguishes between 
newly privileged and stigmatized collectivities... representing those neoliberalism 
dispossesses to be handicapped by their own ‘monoculturalism’ or other historico-
cultural deficiencies” (Melamed, 2006, p. 1). Like criminalization, federal education 
policy works as a discursive force whereby debilitating structural failures are mapped 
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onto racial subjects whose poverty is produced not by capitalism or racism, but by their 
own deficiencies and deviance.  
Thus, official discourse represents mass education as an equalizing force in 
society, providing opportunities to students who either succeed or fail as a product of 
their own character, values, family background, culture, language, etc. In the section that 
follows, I will trace how federal education policy since the mid-1970s has “policed” 
social and economic problems by displacing them from their structural roots in the 
dynamics of racial capitalism and linking them instead to the purported failures and 
deficits of schools, teachers, students, families, and entire groups- whom it then targets 
with new treatments and controls. I will explore how and why federal education policy 
manipulates schooling’s material and symbolic content in the interest of elite class power 
and racial control. As the welfare state was attacked and dismantled in the 1970s and on, 
educational policies and discourses changed the meaning and purposes of schools, and 
modified the ways in which the school a) operates as a site to protect, produce, and 
reproduce race and class hierarchies (Anyon, 1981; Leonardo, 2014), b) funnels public 
money into private hands (Fabricant and Fine, 2012; Lipman, 2011), and c) deploys its 
symbolic content in order to discipline individuals and groups (Foucault, 1977; Harvey, 
1989a; Ball, 1994) to changing conditions in the racialized political economy.  
ESEA, Title I, and the Attack on Welfare 
Federal education policy in the 1970s was marked by two important 
contradictions. First, the expansion of the federal government’s role in shaping education 
policy and funding schools occurred at a time when the welfare state was being widely 
discredited and dismantled in a variety of social arenas. It became increasingly difficult to 
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rationalize federal funding and policy-making within a welfarist, equity-oriented rhetoric, 
yet grassroots pressure, unrest, and the political gains attached to being “good for 
education” meant the state could not extricate itself from educational policymaking and 
funding altogether. In fact, federal funding for public education increased drastically as 
welfare was attacked, but federal policy could no longer lean on equity, redistribution, 
and racial justice as rationalizations for increased federal activism in education.  
Second, powerful rhetorical links were established between educational 
opportunity and economic growth for individuals and communities on the one hand, 
while deindustrialization, financialization, austerity, and “targeted abandonment” 
(Harvey, 1989b, p. 303), and mass incarceration exacerbated urban poverty on the other. 
Human capital theory established powerful rhetorical connections between the state, 
public education, and economic growth, yet widespread global, national, and municipal 
economic crises meant that opportunities were in fact diminished, unemployment and 
poverty were rampant, wages and benefits were suppressed as labor was disciplined, and 
poor communities of color faced increasingly deteriorating infrastructure and intensified 
policing. These structural dynamics challenged the legitimacy of human capital theory 
and meritocracy, and thereby threatened the capacity of education to serve as what 
Bowles (1972) refers to as the “ideological defense of capitalism.”   
 Following the Brown v. Board of Education decision in 1954, education policy 
and reform were more fully integrated into national politics, as the federal government 
declared segregated schools unconstitutional, and embarked on a controversial, contested, 
and never completed effort to integrate schools. Ten years later, in 1965, federal 
education policy linked racial justice to economic opportunity within what Melamed 
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(2006) refers to as the “liberal race paradigm,” in which the state “recognizes racial 
inequality as a problem, and it secures a liberal symbolic framework for race reform 
centered in abstract equality, market individualism, and inclusive civic nationalism” 
(p.2). The Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA) drew on a “liberal race 
paradigm” grounded in notions of equity and opportunity to rationalize increased federal 
activism in, and funding for, public education. Education became an integral part of 
Lyndon B. Johnson’s War on Poverty, whereby the incorporation of poor African 
Americans and Latinos into the labor market was seen as hinging on equal access to 
educational resources. Equal access was hindered by the accumulated historical effects of 
racial segregation and the linking of school funding to property wealth in a district. ESEA 
emphasized compensatory funding for schools as a way to target poverty, providing 
additional resources for disadvantaged students and monitoring states to ensure 
educational equity (McGuinn, 2006). In doing so, ESEA “did not aim to alter the 
operation of the labor market or to protect the least advantaged from its inequities and 
uncertainties, but rather to develop their human capital so that they could participate in it” 
(Kantor and Lowe, 2006, p. 8). Ensuring equitable investment in human capital emerged 
as an imagined federal policy solution to poverty. 
Because education was seen as crucial to labor market participation and social 
mobility within the welfarist human capital framework of the War on Poverty, ESEA 
emphasized redistribution and focused on the role of equitable inputs into education as 
being the key to mitigating urban poverty. Title I, which received $1.06 billion of the 
original $1.3 billion appropriated for ESEA, increased per-pupil expenditures for low-
income families, funneling additional funds into teaching staff, facilities, technology, 
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curriculum, and instruction (McGuinn, 2006, p. 29). As levers for “redirecting (and 
increasing) the monies that flowed into local agencies,” ESEA, and Title I in particular, 
were part and parcel of the kind of expansive, interventionist, and redistributive state 
associated with welfarism under the War on Poverty (Piven, 1993, p. 282). School 
districts would identify “educationally deprived” kids, determine their needs, and design 
programs to meet them. The district would then submit an application to the state 
Department of Education for approval. Once the state approved, it would monitor 
districts and submit fiscal reports and evaluations of local projects to the United States 
Office of Education. The federal role was limited to approving applications submitted by 
states for participation in the program and making sure they received the additional 
money. Beyond that, there were no federal mandates, prescriptions, or accountability 
mechanisms (Murphy, J. in Odden, A. 1991). The expansion of Title I was a welfarist 
strategy that exemplified the notion of “government as a transforming agency that could 
solve such long-standing problems as discrimination and poverty;” for as long as the 
needs of capital were met and profits were growing, “it seemed both possible and 
desirable to take part of the growth dividend and redistribute it to those who had been left 
out of the affluent society” via jobs programs, public works, welfare supports, and 
educational investment (Tabb, 1982, p. 12).  
With the coming of the dramatic economic crises of the early and mid-1970s, 
there was an increased tendency by social movements, civil rights groups, and other 
grassroots activists to bypass resistant and sluggish local and state governments and put 
pressure directly on the federal government to expand welfare (Piven, 1993). Increased 
disorder and grassroots political pressure resulted in greater welfare supports for 
 117 
individuals and families as the government sought to quell unrest among surplus 
populations. As the Title I program expanded in the early 1970s due to more effective 
grassroots activism, districts began experimenting with new strategies such as in-
classroom aides, afterschool programs, and smaller class sizes. Many schools saw an 
influx of new personnel- special education teachers, reading specialists, and teacher 
aides, and many students labeled as “disadvantaged” were pulled out of traditional 
programs and placed in programs where they received special instruction in reading and 
math (Peterson, Rabbe, and Wong, in Odden, 1991).  
Activism and unrest also resulted in an increased linking of Title I to the welfare 
state more generally, as organizations like the National Welfare Rights Organization 
fought to increase Title I expenditures not only for traditional educational inputs, but also 
for food, clothing, health, and other supports for impoverished youth and families 
(Murphy in Odden, 1991). As a result of increases in funding for ESEA and Title I, total 
educational revenues skyrocketed from $14.7 billion in 1960, to $40.3 billion in 1970, to 
$96.9 billion in 1980. Expenditures per pupil grew (in 2000-01) dollars from $3,482 in 
69-70, to $4,710 in 79-80. During the same period, the federal government’s share of 
educational expenditures rose from 8 percent to 9.8 percent, the state’s share increased 
from 39.9 percent to 46.8 percent, and the local share hovered at around 44 percent 
(Odden and Picus, 2000). Like other welfare programs of the late 1960s, ESEA and Title 
I did not seek out a radical transformation of racial capitalist structures, but rather 
emerged as an institutionalized investment in human capital that was part of a 
constellation of “governmental programs designed to moderate widespread political 
unrest among the black poor” (Piven, 1993, p. 337).  
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The expansion of Title I in the 1970s, and its embeddedness within the “liberal 
race paradigm” (Melamed, 2006) of the growing welfare state of the 60s, enveloped the 
state in a contradiction in terms of its relationship to capitalism. The expanding federal 
role in shaping and funding education policy in the mid-1970s was rationalized by 
welfarist rhetoric at a time when the welfare state and its supporting ideologies were 
falling into disrepute, and the relationship between the state and capital were 
transforming alongside national and global changes in the political economy. Though the 
embedded liberalism of the welfare state brought on substantial, albeit uneven, economic 
growth in the U.S. in the 50s and 60s, the 1970s signaled a “serious crisis of capital 
accumulation” accompanied by rampant unemployment and inflation (Harvey, 2005, p. 
12). Urban crises of the 1970s were part of a “global restructuring process” as 
corporations escaped “the control of spatially based governing structures” in order to 
“maximize profits without regard for the social cost or the social needs” (Tabb, 1982, p. 
6). Inflation, caused by the globalization of the dollar as banks and corporations 
increasingly turned to investment in less-regulated European and decolonized “Third 
World” markets to increase profits (as opposed to expanded industrial production at 
home) could not be managed by Keynesian monetary policies. The weakening of the 
dollar, coupled with “continuing wage pressure from US workers,” slowed the rate of 
profit for industry, which increasingly relocated abroad or to the sunbelt, shifted to 
financial speculation to reinvigorate profit flows (Panitch and Gindin, 2012, pg. 152), or, 
when possible, shifted the burden of slowing profits onto workers in the form of attacks 
on wages and benefits.  
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Labor militancy was robust: in 1970 alone, there were nation-wide strikes by 
133,000 General Electric workers, 152,000 federal postal workers, 110,000 truckers, 
355,000 General Motors workers, and 360,000 railroad workers, as well as smaller scale, 
local strikes by “construction workers, teachers, coalminers, rubber workers, 
longshoremen…and taxi drivers” (ibid, p. 141). Rank and file workers in the public and 
private sectors resisted the efforts of business to counter declines in profit by attacking 
wages, benefits, and pensions, while at the same time deindustrialization brought on 
waves of mass un- and underemployment. The disorder engendered by deteriorating 
economic conditions in the early 1970s was seen by elites as being enabled by the 
welfare state, as employers “understood that by shielding working people from some of 
the hazards of the market, relief reduces the power of employers over workers” and 
thereby “undermines labor discipline” (Piven, 1993, p. 345). In other words, if 
unemployment isn’t miserable enough, surplus populations will be less likely to accept 
low wage jobs, and the employed will risk unemployment to fight for higher wages and 
benefits. The reinvigoration of profit required the disciplining of labor, and dismantling 
the welfare state emerged as a strategy to revitalize profits by increasing the 
precariousness of work in order to diminish resistance and flexibilize labor (Harvey, 
1989a). 
Between 1973 and 1975, the welfare state had “proven inconsistent with the 
requirements of capital accumulation” (Harvey, 2005, p. 13). As the U.S. entered a deep 
recession, labor militancy and social unrest posed a “clear political threat to economic 
elites and ruling classes” who “had to move decisively if they were to protect themselves 
from political and economic annihilation” (ibid, p.15).  The state itself was threatened 
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alongside capital, as it faced growing social unrest, declining revenues, vast debts and a 
legitimacy crisis from the Vietnam War, and frightening social-democratic developments 
abroad as a new left socialist-inspired political economic strategies emerged and gained 
traction in Europe and South America (ibid). The Ford and Carter administrations, 
seeking to restore confidence in the dollar and attract investment, opted to restore 
profitability at the expense of welfare supports, wages, benefits, and unemployment, and 
as such “the postwar pragmatic care once unevenly bestowed on labor was transferred, 
with an icing of solicitude, to capital. The state focused on capital’s needs- particularly on 
how to minimize impediments, and maximize opportunities, for capital recruitment and 
retention” (Gilmore, 2007, p. 53). As industries closed and relocated to low-wage areas, 
federal monetary and housing policy, deregulation, and bailouts made financialization all 
the more profitable, and more businesses turned to speculation rather than production to 
shore up profits. State intervention shifted gears as the role of government was 
increasingly to “remove restrictions on trade and corporate investment, reduce corporate 
taxes and eliminate regulation of industry, limit the power of unions, turn public services 
and infrastructure over to the market, and withdraw from provision of social welfare” 
(Lipman, 2008, p. 8). Unions shrank, wage increases slowed behind the rate of inflation, 
businesses made vast cuts to their permanent workforce and leaned more heavily on part-
time, contingent low wage labor, benefits were slashed, income maintenance programs 
were eliminated, and wages in general declined for the working class and poor (Piven, 
1993). As a result, urban poverty increased 22 percent between 1970 and 1980, and the 
number of those living in extreme poverty areas- geographic areas with a poverty rate at 
40% or greater- or in shelters increased by 161 percent (Anyon, 1997). 
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Political economic shifts contradicted the equity-oriented human capital rhetoric 
underlying ESEA and Title I. Deindustrialization, financialization, and the accompanying 
attacks on welfare and labor had a drastic impact on wages, unemployment, and poverty- 
social costs and harms that were disproportionately borne by poor people of color. 
Though African Americans made educational gains in the 1960s and 70s, and some 
modest economic gains, the majority remained locked in “concentrated poverty in 
America’s inner cities” and faced “prolonged unemployment, underemployment, and 
detachment from the labor market” (Anyon, 2005, p. 40). The wage gap between Whites 
and African Americans grew in spite of educational gains during the 1970s, and though 
there was a decreasing gap in test scores between African Americans and Whites, people 
of color continued to occupy a “deteriorated position…in the labor market”(ibid, p. 41). 
For instance, 32 percent of African American men in 1969 were working at or below 
poverty level wages, 26 percent of Latinos, and 12 percent of Whites. By 1979, the 
number of working poor African Americans climbed to 37 percent, Latinos to 31 percent, 
and Whites to 16 percent, and by 1989, 42 percent of African Americans, 38 percent of 
Latinos, and 20 percent of Whites were working at or below poverty level wages. In 
situations of equal education, African Americans and Latinos were also 
disproportionately represented among the working poor (Corcoran and Chaudry, 1997). 
Where poor Whites experienced moderate social mobility, African Americans 
experienced higher rates of intergenerational poverty, as 17 percent of Whites born in 
poverty between 1942 and 1972 remained there as adults, whereas 42 percent of African 
Americans born during the same period remained in poverty (Wagmiller and Adelman, 
2009). 
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The social programs of the welfare state had “altered the terms of struggle 
between capital and labor” (Piven, 1993, p. 358), and the dismantling of those programs 
was crucial to the restoration of elite class power, as labor was disciplined and public 
monies were increasingly redirected towards public-private partnerships, tax incentives, 
corporate and financial infrastructure development, and subsidies for private real estate. 
ESEA and Title I not only survived the attack on the welfare state- the programs were 
expanded and federal funding increased. How is it that during a period of such damaging 
rollback of supports and supplements for the working class and poor, funding for ESEA 
jumped from $40.3 billion in 1970 to $96.9 billion in 1980? Similarly, expenditures per 
pupil grew (in 2000-01) dollars from $3,482 in 1969 to 1970, to $4,710 in 1979 to 1980 
(Odden and Picus, 2000). If the goals of dismantling of welfare state were restoring 
White privilege by rolling back the “positive liberties” gained by African Americans 
during the War on Poverty, as Quadagno (1996) argues, as well as the disciplining of 
labor, the restoration of elite class power, and a vast redistribution of income upwards, as 
Piven and Cloward (1993) and Harvey (2005) contend, how did a federal education 
policy that was premised on the notion that an equitable redistribution of opportunity 
would increase income for poor people of color not only survive, but thrive and expand? 
Colorblindness, incipient neoliberalism, and the conservative restoration 
ESEA did little to increase educational opportunity and economic mobility due to 
“insufficient funding levels and the way the available funds were allocated” as Title I 
funds “provided relatively limited resources to schools attended by large numbers of poor 
children” (Kantor and Lowe, 2006, p. 479). ESEA’s premises, promises, and failures 
were part of the ideological landscape that facilitated the dismantling of welfare and the 
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emergence of the neoliberal and neoconservative counterrevolutions in education and 
elsewhere. Federal education policy during this period helped reframe White working 
class economic and social insecurity as well as racial concerns in free market terms by 
marrying fiscal conservatism to notions of white supremacy and white privilege 
(Quadagno, 1996). As welfare was framed as the cause of the economic troubles of the 
1970s, so to were its chief recipients in urban areas: impoverished African Americans and 
Latinos. The compensatory programs of ESEA contributed to this framing by blaming 
poverty on the social and cultural problems of people of color- their educational deficits. 
These deficits, if left untreated, prevented the poor from competing in the labor market, 
which in turn made them dependent on welfare supports for survival. That is, ESEA and 
Title I reinforced the notion that the culture of poor people of color inhibited their 
mobility and locked them into poverty, producing the rampant welfare dependency that 
supposedly caused the economic recessions and urban fiscal crises that destabilized the 
White middle and working classes. White working class anxiety gave way to resentment, 
and diminished their support for the welfare state (ibid).  
The discourse linking racial and economic justice was increasingly dislodged 
from federal education policy, as New Right and centrist Democrats competed to build a 
vast political base of working class and southern Whites by casting their economic 
instability and racial concerns not only onto the criminality of the poor (Alexander, 
2012), but their educational deficits as well. ESEA linked notions of equity and human 
capital to a pervasive culture of poverty among the poor, discrediting the economic and 
racial justice claims of poor people of color by constructing them as a problem population 
whose cultural deficits, deviance, and values inhibited their ability to compete in the 
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labor force and made them dependent on welfare. This educational discourse reinforced 
criminalization, as both blamed the poor for their own poverty and linked their racial 
inferiority to the bloated welfare rolls that were supposedly at the root of the urban 
economic crisis. Poverty remained rooted in the culture of the poor, rather than the state-
supported racial capitalist conditions that emerged out of the political economic 
restructuring of the 1970s.   
Indeed, ESEA was always premised on the deficit-oriented position that schools 
needed to assimilate African Americans and Latinos into White middle class culture in 
order to make them competitive, but up until the mid-1970s, it did so as part of the 
redistributive rhetoric of a welfare state seeking to mitigate social unrest through full 
employment, wage protections, an expanding public sector, and direct intervention in the 
economy and corporate behavior. However, following Quadagno (1996), as the struggle 
for racial justice became increasingly embedded within welfarist social and economic 
policies, and economic insecurity increased for poor and working class Whites, both 
white supremacy and white privilege were reconstructed in relation to those programs. 
The “positive liberties” the welfare state extended to African Americans were viewed by 
the White middle and working classes as infringements on the “negative liberties” that 
secured their privilege and security, such as de facto segregation and discrimination. 
ESEA and Title I did not disrupt White flight or suburbanization- it accompanied them. 
Nor did it “disturb power relationships between the races” the way forced desegregation 
and busing “threatened white exclusivity” (Kantor and Lowe, p. 481). Rather, they 
functioned as federal policy substitutes for desegregation, replacing the politically dicey 
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agenda of integration with a human capital-oriented emphasis on increased educational 
funding as the antidote to a toxic and disabling culture of poverty.   
Federal education policy absorbed these racial conflicts, as it “forged racial 
hostility with conservative economic policy” (Quadagno, 1996, p. 195) by linking the 
culture of poverty thesis and educational opportunity with the costs of welfare supports 
for poor people of color. Furthermore, the purpose of education policy was reconstructed 
along incipient neoliberal lines through the production and wide circulation of influential 
critiques of Title I which framed it as a certain kind of failure, producing the ideological 
conditions for the emergence of imagined educational policy solutions for poverty that 
were amenable to political economic transformations of the late 20
th
 century and 
concomitant shifts in racial control. As such, though ESEA continued to embrace 
investment in human capital as a way of treating the pathologies of the poor, it shifted its 
emphasis from an equity-oriented discourse around the distribution of educational 
resources to a surveillance-oriented discourse around measuring and monitoring student 
performance and other educational outputs.  
A 1974 study of Title I by The Rand Corporation shows how the shift to a 
surveillance and accountability discourse was prefaced by a critique of Title I as being a 
failure due to its inability to generate useful data because the schools and districts 
themselves had no incentive to produce it: "The central cause is that LEAs [Local 
Educational Agencies, i.e. districts and schools] had no incentive to collect or report 
output data, and federal officials lacked the political muscle to enforce evaluation 
guidelines or to require cooperation with other federal evaluation efforts" (The Rand 
Corporation, 1974, p. vi). Title I was not ineffective as a force for social mobility because 
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of the dynamics of the political economy, nor was it hindered by racial inequality. Rather, 
the Rand study states, "the experience of Title I suggests that the local perception of 
federal initiatives and commitments as inherently unstable, combined with a basic 
defensiveness about achievement measures" is what undermined "federal attempts to 
secure objective, reliable program data" (ibid, p. vii).  
As a result, the study asserts, “The mandated evaluation scheme has led to local 
evaluation that is typically seen as little more than an annual ritualistic defense of 
program activities" (ibid). Better evaluation, according to the study, required not only 
additional funds, but an "appeal to dominant constraints and incentives," calls for 
"efficiency and rational planning," and "a three-step process that involved, first, control 
of program information systems; second, increased federal involvement in program 
planning; and, consequently more control for USOE…over state and local 
implementation of federal programs" (p. 93). The failure of Title I to create upward 
mobility for the poor was reduced to "the slippage between federal intent and local 
practice" due to a lack of "effective muscle at the top"(p. 109). By the mid-1970s, the 
Rand study concludes, "the Title I experience has shown how resistant the educational 
policy system is to assessment of achievements and accomplishments" and "the structure 
and control of the nation's education system hampers all reporting, and it may preclude 
the accountability and impact reports reformers wanted" (p.110-111).  
This critique resonated with shifts at the policymaking level, as the federal 
government, in a set of reforms in 1974, established the National Center for Education 
Statistics (NCES) (Education Amendments of 1974, Public Law 93-380). NCES was 
created to "collect, collate, and from time to time, report full and complete statistics on 
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the conditions of education in the United States" and to "conduct and publish reports on 
specialized analyses of such statistics" (ibid, p. 556). In addition to institutionalizing the 
discursive shift towards gathering data around achievement, the creation of the NCES 
also established new links between the public and private sector: "The Assistant 
Secretary is authorized to make grants to, and contracts with public and private 
institutions, agencies, organizations, and individuals" (p. 558). By 1974, public-private 
partnerships were already big business: the law creating the NCES set aside $20,000,000 
in grants made available for FY75, $25,000,000 for FY76, $30,000,000 for FY77 (ibid), 
thus setting the stage for the massive privatizations and public-private partnerships to 
come in the era of No Child Left Behind.  
ESEA and Title I thereby reinforced the displacement of racial and economic 
inequality from their structural roots and paved the way for the neoliberal education 
reforms of the 1980s and 90s by shifting from a compensatory treatment-oriented 
approach to the purported deficits of African American students to a more managerial 
formulation of the “problems of race and political economy in terms of educational 
achievement” (Kantor and Lowe, 2006, p. 477), and the failure of school districts to 
measure and report that achievement. Reforms to ESEA in the mid- to late-1970s, which 
sought to remedy the data-gathering gap, such as the creation of the NCES, established 
important links between the public and private sphere, setting aside millions in grant 
money to outsource data gathering, analysis, and publication of findings to private 
providers.  Furthermore, as Title I, in response to grassroots activism, expanded to 
include women and students with disabilities, wide swaths of educational activities were 
made available to the private sector. For instance, the 1974 reform to Title I which 
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established an "Advisory Council on Women's Educational Programs," authorized the 
commissioner to “make grants to, and enter into contracts with, public agencies and 
private nonprofit organizations and with individuals for activities… at all levels of 
education, including preschool, elementary and secondary education, higher education, 
and adult education" including "the development, evaluation, and dissemination…of 
curricula, textbooks, and other educational materials," as well as pre-service and in-
service training, and vocational and career education programs. Once again, millions 
were made available to private sector educational organizations, as this law allocated 
$30,000,000 per year for FY75, FY76, and FY77. In addition, the Commissioner was 
authorized to hand out small grants in the amount of $15,000 each for "innovative 
approaches" to educating women, to "private nonprofit agencies and to individuals"  
(Education Amendments of 1974, Public Law 93-380, p.554-555). 
The late 1970s found an inchoate neoliberal discourse also emerging in studies 
and critiques of ESEA and Title I that advocated the deregulation of federal education 
policy, while tying funding to increased autonomy, flexibility, and entrepreneurialism at 
the local level. A 1978 study undertaken by the Rand Corporation for the U.S. Office of 
Education paved the way for the neoliberal restructuring of public education in the 1980s 
and 90s. Falling in line with the general attack on welfare, this study of Title I programs 
argued against the importance of equitable funding and resources: "The choice of 
educational methods and the resources available (e.g. the amount of funding per student) 
determined the project's outcomes and continuation only a small and limited extent. 
Inputs to school districts, whether money, new methods, or federal guidelines, mattered 
less than other local factors" (p. 34). Instead, the report integrated the rhetoric of 
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achievement into free market ideology by linking achievement to federal deregulation 
and innovation at the local level. That is, achievement, rather than equity, should be the 
goal, and the federal government should not interfere with the entrepreneurial 
“innovative” capacities for improving achievement that exist at the local level. Though 
the report’s findings mention that the fed can have an impact on schooling when local 
education agencies' projects are federally funded, and that funding is tied to "federal 
guidelines that encouraged specific educational practices" (p. vi), the report generally 
challenges the notion that "the federal government should develop new technologies, 
provide incentives for their adoption, and introduce these technologies into school 
districts that were targeted, and thus accountable" (p. ix). Rather, they argue for increased 
autonomy and flexibility for schools, and a stronger role for state departments of 
education in determining curriculum, pedagogy, and school organization. The goal of the 
federal government should be to provide “seed money” for innovation, and tie this money 
to quantitative evidence of student achievement brought about by the entrepreneurial 
capacities of the local educational agencies (The Rand Corporation "Federal Programs 
Supporting Educational Change, Vol. VIII: Implementing and Sustaining Innovations" by 
Paul Berman and Milbrey Wallin McLaughlin, May 1978).  
Literacy Crisis and the Enemy Within 
The gradual neoliberalization of education policy was helped along by a 
“manufactured” literacy crisis in the late 1970s and early 80s (Berliner, 1995; Shor, 
1986). In 1975, the New York Times reported on its front page that scores on the SAT had 
fallen steadily for over a decade. The College Board appointed a commission to find out 
why scores were falling, and pointed the finger at the increased number of minority 
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students who were taking the test, but whose scores, due to their lower literacy and verbal 
skills, were lower than White students or “traditional test takers” (Ravitch, 2011, p. 24; 
Shor, 1986). That same year, Newsweek published a cover story entitled “Why Johnny 
Can’t Write” which argued for a renewed emphasis on basic skills and Standard English 
(Shor, 1986). The article is alarmist, warning parents that “the chances are less than ever 
that” their children “will be able to write English at the minimal college level when they 
get there” and that “their skills in writing English may not even qualify them for 
secretarial or clerical work” (Newsweek, December 8, 1975). “The statistics on literacy 
grow more appalling each year,” and in order to “stop the rot,” the article advocates an 
increased “focus on sentence and paragraph construction,” “traditional drills,” and an 
emphasis by teachers that “not all writing is equally admirable” (ibid). The article 
concludes: 
“The point is that there have to be some fixed rules, however tedious, if the codes 
of human communication are to remain decipherable. If the written language is 
placed at the mercy of every new colloquialism and if every fresh dialect demands 
and gets equal sway, then we will soon find ourselves back in Babel. In America 
today, as in the never-never world Alice discovered on her trip through the 
looking-glass, there are too many people intent on being masters of their language 
and too few willing to be its servants” (ibid).  
Speakers of non-Standard English, and the teachers and schools that “failed” them, were 
labeled as a threat to American social values and economic stability. Like Hall et al.’s 
(1978) muggers, literacy among poor youth of color “had become a central symbol for 
the many tensions and problems besetting American social and political life in 
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general…because of its ability to connote a whole complex of social themes in which the 
‘crisis of American society’ was reflected” (p. 19). The remedy for this nexus of political, 
economic, and racial crises was a “core curriculum” that could transmit “an official value 
system disguised as universal knowledge” and thereby “restore the hierarchy of power 
threatened by egalitarian social movements” (Shor, 1986, p. 23). That is, as political 
economic instability was exported to schools via the construction of a literacy crisis 
among poor youth of color, educational discourses around achievement, excellence, 
standards, and accountability were drawn on as policymakers and elites imagined new 
educational policy solutions to poverty. 
The literacy crisis incited a “moral panic” whereby themes of race, class, and 
education “condensed” into a discourse around literacy which served “as the articulator” 
or “ideological conductor” of fears and anxieties around the larger economic and racial 
crises that were threatening and destabilizing the status quo (Hall et al., 1978, p. viii). It 
braced up the attacks on welfare and the emerging neoliberal discourses linking political 
economic problems to issues of excellence, achievement, and accountability in education. 
The literacy crisis “took its own kind of stranglehold on the public and official 
imagination” (ibid, p.5), blaming the over-permissiveness of the welfare state and the 
progressive education movements of the 1960s for both the educational and economic 
problems of the 1970s (Shor, 1986) and “providing a spearhead for a white backlash 
against blacks and the poverty programmes (which seemed to be giving blacks an unfair 
advantage)” (Hall et al., 1978, p. 20). By constructing an “enemy within,” the literacy 
crisis created the ideological conditions for a “conservative restoration” in education 
policy that sought to reestablish race and class hierarchies, enhancing education’s 
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capacity to serve as an “ideological defense of an irrational political economic system” 
by ushering in a policy regime that emphasized basic skills, standards, and traditional 
values (Shor, 1986, p. 97).  
As Harvey (1989a) notes, “ideological and political hegemony in any society 
depends on an ability to control the material context of personal and social experience” 
(p. 227). “Considerable power,” he continues, “goes to those who command the 
techniques of representation” (p. 233). As such, the literacy crisis deployed a critique of 
public education that represented educational and economic issues in ways that were 
coherent with the needs of emerging forms of flexible capital accumulation. It did this 
chiefly by: a) articulating racially coded representations of the relationship between 
education and social class; b) framing the curricular and pedagogical content of 
progressive education as at odds with economic growth; and c) representing poor youth 
of color themselves as deficient and an “enemy within” whose ways of being threatened 
the very social fabric and economic stability of the nation. The conservative restoration 
emerged as a set of discourses and policies intended to “fix” these problem populations 
via a reform agenda that would transform the purposes of education, advance a core of 
“official knowledge” (given these new purposes), and alter school governance in order to 
reinforce traditional authority structures and give elite groups more control over the 
content and purposes of schooling (Apple, 2000).  
In conclusion, ESEA was linked to the welfare state in complex and contradictory 
ways. It emerged as part of Johnson’s War on Poverty, and was premised on a rhetoric 
that linked educational equity, in the form of increased resources, with economic mobility 
for poor people of color. It increased the expectations many poor and working class 
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people held for education, yet provided little in the way of economic growth and 
undermined desegregation efforts. When the economic crisis of the mid-1970s brought on 
declining profits for capital, threatening elite class power, and social movements and 
racial upheavals threatened white supremacy, the welfare state fell under attack as racial 
antagonisms were exploited to drive a wedge between working class/poor Whites and 
African Americans, undermining labor militancy and rolling back civil rights gains.  
Yet as unemployment soared, with an estimated 38 million jobs lost in the 1970s 
(Weis, 1988, p. 186), and urban poverty worsened, the federal government increasingly 
withdrew from social provision. The revamping of capital accumulation processes 
“characterized by the emergence of new sectors of production, new ways of providing 
financial services, new markets, and above all, greatly intensified rates of commercial, 
technological, and organizational innovation” demanded “more flexible work regimes 
and labor contracts” as employers shifted to an increased dependence on part-time, 
contingent, and temporary labor (Harvey, 1989a, p. 147). ESEA not only survived, but 
expanded, because it articulated a “reassertion of the preference to offer protection to 
citizens against the uncertainties of the market by reformulating the problems of poverty, 
inequality, and income insecurity in terms of economic growth and educational 
achievement [emphasis added]” (Kantor and Lowe, in Carter and Welner, 2013, p. 33). 
Federal education policy remained a prominent social policy ostensibly aimed at 
generating upward mobility for poor people of color at the same time that the political 
economy was restructured in a way that “permitted substantial redistributions of income 
to be achieved, which have advantaged, for the most part, the already privileged” 
(Harvey, 1989a, p. 171).  
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The moral panic of the literacy crisis reinforced culture of poverty theories, and 
helped create a discursive terrain for the conservative restoration in education to emerge 
as a solution that linked “the desire for stable values” with “a much more competitive 
individualism” and “ideologies of entrepreneurialism, paternalism, and privatism” (ibid, 
p. 171, 192). ESEA’s shift to an emphasis on standards, achievement, excellence, and 
assessment not only further obfuscated the structural causes of poverty, but also 
instigated shifts in pedagogy and curriculum that altered “the conditions of consciousness 
formation and political action” (ibid, p. 192; see also Freire, 1970; and Shor, 1992). The 
gradual transformation of the educational discursive terrain which accompanied the shift 
towards flexible accumulation culminated in A Nation at Risk (1983), as the cultural 
deficits of poor people of color were elevated from being an impediment to a racial, 
ethnic, or linguistic group’s ability to compete in the labor market, to the level of a threat 
to American competitiveness, security, and global hegemony. Through the publication of 
A Nation at Risk, and the education policies that followed in the 1990s and 2000s, the 
culture of poverty thesis grew into a discursive tool that called for policy instruments that 
transformed education into a crucial institution for crafting the neoliberal state (Leonardo, 
2007; Wacquant, 2010).  
A Nation at Risk and the Rise of Neoliberal Federal Education Policy 
Education discourse in the 1980s increasingly concerned “the distribution and use 
of money for the purpose of providing educational services and producing student 
achievement” (Odden and Picus, 2000, p. 1). There was a shift away from equity as an 
organizing principle of policy, and the state avoided redistributive, egalitarian educational 
discourses that framed educational inequality in relation to the diminished property tax 
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bases of historically disinvested neighborhoods and districts. Instead, the state embraced 
a discourse that situated poverty within a logic linking social mobility to the amount of 
federal funds spent on education, the use of those funds, and levels of student 
achievement. Policymakers, elites, and politicians wanted to know how the level and use 
of dollars affected achievement (Odden and Picus, 2000) and restructure schooling 
accordingly, but in a way that divorced the causes of educational inequality from the 
wider social context of deindustrialization, the transition to a service economy, increasing 
economic instability and polarization, and the localized impact of U.S. global economic 
hegemony (Lipman, 1998; Sassen, 2001).   
The publication of A Nation at Risk in 1983 helped resolve some of the 
contradictions that existed between the emerging regimes of capital mobility and flexible 
accumulation on the hand, and the fallacious human capital and meritocratic 
underpinnings of ESEA and Title I on the other. The “devaluation of labor power” via 
flexibilization (Harvey, 1989, pg. 192) and the shift towards a low-wage service economy 
(Sassen, 2001) increased inequality, while the dismantling of welfare meant that the state 
had to manage the resultant instability without recourse to the placating, albeit 
insufficient, redistributive mechanisms of the welfare state. A Nation at Risk 
reconstructed the relationship between the state and equality. Instead of drawing on 
redistributive discourses around economic and racial justice to link the state and equality, 
it construed the state as an agent of egalitarianism by asserting a state education apparatus 
that guarantees fairness via choice and competition in the free market (Apple, 2000; 
Harvey, 2005).  
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But as Stuart Hall (2011) cautions us, “Ideology is always contradictory… 
Ideology works best by suturing together contradictory lines of argument and emotional 
investments” (p. 18). The ideological task of A Nation at Risk, and the federal education 
policies that followed in its wake, was to mobilize educational discourse in a way that 
would reconcile increased poverty, inequality, and insecurity with the often-contradictory 
promises and values of both neoconservatism and neoliberalism. Using Hall’s 
vocabulary, A Nation at Risk had to “suture” the educational solutions to racism and 
poverty to the same racial capitalist forces that produced them. By deploying powerful 
discourses around excellence and risk, A Nation at Risk situated structural poverty and 
inequality within the larger discourses of individual failure and cultural deficiency that 
appealed to neoconservative values around individual responsibility and cultural unity, 
while simultaneously constructing a neoliberal educational discursive terrain where the 
incentives and sanctions of the free market could present themselves as viable solutions 
to social problems (Apple, 2000; Harvey, 2005).  The threat to children’s futures lay not 
within an increasingly volatile and racially hostile political economy, but rather within an 
education system that failed to institute the right corrective measures.  
Macro-level economic and social policies that facilitated the transition to 
deindustrialization, financialization, and the growth of the low-wage service sector 
brought with them waves of disinvestment, dispossession, and dislocations for poor 
people of color. These dynamics are reflected in shifts in the uneven distribution of 
wealth and harm along lines of race and class, leading up to, and following, the 
publication of A Nation at Risk. There were multiple global economic crises in the 1980s, 
and A Nation at Risk appeared on the heels of a deep recession in the U.S. in 1982, in 
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which the country saw a 50 percent jump in bankruptcies, a devastating decline in 
agricultural exports, and an increase in interest rates. Unemployment moved from 7 
percent in 1980 to 8 percent in 1981, then to 10.8 percent and peaking at 16.3 percent in 
1982. Interest-rate increases instigated by the Federal Reserve, intended to break 
inflation, resulted in a fall in home sales. The rise in unemployment, interest rates, and 
declining property values coincided with dismal approval ratings for Reagan, which 
reached an all-time low of 35% in early 1983 (New York Times, 01/21/09; Pew Research 
Center, 2010).  
The poverty threshold for a family of four in 1983 was $10,178 (U.S. Census 
Bureau, n.d.). In 1978, 15.8% of the U.S. population lived at or below 125 percent of the 
poverty level; by 1983, that number had grown to 20.3 percent (U.S. Census Bureau, 
n.d.). Furthermore, the percentage of people living in extreme poverty, below 50 percent 
of the poverty line, in 1978 was 3.6; by 1983, it had almost doubled, reaching 5.9 percent 
(U.S. Census Bureau, n.d.). A Census Bureau study (1984) looking at changes in poverty 
levels between 1981 and 1982 reveals the profound growth in poverty, especially among 
poor families of color living in the urban core, in the years leading up to the publication 
of A Nation at Risk. Between 1981 and 1982, in the third consecutive year of increasing 
poverty rates, the number of people in poverty rose from 31.8 million to 34.4 million, 
jumping 2.6 million or 8.1 percent. This was the highest level the nation had seen since 
1966. Of the people living below the poverty level in 1982, 23.5 million were white, 9.7 
million were African American, and 4.3 million were Latino. Differences in the increases 
in the poverty rate ran along lines of race and gender: between 1981 and 1982, poverty 
rates increased from 11 to 12 percent for whites, from 26.5 to 29.9 percent for Latinos, 
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and from 34.2 to 35.6 percent for African Americans- indicating not only higher rates of 
poverty among families of color, but statistically significant disproportionate increases 
for African Americans and Latinos during this period. Women also faced higher 
increases in poverty rates, rising from 26.6 to 27.7 percent, as compared to 18.1 to 18.8 
percent for men (a 1.1 percent increase for women and a .7 percent increase for men). 
There was also an increase in poverty rates for single parent female-headed families, 
which hit 3.4 million poor families in 1982, increasing from a 34.6 percent poverty rate in 
1981 to a 36.3 percent rate in 1982. Children were hard hit by the economic restructuring 
of the late 1970s and early 80s: Between 1981 and 1982, the number of children living in 
poverty increased from 12.3 million to 13.5 million- the rate rising from 19.8 percent to 
21.7 percent. Out of all age groups, children under 15 faced the largest increase in 
poverty rates during this period (ibid).  
This racialized growth in poverty was spatially articulated, disproportionately 
affecting families of color living in urban core neighborhoods. Of all people living below 
poverty line in 1982, 61.8 percent lived in metropolitan areas, 36.9 percent of them in 
central cities and 24.9 percent outside the central city in suburban areas, nearby small 
cities, and towns.  Of all poor whites in 1982, 28.7 percent lived in central city areas, as 
compared to 56.1 percent of blacks. Furthermore, only 7.7 percent of poor whites lived in 
high poverty areas, compared to 32.3 percent of blacks.  Central city neighborhoods of 
metropolitan areas faced greater increases in poverty than areas outside the central city. 
In central city areas, there was an increase from 11.2 million people living under the 
poverty level in 1981 to 12.7 million people in 1982, whereas poverty in outside central 
city areas increased from 8.1 to 8.6 million. Central city areas faced a 19.9 percent 
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unemployment rate, compared to only 9.3 percent for areas outside the central city. 10.4 
percent of white people living in metropolitan areas were below the poverty level in 
1982, compared to 33.5 percent of African Americans. Likewise, 14.5 percent of white 
people living in center city areas were poor, compared to 36.9 percent of African 
Americans. Even in predominantly white suburban areas outside the central city, 25 
percent of African Americans were poor, as opposed to only 8.1 percent of whites (ibid).  
 The staggering growth in poverty among people of color in the early 1980s, and 
its spatial expression in core urban areas, was exacerbated by severe cuts to public 
housing. In 1979, 38.5% of subsidized housing recipients were African American. In 
1982, Reagan terminated most federal funding for new construction of subsidized 
housing and raised the price of existing housing by 5% (Quadagno, 1996). In addition, 
federal urban development funds fell from $19.8 billion in 1980 to $8.7 billion in 1990. 
In 1980, one out of every five dollars cities spent came from the federal government; by 
1990 it was one out of every ten. As a result, central business district (CBD) development 
was funded by a mix of public money (tax breaks and subsidies) and private dollars 
directed at projects initiated by developers, bankers, finance, and corporations (Moody, 
2007). Public money also subsidized the suburbanization of production, resulting in the 
movement of high tech jobs and manufacturing into suburban areas unreachable by the 
public transportation methods poor urban laborers relied upon (Lipman, 2008; Anyon, 
2005). Technological shifts that accompanied flexible accumulation placed higher 
educational demands on workers as high-paying, entry level manufacturing jobs 
evaporated, leaving unskilled, undereducated surplus populations facing either low-wage 
service industry work, part-time highly contingent labor, or unemployment. As a result, 
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the distribution of wealth became increasingly polarized in the 1980s. For instance, 
between 1983-89, the top 20 percent of the U.S. population gained just under 99% of the 
growth in the marketable wealth. The bottom 80% gained only a little over 1%, and 
suffered most of the loss in income (Lipman, 1998).  
The political economic transformations of the late 1970s and early 1980s created 
a vast surplus population of unemployed and impoverished people of color. Where once 
the welfare state “[solved] accumulation problems- at least in the medium run- by 
assuming some of the costs of ‘reproducing’ labor power” and “[solved] legitimation 
problems by providing public jobs or income transfers for people who are made 
superfluous by the advance of capitalism” (Piven and Cloward, 1993, p. 414)), A Nation 
at Risk framed education as the cause of economic problems, and articulated an education 
policy solution for dealing with surplus populations, drawing on and advancing a 
neoliberal discourse that, as Harvey (2005) points out, was gaining credence nationwide 
as the “only alternative” to the welfare state. Following Apple (2000) and Harvey (2005), 
the restoration of elite class power that emerged out of the restructuring of the 1970s and 
early 80s meant that economic crises, such as mass unemployment and poverty, must be 
resolved in ways that are amenable to elite interests. Elite control over government and 
its institutions results in a class dynamic in which the imagined resolution to 
unemployment and poverty doesn’t necessarily have to entail the creation of jobs, higher 
wages, or alleviating the harms associated with poverty. Instead, the report claims that “to 
keep and improve on the slim competitive edge we still retain in world markets, we must 
dedicate ourselves to the reform of our educational system for the benefit of all--old and 
young alike, affluent and poor, majority and minority. Learning is the indispensable 
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investment required for success in the ‘information age’ we are entering” (Gardner, 
1983).  
 The restoration of elite class power that emerged out of the crises of the 1970s 
(Harvey, 2005) meant resolving economic crises would entail the realigning of social 
institutions like schools- a neoliberal restructuring that required new ways of framing 
educational problems as the cause of poverty and unemployment. Whereas Diane Ravitch 
(2011) contends that A Nation at Risk was “a response to the radical school reforms of 
the 1960s and early 1970s” (p. 23), it’s significance in this analysis derives from the ways 
it elaborated a new discursive terrain through which elites could “export” crises from 
their own practices and policies and map them onto schools. That is, to solve the 
problems of poverty, schools, teachers, curricula, and students needed to be more tightly 
controlled, and education in general had to be more finely tuned to the changing needs of 
increasingly globalized corporations, finance, and industry (Apple, 2000). As such, the 
report reminds us: 
History is not kind to idlers… The world is indeed one global village. We live 
among determined, well-educated, and strongly motivated competitors. We 
compete with them for international standing and markets, not only with products 
but also with the ideas of our laboratories and neighborhood workshops. 
America's position in the world may once have been reasonably secure with only 
a few exceptionally well-trained men and women. It is no longer.  
The report’s introduction goes on to frame the political economic transformations 
wrought by globalization as “a redistribution of trained capability throughout the globe” 
such that “knowledge, learning, information, and skilled intelligence are the new raw 
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materials of international commerce” (Gardner, 1983). That is, U.S. businesses could be 
more competitive if high school graduates had stronger cognitive skills and facility with 
technology (Anyon, 2011). But as Steven J. Ball (1993) notes, “discourses are about what 
can be said, and thought, but also- about who can speak, when, where, and with what 
authority.” A Nation at Risk was prepared by the National Commission on Excellence in 
Education- an elite group appointed by Terrell Bell, Secretary of Education under 
Reagan, and chaired by David P. Gardner, a former army intelligence officer and then 
president-elect of the University of California (Shor, 1986). The commission featured a 
mix of politicians, college presidents and professors, educators, and representatives from 
the business world like William O. Baker, then president of Bell Laboratories, a division 
of the AT&T Corporation. Corporate ideals were also represented by the presence of 
Charles A. Foster, Jr., former president of the Foundation for Teaching Economics, a 
private nonprofit organization whose mission is to "introduce young individuals…to an 
economic way of thinking about national and international issues," based on the 
proposition that "people choose, and individual choices are the source of social 
outcomes" (http://www.fte.org/). Another advocate of neoconservative and free market 
ideology was committee member Annette Y. Kirk of Kirk Associates- now the Russell 
Kirk Center for Cultural Renewal- a private nonprofit organization whose mission is 
"conveying to America's rising generations an understanding of the process by which a 
healthy culture is transmitted from age to age" and promoting "an appreciation of the 
'permanent things' that maintain and nurture our civil social order." In the 1990s, Kirk 
went on to serve as a board member of the Midland Charter Initiative in Michigan, and 
the Education Freedom Fund (http://www.kirkcenter.org/index.php/about-us). Committee 
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member Robert V. Haderlein was the former president of the National School Boards 
Association, an organization whose "Vision for Public Education" echoes this connection 
between culture, stability, and the economy. It states that education is the key to 
achieving "a standard living that is the American Dream" and that public education must 
"continue to be the backbone of our nation's unity" and "common culture," thereby 
providing "the foundation for social and merit based mobility that is so essential for a 
vibrant democracy and leading world economy" (National School Boards Association, 
n.d., p. 1).  
Albert H. Quie, was the one governor on the committee. As governor of 
Minnesota, he addressed the state's budget crisis through cuts to social services, along 
with a tax-indexing plan which protected wealthy Minnesotans from being pushed into a 
higher tax bracket due to inflation- a move which cost the state $800 million in revenues, 
casting the state into an even deeper deficit and calling for even greater austerity 
(Minnesota Post, 05/12/09). Yet budget crises, the impact of inflation on the working 
class, regressive tax structures, and cuts to important social services for the poor do not 
feature in the discourse advanced by the report. Instead, according to A Nation at Risk, 
economic problems emerge from the fact that “more and more young people emerge 
from high school ready neither for college nor for work. This predicament becomes more 
acute as the knowledge base continues its rapid expansion, the number of traditional jobs 
shrinks, and new jobs demand greater sophistication and preparation” (Gardner, 1983). 
But as Anyon (1997) points out, unequal funding, due to the spatially uneven distribution 
of property wealth, results in patterns of unequal spending on schools by district. The 
restructuring of the national economy in the late 1970s and early 80s resulted in a severe 
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decline in low-skill employment in manufacturing and an increase in “highly productive, 
highly skilled, and capital intensive positions” of a “postindustrial, information-
dependent, high value-added manufacturing and service based economy” where there 
were very few high-wage jobs and a growth in low-wage work (p.130). 
The report invoked a crisis around the “quality” of education by linking economic 
growth to educational deficits indicated by declining SAT scores between 1963-1980. 
Further evidence of a crisis was provided by reference to lower scores on other 
standardized tests and international assessments, illiteracy, the expansion of remedial 
classes on college campuses, and the rising costs of remedial programs plaguing the 
military and business (Ravitch, 2011; Berliner, 1995). The “erosion of the content of the 
curriculum” was seen as a chief culprit. The authors cited a growth in the “general track” 
from 12% in 1964 to 42% in 1979, which, when combined with student curricular choice, 
led to “a situation in which only small proportions of high school students completed 
standard, intermediate, an advanced courses” (Ravitch, 2011, p. 26). The report also 
claimed that academic standards had fallen: teachers were giving less homework, schools 
enacted easy graduation requirements, colleges lowered their entry requirements, and 
schools were offering less courses in math and science compared to those in Japan (ibid). 
As a result, the authors, in the report’s famous opening paragraph, assert that: 
Our Nation is at risk. Our once unchallenged preeminence in commerce, industry, 
science, and technological innovation is being overtaken by competitors 
throughout the world. This report is concerned with only one of the many causes 
and dimensions of the problem, but it is the one that undergirds American 
prosperity, security, and civility. We report to the American people that while we 
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can take justifiable pride in what our schools and colleges have historically 
accomplished and contributed to the United States and the well-being of its 
people, the educational foundations of our society are presently being eroded by a 
rising tide of mediocrity that threatens our very future as a Nation and a people 
(Gardner, 1983). 
Part of the political economic context for the publication of A Nation at Risk was a 
national recession in the early 1980s. This period was marked by a growth in inequality 
as financialization, deindustrialization, flexible accumulation, and the disappearance of 
social supports funneled wealth up the social ladder and exacerbated urban poverty. At 
the same time, the late 1970s and early 1980s witnessed “the geographical mobility of 
manufacturing capital that the increasingly hyper-mobile financial capital could feed 
upon” (Harvey, 2003, p. 64).  
The expansion of transnational capitalism took shape not just in the form of 
outsourcing by U.S. based multinational corporations, but though the integration of 
global financial markets. These global financial markets, because of deregulation and 
increased speculative activity, became more and more volatile. Furthermore, periodic 
slows in the rate of profit at home were accompanied by increased competition from 
highly productive countries like Japan and Germany, whose products helped sustain the 
U.S.’s high levels of consumption (Ginden & Panitch, 2012). Elites were able to restore 
their class power at home, gaining considerable control over government, social and 
economic policy, and public institutions. But the transnational capitalism and 
internationalization of finance that sustained economic elites in the 1970s and early 1980s 
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brought with them new levels of competition and volatility that threatened to undermine 
the massive influx of capital into U.S. firms and corporations.  
The linking of “educational excellence” to American security in A Nation at Risk 
demonstrates how “it became clear that manufacturing in the United States was now but 
one complex among many operating in a highly competitive global environment, and that 
the only way it could survive was by achieving superiority…in productivity and in 
product design and development” (Harvey, 2003, p. 65). A Nation at Risk called for the 
development of a repressive educational apparatus which, as a “core organ of the state” 
(Wacquant, 2010), would function as a “terminal outlet” (Foucault, 1978) for state power 
as it stifled the dissent and unrest generated by globalized racial capitalism through 
projects of pedagogical and curricular pacification and incorporation into the dominant 
culture (Freire, 1970; Apple, 1979; Anyon, 1981; Shor, 1992). Furthermore, A Nation at 
Risk asserted a productive role for public education, articulating its “expressive function 
and ramifying material effects… which are to generate controlling images and public 
categories, to stoke collective emotions, and accentuate salient social boundaries” 
Wacquant, 2010, p. 215). The racially-coded invocation of a crisis in math, science, and 
literacy stigmatized poor people of color and framed them as an enemy within, a dull and 
dangerous caste, high water surging forth in a “tide of mediocrity” that was washing 
away U.S. competitiveness. This anxiety-provoking narrative pinned insecurity to a 
problem population, and called for a profound intervention by the state in the form of a 
mandated treatment regimen of standards and tests. This regimen would boost cognitive 
and technical skills, establish “excellence in education,” and thereby secure U.S. 
economic productivity, competitiveness, and hegemony. But it would take time before 
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the standards and testing regime could really establish itself, and the full blown 
implementation of the regime would not emerge as the dominant educational policy 
paradigm until Bill Clinton’s Goals 2000 and Improving America’s Schools Act in the 
1990s. 
Reagan’s free market fundamentalism materialized in brazen attempts to demolish 
the Federal Department of Education and devolve federal funding to individual 
consumers via a comprehensive voucher system, but this agenda was met with strong 
political resistance from Democrats and teachers unions, and his efforts were ultimately 
defeated. But in addition to securing the place of standards and testing in public 
schooling, education policy in the 1990s also realigned and reinvigorated elite efforts to 
corporatize education, as it forced open markets and capital markets in heretofore 
minimally profitable arenas. Furthermore, education policy and practice under Clinton 
was retooled into a means by which elites sought to “increase their power in the larger 
social arena” (Apple, 2000, p.10) by redefining the public sphere such that it was more 
amenable to private sector management techniques. As is well documented elsewhere, 
the neoliberal agenda in education hit full stride with the passing of the No Child Left 
Behind Act (NCLB) in 2001 (Anyon, 2011; Apple, 2004, 2006; Giroux; 2011; Hursh and 
Martina, 2003; Hursh, 2007; Lipman, 2005, 2008, 2011), and continues unabated in 
Obama’s Race to the Top (RttT) initiative and American Recovery and Reinvestment Act 
of 2009.  
Globalization in the 1980s caused a decline in profits from production, so more 
U.S. corporations turned to financialization to supplement transnational, flexible 
accumulation processes and reinvigorate profit flows- a process that intensified in the 
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1990s. This required a further disciplining of the labor force, deregulation, austerity, and 
the opening of new markets and capital markets at home and abroad- hallmarks of the 
neoliberal project (Harvey, 2003). Education reform in the 1990s and 2000s was part and 
parcel of this project, as the standards, testing, and accountability regime created a multi-
billion dollar global education-industrial complex (Ball, 2012; Picciano and Spring, 
2013). At the same time that capital accumulation processes in New York City 
necessitated disinvestment in and “targeted abandonment”(Harvey, 1989b) of educational 
and other infrastructure in certain neighborhoods, policies like NCLB were incorporating 
urban education in New York deeper into the “new financial architecture” (Harvey, 2003, 
p. 73) of neoliberal urbanism. The next chapter will situate the development of charter 
schools in New York within the dynamics of austerity, disinvestment, and dispossession 
that accompanied the city’s economic restructuring in the aftermath of the mid-1970s 
fiscal crisis. Furthermore, the shift to financialization brought with it increased inequality 
(Sassen, 2001; Lipman, 2011) and volatility- and thus more social and economic crises, 
while the dismantling of the welfare state signaled a shift in modes of state intervention 
from crisis prevention to crisis containment (Panitch and Gindin, 2013). The next chapter 
will trace how education reform in New York City- particularly the proliferation of 
charter schools- materialized, alongside mass incarceration, as part of the creative 
destruction that characterizes processes of urbanization within the neoliberal state 
(Harvey, 2007). Whereas other scholars (Fabricant & Fine, 2012; Lipman, 2011; Pedroni, 
2007) frame the charter school phenomenon as a corporate cooptation of what was 
originally a grassroots response to the failures of the public school system, this analysis 
will extend those arguments by analyzing continuity in the roll out of charter schools. 
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Charters, it will be argued, are also part and parcel of disinvestment, not just a response 
to it. As such, education reform in New York City will be analyzed as a highly localized 
form of “structural adjustment” akin to the global manipulations of the IMF and World 
Bank.  
Furthermore, the symbolic power of charter school proliferation in New York 
emerges out of the contradiction between the promises of human capital theory and the 
inherently disequalizing effects of neoliberalism. Flexible accumulation, financialization, 
and globalized capitalism create material and discursive conditions that challenge the 
capacity of schooling to serve as the “ideological defense of capitalism” (Bowles, 1972) 
and threaten the “common sense” of racial capitalist social relations and hierarchies. 
Public schools face a legitimacy crisis, and charters articulate a reworking of the 














“Delivering on the Dream”: A Political Economy of New York City Charter Schools 
NOW, THEREFORE, I, BARACK OBAMA, President of the United States of 
America, by virtue of the authority vested in me by the Constitution and the laws 
of the United States, do hereby proclaim May 5 through May 11, 2013, as 
National Charter Schools Week. I commend our Nation's charter schools, 
teachers, and administrators, and I call on States and communities to support 
charter schools and the students they serve.  
-Presidential Proclamation, National Charter Schools Week, 2013 
 
This chapter will situate the development and proliferation of charter schools in 
New York City within shifts in the global political economy that brought about waves of 
“targeted abandonment” (Harvey, 1989b), dispossession, and new forms of social control 
as deindustrializing New York transitioned into a “global city” driven by finance, 
investment, and real estate (Sassen, 2001). Drawing on a mix of primary and secondary 
sources, the analysis that follows will explore the historical interplay of material and 
ideological conditions in New York in order to analyze charter school reforms along 
several braided strands. First, the response by elites and the state to New York City’s 
fiscal crisis in the 1970s was akin to the current practices of global financial institutions 
like the IMF and World Bank as they “bail out” fiscally stressed developing nations in 
order to discipline labor, slash public expenditures, cut taxes on elites and business, and 
open up new and deregulated markets. Charters emerged, in part, out of a highly 
localized form of “structural adjustment” visited upon New York City in the form of 
 151 
municipal austerity. Second, charter reforms are discursively, materially, and spatially 
located at the intersection of education and urbanization, especially processes of 
disinvestment, gentrification, and central business district (CBD) development. A critical 
analysis of charter school reform in New York must therefore account for the place of 
charters within these spatial dynamics and the impact of this relationship along lines of 
race and class. 
Third, Charter schools are vehicles for the corporatization of public education. 
They are linked to processes of privatization and the absorption of surplus capital. They 
channel public sector funds into the private sector, rendering public schools important 
sources of surplus capital flows under corporate control. Charters expand private sector 
control over schooling and incorporate teachers, parents, and students into the logic of 
capital in new ways by commodifying educational services. As a crucial part of the larger 
testing and common core regime, charters help open new opportunities for profit making 
in the public sector. By providing ‘alternative’ schools in historically disinvested 
neighborhoods, with extremely limited space for youth, the resulting competition among 
parents has created a small but vocal constituency of corporate allies in the impoverished 
urban core. In addition, charters have become an important wedge in capital’s war against 
organized labor, as teachers’ unions face unprecedented attacks from across the political 
spectrum. Finally, charter reforms indicate a reworking of the ideological functions of 
schooling, particularly the notion of equal educational opportunity as a meritocratic 
mechanism for the development of human capital. The “common sense” of charter 
schools, and the market model in education more generally, is linked to the historic 
inability of disinvested public schools and neighborhoods to provide upward mobility for 
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many poor people of color (Lipman, 2011)- a contradiction which diminished the 
capacity of schooling to serve as the “ideological defense of capitalism” (Bowles, 1972). 
School choice discourse revitalizes the construction of consent by merging culture of 
poverty theories with the commodification of education in a way that positions parents to 
perform unpaid labor in order to make “good choices” in an ostensibly equitable 
education marketplace. Charters use free market ideology to revamp cultural explanations 
of African American and Latino poverty, further obscuring inequality’s structural roots in 
racial capitalism and legitimizing social and economic policies that exacerbate race and 
class inequality. 
To tease out these interlocking material and ideological strands, the chapter will 
begin by situating school choice historically. First, it will examine the federal policy 
context for the charter school movement by analyzing the development of school choice 
within reforms to ESEA in the 1990s. Next, the chapter will zoom in to look at the 
development of charter schools in New York City as an outgrowth of the political 
economic shifts that structured school decentralization in New York in the 1970s, 80s, 
and 90s, and as well as the era of No Child Left Behind and mayoral control in the 2000s. 
Finally, the chapter will conclude with a Marxian analysis of charter schools. By drawing 
on Marx’s theory of the coercive law of competition (1867), I will analyze the underlying 
assumptions behind marketizing education, as well as the impact of competition on the 
distribution of wealth and harm in New York City. 
Federal Education Policy and the War on (the Culture of) Poverty 
 The previous chapter situated federal educational policy and discourse within the 
context of the complex racial and political economic dynamics of the 1970s and 1980s. It 
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examined how ESEA and Title I survived the dismantling of the welfare state, and how 
they were, both materially and ideologically, implicated in the shift to neoliberalism. The 
chapter examined how the literacy crisis and the A Nation at Risk report helped establish 
a new discursive terrain for educational policy, whose subtext, I argued, linked it to the 
restoration of elite class power and the revamping of racial hierarchies that were 
challenged by the upheavals of the 1960s and early 70s. This section will pick up where 
the previous chapter left off, but with a particular focus on the renewed place of school 
choice, particularly in the form of charter schools, in the federal educational policies of 
the 90s and 2000s. Reagan’s efforts to dismantle the federal Department of Education and 
devolve federal involvement in education to the issuance of vouchers were ultimately 
defeated. Vouchers became educational policy in cities like Milwaukee and Cleveland, 
and were experimented with briefly in New York City under Giuliani’s mayoralty. 
Though vouchers never took off the way Milton Friedman or Ronald Reagan might have 
liked, the underlying market ideology survived and was, with great success, rearticulated 
through the charter school movement.  
In the 1990s and 2000s, school choice was reinvented in a way that gripped the 
social imagination of federal policymakers. Charter schools, as public-private 
partnerships, held broad appeal across the political spectrum as a way to use market 
practices to improve education. At the same time, neoliberalism had moved in from the 
fringes and was reorienting social and economic policy in a variety of arenas. Once “the 
only alternative” to the welfare state, neoliberalism was becoming established, 
ideologically, as the new common sense, and, materially, as an actually existing regime 
of power capable of restructuring urban areas along lines amenable to the changing needs 
 154 
of racial capitalism (Harvey, 2003, 2005; Brenner, 2002). Furthermore, neoliberalization, 
as a form of capitalist creative destruction (Harvey, 2007), was creating its own crises as 
well, to which education reform, like policing and mass incarceration, was imagined as a 
solution. 
There was a substantial growth in market discourse in education during the 1980s 
and 90s as corporate elites, economists, and neoliberal think tanks increasingly shaped 
educational rhetoric. The nascent demand to educate students for the kind of labor force 
needed by a rapidly changing and unstable global economy soon became the standard 
call. Schooling became a critical site for preparation for the “knowledge economy,” with 
its emphasis on technological knowledge and skills as crucial to participation in the 
globalized workforce.
2
 This rearticulation of the purposes of education hit full stride in 
1983 with the publication of A Nation at Risk, which was followed by other influential 
reports, underwritten by corporations, proclaiming links between education and the 
global economy. For instance, Action for excellence: A comprehensive plan to improve 
our nation’s schools was published in 1983 and focused in large part on creating a 
stronger role for business in setting the goals and purposes for education for the U.S. Its 
author, The Task Force on Education for Economic Growth, was funded by 15 
corporations and foundations, including Aetna Life & Casualty Insurance Foundation, 
At&T, Control Data, Dow Chemical, Xerox, Texas Instruments, RCA, Ford Motor 
Company, and IBM. In 1986, A Nation Prepared: Teachers for the 21
st
 Century- a report 
published by the Task Force on Teaching as a Profession- further reinforced this market 
                                                        
2 The use of the term “knowledge economy” in published books increased 110 
percent between 1973 and 2008 (Michel, J. et al., 2010). 
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rhetoric as it called for an increased emphasis on education for participation in the labor 
market and workplace productivity (Spring, 1998).  
In 1989, when George H.W. Bush took office, he convened a national summit of 
governors to come up with a set of educational goals that would address these needs. The 
resulting proposal, America 2000, would inform education policy under presidents 
Clinton, Bush Jr., and Obama. The goals included the following: By the year 2000, 
American students would rank first in the world in math and science; the U.S. would 
have at least 90% graduation rate; all children would master difficult subject matter; all 
adults would be literate and ready to compete in the global economy; every school would 
be free of drugs, alcohol, and violence (Ravitch, 2011). In his 1991 “Address to the 
Nation on the National Education Strategy,” Bush explicitly linked these educational 
goals to the needs of the free market: 
Education has always meant opportunity. Today, education determines not just 
which students will succeed but also which nations will thrive in a world united in 
pursuit of freedom in enterprise. Think about the changes transforming our world: 
the collapse of communism and the cold war, the advent and acceleration of the 
Information Age. Down through history, we've defined resources as soil and 
stones, land and the riches buried beneath. No more. Our greatest national 
resource lies within ourselves: our intelligence, ingenuity, the capacity of the 
human mind. 
In this speech, Bush is framing “the capacity of the human mind” as a commodity to be 
extracted from schooling, the way coal is dug out of the earth, and exchanged in the free 
market for vast “riches.” In order to push privatization, Bush caulks his claims about the 
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returns on educational investment with a class and color-blind appeal to an equality that 
does not exist, representing the economic promise of education in an exaggerated light. 
Priming the pump for school choice, he goes on to link educational innovation to 
opportunity, and, in the spirit of the time, invokes the racially-coded threat of urban crime 
and drug use: 
If we want America to remain a leader, a force for good in the world, we must 
lead the way in educational innovation. And if we want to combat crime and drug 
abuse, if we want to create hope and opportunity in the bleak corners of this 
country where there is now nothing but defeat and despair, we must dispel the 
darkness with the enlightenment that a sound and well-rounded education 
provides...Think about every problem, every challenge we face. The solution to 
each starts with education. 
Bush was establishing crucial links in education discourse that would permeate and shape 
the reforms and practices mandated by Goals 2000, No Child Left Behind, and Race to 
the Top. He was also helping to construct an imagined urban landscape of “bleak 
corners” of “defeat and despair” plagued by a “darkness” which only an “enlightened” 
education could “dispel.” Education reform, dressed in an exaggerated promise of the 
American Dream for all, was a discursive tool for constructing a race and class-blind 
frame for thinking about and treating social and economic problems that were in fact race 
and class-bound: Between 1983 and 1989, the top 20 percent of the U.S. population 
captured approximately 99 percent of the growth in wealth, while the bottom 80 percent 
gained just over 1 percent, and suffering the overwhelming majority of income declines 
during this same period. The poverty rate for African American children under three 
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years of age was 52 percent in 1990, and for Latino children it was 42 percent, whereas 
the poverty rate for White children under three was 15 percent (Lipman, 1998). Yet in 
1991, school choice and the institutionalization of competition in education were 
reemerging at the national level as an education reform strategy imagined as a solution to 
problems created by the political economy: 
We can encourage educational excellence by encouraging parental choice. The 
concept of choice draws its fundamental strength from the principle at the very 
heart of the democratic idea. Every adult American has the right to vote, the right 
to decide where to work, where to live. It's time parents were free to choose the 
schools that their children attend. This approach will create the competitive 
climate that stimulates excellence in our private and parochial schools as well 
(Bush, G.H.W.).  
Rather than being produced by individualized notions of “hope” and “despair,” the 
livelihoods of poor people of color in the 1980s and 1990s were being “reshaped by 
profound macro-economic and social changes caused by the transition to 
postindustrialism and the decline of U.S. economic hegemony” (Lipman, 1998, p. 8). 
Though the achievement gap had decreased by 50 percent between 1970 and the mid-
1980s, it increased between 1990 and 1994. By 1996, “African Americans had the lowest 
composite ACT and SAT scores of any nationality group” (ibid, p. 8). The linking of 
increased investment in education to increased wealth was misleading at best. For 
instance, education was not solving the problem of disproportionate unemployment 
among African Americans. By 1994, only 40 percent of African American high school 
graduates not in college were employed, compared to 72 percent of whites (ibid).  
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Following Anyon (2005), the “main determinant of whether one is poor or not is 
whether or not one has a decently paying job” (p. 21). But in 1982, Reagan dismantled 
the Comprehensive Employment and Training Administration (CETA), a job creation 
program, and replaced it with the Job Partnership Act, a job-training program. In spite of 
evidence suggesting a dearth of jobs, the federal government embraced a policymaking 
orientation grounded in the notion that there were ample jobs available, but people were 
just not educated well enough to work them (ibid). The federal government has 
maintained this position ever since, and it underlies not only its economic and social 
welfare policies, but its education policies as well. As a result, the innovations promised 
by school choice and competition were increasingly envisioned as educational solutions 
to economic problems, and this developing social imaginary (Appadurai, 1996) found a 
home in the educational platforms and policies of the Clinton and Bush Jr. 
administrations. If urban public schools could not solve the problems of the culture of 
poverty and thereby provide upward mobility for poor people of color, then the market 
could.   
 Official poverty levels in the early 1990s were staggering. In 1993, approximately 
39.2 million people in the U.S. were officially poor. Two-thirds of this group lived in 
urban areas, and most of them were African American and Latino. Even in 1998, at the 
apex of the “boom” of the Clinton years, 13 percent of U.S. households were living at or 
below the official federal poverty level. With the federal minimum wage set at 
$5.15/hour in 1998, full-time workers were earning $10,712 per year- a number which 
left them well below the official poverty line (Anyon, 2005). Wages did go up between 
1996 and 1999. For instance, the poorest 10 percent of working Americans saw an 
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increase from $5.49/hour in 1996 to $6.05 in 1999. The next highest 10 percent saw their 
wages increase from $6.80/hour to $7.35/hour over the same period of time. These 
increases, however, have not been enough to equal the amount low wage workers were 
earning in 1973, nor are they enough to allow workers to live above the poverty line 
(Ehrenreich, 2011). In fact, income growth during the “boom” of the 1990s, as well as 
subsequent periods of growth leading up to the Great Recession, by and large went to 
elites. Overall, between 1979 and 2007, the top 1 percent collected 53.9 percent of the 
total increase in income during that period. As the average income of the top 1 percent 
increased by 200.5 percent, that of the bottom 99 percent grew by a mere 18.9 percent 
(Economic Policy Institute, 2014).  
In spite of these structural factors, school choice and education reform, like 
prisons and drug courts, persisted as imagined policy solutions to poverty. Studies show 
that educational attainment in the 1990s and 2000s only explains approximately one-third 
of income levels, and therefore education can neither be relied upon to explain urban 
poverty, nor as a strategy to remedy it.  Racial, gender, and age discrimination in hiring 
practices and in pay undermine educational attainment. Furthermore, limited access to 
unionization, heavy reliance on part-time contingent labor, and lack of regulations 
weaken the potential of education to lead to increased wages. By 1996, one out of six 
college graduates earned less than the average salary of high school graduates (Anyon, 
2005). In 1999, 70 percent of welfare recipients were high school graduates, compared to 
42 percent in 1979. Between 1973 and 2003, the real wages for high school graduates fell 
by 11.3 percent, and the wages of college graduates rose by a mere 5.7 percent. By 1990, 
approximately 11 percent of college graduates with bachelor’s degrees made minimum 
 160 
wage, and almost 20 percent of college graduates have not been able to find “college-
level work” (ibid, p. 36). In spite of the fact that “no evidence exists for the belief that 
deteriorating education- whether measured as fewer years of school, falling achievement 
levels, or demographics of the workforce- are the cause of the falling wages of U.S. 
workers” (ibid, p. 38), federal education policy maintains that education is the key to 
success in the global economy. Economic problems are framed, at the individual level, as 
the result of poor choices and cultural deficits, and at a quasi-structural level, as systemic 
educational failures. The innovations spurred by school choice, then, are presented as 
crucial weapons in the war against the culture of poverty. Market mechanisms are 
coercive treatments for the culture of poverty. By vanquishing what Bush Sr. refers to as 
the “darkness” that haunts poor people of color, school choice will reinvigorate the 
lagging production of human capital.  
Education policy under the Clinton and Bush Jr. administrations was very much 
about “integrating” education into a “wider set of ideological commitments.” Education 
became linked to the expansion of the free market, reduction of government 
responsibility for the economic and social welfare of citizens, reinforcement of 
competition, not only among schools, but in the labor market more broadly, creation of a 
workforce with low expectations in terms of economic security, and popularization of 
racially coded social Darwinist thinking about educational achievement and success 
(Apple, 1996, p. 28). These ideologies congealed within a discourse and set of policies 
that defined education as job training for the global economy, at the same time that mass 
incarceration became the sponge for absorbing and removing the global city’s surplus 
populations and discontents. For instance, Clinton, like Reagan, advocated government 
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support of training rather than job-creation for the unemployed. For both presidents, 
education-as-training was a solution to a perceived surplus of unfilled jobs, in spite of the 
fact that there was actually a deficit of medium and high wage jobs and that “at any given 
time there are far more unemployed people than there are job openings” (Anyon, 2005, 
pg. 21). Clinton proposed a $1500 per year tuition tax credit, a $10,000 income tax 
deduction for college tuition for working families, and a $2600 instructional grant to 
under- or unemployed workers to receive job training (Spring, 1998). At the same time, 
he ended “welfare as we know it,” eliminating supports for poor and working class 
families, and intensified the war on drugs. As Quadagno (1996) points out, the White 
middle class saw welfare as a transfer of wealth from their race and class to undeserving 
poor people of color. Under Clinton, welfare, like education, was ostensibly transformed 
into preparation for the workforce through the development of “workfare”- a policy that 
required welfare recipients to take on dead-end, menial labor that provided them with 
little in the way of marketable skills or social capital.  
Signed into law in 1994, Clinton’s Goals 2000: Educate America Act was in some 
ways a precursor to Race to the Top. It gave states an additional $1.3 billion in federal 
money, but linked this money to mandates as a means of expanding federal, top-down 
control over education at the local level. States were paid to write their own academic 
standards and pick their own tests, but would be held accountable for achievement 
(Ravitch, 2011). Clinton’s 1994 reauthorization of ESEA- the Improving America’s 
Schools Act (IASA)- introduced several changes to Title I allocation. Before these 
reforms, the federal government would allocate funds to states based on the number of 
low-income children in each county, and each state’s per-pupil expenditures (Odden and 
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Picus, 2000). One major change was that Title I funds used to be distributed to states, 
which would then redistribute them to districts based on the overall poverty level in 
individual counties. As of 1994, allocation would be based on the number children in 
each individual district who qualify for free and reduced price lunch. Schools with a rate 
of 75 percent or higher were required to be served Title I funds, and leftover funds could 
be distributed to schools with lower poverty rates. Struggling public school districts, 
however, were encouraged to disinvest in their highest poverty schools by a loophole 
through which funds could be redistributed to more schools in the district (ibid). The 
costs of programs in the poorest schools could be driven down by using cheap services 
from private sector providers, old textbooks, and through general infrastructural neglect, 
thereby freeing up Title I allocations and allowing impoverished districts to stretch their 
funding to their better off schools.  
The structure of Title I allocations incentivized disinvestment in the poorest 
schools. Furthermore, “in most states, school districts that educate the largest number of 
poor and minority students have fewer state and local dollars to spend per student than 
districts with the least number of poor and minority students” (Anyon, 2005, pg. 63). In 
New York, low-poverty districts have approximately $2,152 more to spend per student 
than high poverty districts, as  “low urban property tax receipts and insufficient additional 
school financing” impoverish schools in the urban core (ibid). At the same time that 
macroeconomic policies were engaging in “targeted abandonment” (Harvey, 1989b) of 
the urban core, IASA and NCLB were engaging in targeted investment in school choice 
as means to improve impoverished schools. The material conditions produced by federal 
abandonment of the urban core, as manifested in its deteriorating schools and other 
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infrastructure, were drawn on as ideological justifications for further disinvestment, 
restructuring, and dispossession via market-driven, corporate education reforms like 
testing, accountability, and school choice.  
Education reform was funneling much-needed public funds out of impoverished 
neighborhoods and pumping them into private sector providers. IASA doubled federal 
funding for charter schools to $100 million. IASA also paved the way for the more 
sweeping corporate reforms of NCLB by mandating that: 1) States develop standards; 2) 
Schools use assessments aligned with those standards; and 3) Schools be held 
accountable to produce Annual Yearly Progress (AYP) based on student performance on 
these standardized tests. $2 billion was earmarked for the startup and implementation of 
these reforms. IASA also, to the boon of the school choice movement and other private 
sector providers, deregulated the use of federal funds in order to promote local flexibility 
and school improvement (Democrats for Education Reform, 2010). In his 1997 
proclamation “America Goes Back to School,” Clinton argued that “every school and 







grade on the one hand while we “expand school choice and accountability in public 
education” on the other. Clinton called on a partnership of public and private sector 
entities, including the military, to help “America’s young people grow into responsible 
and productive citizens” (Clinton, 1997).   
IASA institutionalized the rhetoric linking choice to learning by formalizing it 
into a set of goals related to charter school proliferation. The Act asserted a positive 
causal relationship between charter school proliferation and improved student 
performance on standardized tests: 
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Enhancement of parent and student choices among public schools can assist in 
promoting comprehensive educational reform and give more students the 
opportunity to learn to challenging State content standards and challenging State 
student performance standards, if sufficiently diverse and high-quality choices, 
and genuine opportunities to take advantage of such choices, are available to all 
students (IASA, 1994).  
Innovation and entrepreneurialism are once again pronounced as the chief means of 
improving student learning and performance, and as such require a modicum of 
deregulation and freedom from state intervention: 
Charter schools are a mechanism for testing a variety of educational approaches 
and should, therefore, be exempted from restrictive rules and regulations (ibid).  
The state makes its alignment with charter school proliferation clear. The way to improve 
student achievement is first to encourage educational innovation and entrepreneurialism 
through deregulation, and second to scale upwards and outwards in such a way that the 
coercive law of competition provokes public schools to follow suit or else lose their 
market share of students. Thus the purpose of the act was, it claims, “to increase national 
understanding of the charter schools model by…providing financial assistance for the 
design and initial implementation of charter schools” (ibid). To that end, no more than 10 
percent of funding would be set aside for “development and dissemination of model State 
charter school laws and model contracts or other means of authorizing and monitoring the 
performance of charter schools” and the ``collection and dissemination of information on 
successful charter schools” (ibid). Under IASA, charter school development, promotion, 
and proliferation go hand in hand: 
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For the purpose of carrying out this part, there are authorized to be appropriated 
$15,000,000 for fiscal year 1995 and such sums as may be necessary for each of 
the four succeeding fiscal years (ibid). 
In sum, federal education policy in the 1990s laid important material and ideological 
groundwork for the school choice movement. Though No Child Left Behind would 
intensify federal intervention and the corporate reform of education, the continuity 
between NCLB and earlier iterations of ESEA is often overlooked, particularly regarding 
the roll out of neoliberal school reforms around standards, testing, accountability, and 
choice. Charter schools, like drug courts, emerged in the mid-1990s as part of the 
massive roll out of neoliberal federal polices fostering creative destruction and 
accumulation by dispossession, and the destroyed and the dispossessed called for new 
forms of social control. Charter schools and drug courts were both piloted by small 
groups of activists. In the case of drug courts, these activists were insider judges in 
positions of significant power seeking to refine and enhance the criminalization of low-
level drug users and sellers. In the case of school choice, its early experimental phase in 
the 1970s and 80s was spearheaded by parents and educators trying to navigate 
precarious landscapes of postindustrial urban devastation, as Pedroni (2007) and Lipman 
(2011) have shown. In the 1990s, however, the charter school experiment was “swept 
up…by a movement organized to promote an ambitious alternative to public schools” 
(Fabricant & Fine, 2012, pg.19). Free market intellectuals and politicians, prominent 
think tanks, hedge fund investors, and all manner of corporate elites soon threw their 
weight behind the movement, as these groups congealed around school choice as an 
educational agenda for solving the social and economic problems of the global city. An 
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important effect of this cohesion in New York City was the restructuring of education, 
and urban space and activity more generally, in such a way as to advance the political and 
economic interests of elites at the expense of the dispossessed.    
A Political Economy of New York City Charter Schools 
Pauline Lipman (2011) argues that charter school proliferation is rooted in “the 
unfulfilled aims of civil rights strategies” and is “dialectically related to this country’s 
historical disinvestment in communities of color”(p. 125). In the analysis that follows, I 
want to elaborate on and extend Lipman’s own analysis of charters in Chicago by 
situating the emergence and proliferation of charter schools in New York City within 
changes in the racial capitalist dynamics of the city’s political economy. School choice 
and marketization, the discourses and policy reforms behind the rapid expansion of 
charter schools, were bound up in the gradual transformation of New York City through 
large scale projects of neoliberal urbanization (Brenner & Theodore, 2002; Hackworth, 
2007), and the mix of abandonment, disinvestment, dispossession, and racialized social 
control that such a transformation required. That is, the rapid increase in the number of 
charter schools that occurred under NCLB and the Bloomberg administration was made 
possible by its continuity with the gradual transformation of New York into a neoliberal 
city.  
The emergence of the neoliberal city has been accompanied by a growth in 
inequality. A recent report by the Economic Policy Institute (2014) shows that, 
nationwide, the wealthiest 1 percent earned 53.9 percent of the total increase in income 
between 1979 and 2007. Their average income grew by 200.5 percent over this same 
period, while the average income of the bottom 99 percent grew by a mere 19.9 percent. 
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Income inequality was particularly pronounced in New York State, where the top 1 
percent captured 67.6 percent of all income growth between 1979 and 2007. The top 1 
percent captured 11.5 percent of income in 1979 and 32.6 percent in 2007. This trend is a 
reversal of the decline in the share of income held by the top 1 percent between 1928 and 
1979, when, in New York, the top 1 percent’s share of income decreased by 17.9 percent. 
In 2011, New York, along with Connecticut, had the largest gap between the average 
incomes of the top 1 percent and those of the bottom 99 percent, with the 1 percent taking 
home average incomes approximately 40 times those of the bottom 99 percent (ibid). 
In Capital (1867), Karl Marx explains how the capitalist system, because of its 
reliance on exploitation, produces institutions and practices that create and maintain the 
kind of inequality described above. That is, the above statistics from the Economic Policy 
Institute reflect a phenomenon – inequality – that is actively produced by the political 
economy, or the relationships between the state and capitalism. This process takes 
different shapes at different times and in different places, and operates through a variety 
of institutions. The glittery story of the neoliberalization of New York City is also the 
grim story of the production of inequality. As such, it is also the story of those institutions 
that both reflect and exacerbate inequality: the city’s schools, jails, housing, hospitals, 
sanitation, and transit, as well as the city’s complex financial architecture. 
Neoliberalization is a story about how a changing political economy transformed urban 
life and space in a way that relied heavily on disinvesting, abandoning, policing, and 
restructuring certain neighborhoods and the institutions people in those neighborhoods 
relied upon for their survival. As Ruthie Gilmore (2008) notes, “forgotten places are not 
outside history…rather, they are places that have experienced the abandonment 
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characteristic of contemporary capitalist and neoliberal state reorganization…Forgotten 
places…are both symptomatic of and intimately shaped by crisis” (pg. 31). The 
development and proliferation of New York City charter schools have their roots in the 
highly local iterations of macro-level processes of abandonment, forgetting, crisis, and 
reorganization. 
In the aftermath of the community control experiments of the late 1960s, New 
York City returned to a decentralized school system. Community control had indicated a 
shift in power relations as local poor and working class African American and Latino 
constituencies gained jurisdiction over school districts in Brooklyn and Manhattan. After 
overwhelming resistance from teachers, principals, politicians, and the teachers union, 
however, these experimental districts were dismantled. In 1969, the state legislature 
passed a school decentralization law which broke the city up into 32 community school 
districts, each with an elected board and decentralized administration and policymaking 
bodies (Lewis, 2013).  
The decentralization of the city’s schools mirrored a larger trend at this time 
towards localizing authority, in the name of bestowing autonomy and choice upon 
municipalities, which, in contradiction, were quite constrained as to the choices they 
could actually make. Decentralization, for a municipality like New York City, was “the 
result of an institutionally regulated (and policed) disciplining of localities” (Hackworth, 
2007, pg. 17). As increasingly globalized finance capital took further control of the city 
in the aftermath of the fiscal crisis of the mid-1970s, localized choice and autonomy were 
less about “the degree of separation from the wider economic sphere” but  “rather about 
the degree of control over the social construction of place” (ibid, pg. 19). 
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Decentralization of New York City’s school system, like the decentralized governance of 
municipalities, was not about freedom from control, but rather, about using choice and 
autonomy as a means for realigning and enhancing control.  
For New York, this shift in control manifested in an increased susceptibility to 
bond rating agencies and creditworthiness was elevated to be the primary goal driving the 
city’s social and economic policies (Hackworth, 2007; Moody, 2007; Tabb & Sawers, 
1984; Tabb, 1982). Deindustrialization, White flight, and economic abandonment by the 
federal government in the 1970s meant that municipal functions ranging from housing 
and sanitation to transit, education, and criminal justice, had to be financed by borrowing 
money. To do so required a strong bond rating, and a strong bond rating meant 
prioritizing the needs of investors in order to make the city an attractive place for 
investment.  This project took many shapes, ranging from the beautification and renewal 
of “blighted” areas to the heavy-handed policing of squeegee-men and turnstile hoppers. 
As the city’s municipal functions were increasingly incorporated into the logic of capital 
through, e.g., forcing workers to invest their pensions in municipal bonds, the profit-
driven activities of real estate developers, mega-project developers, investors, and 
bankers transformed the city’s built environment. Furthermore, global capital flows 
shaped the allocation and flow of local capital as New York’s service industry developed 
to meet the needs of international finance (Moody, 2007). Unions, along with social 
programs like welfare and public housing, were seen as straining the city’s budget, bad 
for credit, and threatened the economic and political interests of this new elite power bloc 
(ibid). Labor would have to be disciplined.  
 170 
Disinvestment in the urban core emerged as a strategy for making funds available 
for investment in central business district development, office space development, 
gentrification projects, mega-project developments, as well as subsidizing low property 
assessments and tax abatements for real estate developers. Austerity emerged alongside 
disinvestment. As the city’s tax cuts diminished its revenues, it fired thousands of 
municipal workers and slashed much needed services to its most impoverished 
neighborhoods. Poor African Americans and Latinos suffered disproportionately at the 
hands of the city’s tripartite disinvestment-reinvestment-austerity strategy. 
Decentralization of the school system was taking place at the same time that 
infrastructure in the urban core where poor people of color lived was deteriorating- not 
just the housing stock, roads, and transit, but also the neighborhood schools. As a result, 
public schools serving African American and Latino students in the 1970s and 1980s 
tended to have “transient and ineffective teachers and administrators, overcrowded and 
deteriorating facilities, and fewer resources than schools in working class white 
communities (Lewis, 2013, pg. 16). 
School decentralization in New York City was battered by the austerity measures 
of the mid to late 1970s. The new elite power bloc of bankers and real estate tycoons was 
institutionalized by the creation of the Municipal Assistance Corporation (MAC) and the 
Emergency Financial Control Board (EFCB) which represented their interests and 
injected their influence into city governance. In the spirit of the structural adjustments 
demanded by the World Bank and the IMF, MAC and EFCB demanded austerity as a 
precondition for restoring the creditworthiness of the city, and public schools were no 
exception to the cuts this entailed. After a six-day strike by the United Federation of 
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Teachers in 1975, the union acquiesced and, though some teachers’ jobs were saved, New 
York City schools intensified teachers’ workload by cutting prep periods, and reduced 
instructional time by 90 minutes per week. Student services were cut as, between 1975 
and 1983, the EFCB slashed the city’s budget by 22 percent. 15,000 teachers were laid 
off during this period. Elementary schools lost 21 percent of their staff, and middle 
schools and high schools lost 16 percent (Tabb, 1982). As a result, class size and student-
to-teacher ratios exploded while school buildings, and entire neighborhoods, deteriorated. 
Austerity disproportionately affected African American and Puerto Rican educators 
when, in 1975, 15,000 teachers and paraprofessionals were laid off. The number of 
African American and Latino teachers decreased from 11 percent to 3 percent, even 
though two-thirds of the city’s students were African American or Latino. These trends in 
education were mirrored in the racialized impact of austerity on municipal workers more 
generally. Between 1974 and 1976, New York City lost half its Latino workers, two-
fifths of African American workers, and one-third of its female workers- many of whom 
were parents of youth in the city’s decentralized school system. Though African 
Americans and Latinos made up only 31 percent of the city’s municipal workforce, they 
were dealt 44 percent of the cuts (Tabb, 1982). 
Following Gilmore (2008), “abandoned places are also planned concentrations or 
sinks—of hazardous materials and destructive practices that are in turn sources of group-
differentiated vulnerabilities to premature death (which, whether state-sanctioned or 
extralegal, is how racism works, regardless of the intent of the harms’ producers, who 
produce along the way racialization and therefore race)” (pg. 36). Thus abandonment, 
disinvestment, and dislocation are not just about exodus, social costs, dismantlings and 
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disappearances- they are also productive. They produce the ideological and material 
conditions and practices that shape unequal schooling and structure the racialized nature 
not only of criminalization or public health, but also of educational experiences and 
trajectories. 
Throughout the 1970s, as living conditions worsened for poor people of color 
living in the urban core, decentralization of education claimed to be an organizational 
strategy that could improve educational outcomes by focusing on the relationship 
between the governance of individual schools and the delivery of educational services. 
These outcomes were, however, structurally determined. For instance, state educational 
expenditures and Title I funds did not increase in proportion to the growth of 
concentrated poverty in the city (Brown, 2007). When school choice emerged, it surfaced 
at the intersection of macro- and local-level economic transformations that were bringing 
about profound dislocations and mass unemployment, at the same time that austerity and 
a growing emphasis on investment in gentrification and central business district 
development were shifting allocation priorities. All of this resulted in a marked 
disinvestment in urban education. At the same time that disinvestment, austerity, and 
mass incarceration devastated neighborhoods in the urban core, decentralization 
institutionalized autonomy as a way of holding neighborhood schools more accountable 
for producing improved educational outcomes. This mix of racialized political economic 
and educational policy developments was setting the stage for the testing-accountability-
charter school reforms to come in the subsequent decades.   
Educational crises of the 1980s occurred in conjuncture with deepening economic 
crises, the drug war, and the restructuring of state and local political economies. When 
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President Carter signed the New York City Loan Act of 1978, reestablishing the fed’s 
line of credit to the city, Mayor Koch responded with promises of more austerity in the 
form of cuts to services and wages (Tabb, 1982). The 1980s witnessed massive cuts to 
social welfare and urban infrastructure accompanied by increased government spending 
on militarization and mass incarceration. At the same time, more and more public money 
was being siphoned off into the private sector. For instance, in 1980, $.20 of every dollar 
in city tax revenue was going to debt servicing. In 1982 New York City lost hundreds of 
millions in federal aid due to Reagan’s budget cuts (ibid). There were high levels of 
unemployment and inflation, as the manufacturing base declined and New York City’s 
economy was restructured around technological and electronic production, as well as 
finance, investment, and real estate (FIRE) and their attendant service sectors (Sassen, 
2001). Job creation was reconfigured as “offering investment subsidies;” while 
construction was “stimulated by interest-rate subsidies and property tax abatements” 
(Tabb, 1982, 14). The city’s economy was being restructured, and the instability this 
produced reverberated throughout its streets, schools, and prisons. 
As Tabb (1982) puts it, crises “are about restructuring, a process of uneven 
development in which decay and growth are part of a single reality” (pg. 10). In New 
York City, unemployment, dislocation, and disinvestment were accompanied by the 
growth of FIRE and the service sector, as well as increased investment in urban renewal 
and gentrification. But schools, like prisons, are also part of the “single reality” of “decay 
and growth.” As reported in the New York Times, in the early 1980s, Mayor Koch closed 
40 schools in impoverished areas of Hunts Point and the South Bronx. Schools became 
part of Koch’s "planned shrinkage" approach to balancing the budget, “'shrinking' its 
 174 
investment in such facilities as school buildings and in projects to rehabilitate 
deteriorated areas"(Smothers, 1980). Between FY1980 and FY1981, there were 7,907 
municipal layoffs, 5,098 of which were from the Board of Education. In FY1982, there 
were another 3,921 layoffs, 2,091 of which were from the Board of Education (ibid). 
Thus, during the shift to FIRE and a service economy, decentralized school districts were 
being hollowed out at the same time as they were attacked for being an inefficient suck 
on the city budget and not improving student performances. The city’s public schools 
came to be known as “drop out factories” due to their 41.9 percent annual dropout rate 
(compared to the average national rate of 25 percent). Yet because of the “structural 
adjustment” visited upon the city by MAC and the EFCB, the city’s schools were 
underfunded by the both the city and the state. New York City schools were enrolling 34 
percent of the state’s students, yet receiving 30 percent of state education funds allocated 
for education. Furthermore, the schools were overcrowded, and had unusually high 
concentrations of poor students with high needs, low academic skills, and who were in 
need of an array of costly additional resources (Fine, 1991). In 1985, 20 percent of New 
York City children lived at or below the poverty line, and these students attended schools 
with ever-increasing class sizes. Between 1973 and 1983, student-teacher ratios increased 
by 27 percent, and class size grew by 16.6 percent (ibid).  
As poverty worsened and conditions in many urban schools deteriorated, class 
struggle and the “politics of redistribution” (Tabb, 1982, pg. 14) as means of improving 
neighborhood schools were being supplanted by the gradual institutionalization of choice 
through the budding small schools movement. Though small schools are public schools, 
they were built primarily in impoverished neighborhoods to serve as alternatives to the 
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city’s large “dropout factories.” The first wave of small schools came in the 1960s, 
developing alternative high schools that used nontraditional methods to work with 
students who weren't served well by traditional high schools (Stiefel, Berne, Iatarola, & 
Fruchter, 2000). In the 1970s, Districts 4 and 13 were viewed as models that successfully 
used school choice around small schools to improve performance among primarily 
African American and Latino students. The models differed- District 4 was based on a 
model of choice that catered to student interests, using student-centered curriculum to 
spur competition, while District 13 embraced more of a market model that used the 
dissemination of test scores as a means to shame teachers and principals into competing 
to improve student performance. Both districts linked small schools with choice as an 
attempt to attract middle class families by offering accelerated and progressive 
educational opportunities not available in other schools. Furthermore, both districts co-
located these small alternative schools within larger traditional schools (Lewis, 2013; 
Ravitch, 2011), setting the stage for the surge of colocations to come in the 2000s.  
Decentralization created space for innovation in individual schools, and small 
schools sought to create alternative experiences for poor students of color. Small schools 
in the early 1990s "were designed and constructed with a rich sense of justice and 
democracy" and "led by educators who insisted that children of poverty deserve the same 
education as children of elites" (Fine, pg. ix, in Hantzopoulos & Tyner, 2012). Early 
small schools like CPE1 and Central Park East Secondary School sought to improve 
urban education through "sustained relationships among educators, youth, and 
parents/community" and maintaining participatory and democratic spaces wherein 
authentic student inquiry was the goal of teaching, learning, and assessment. Such 
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schools were committed to equity, educational justice, and social justice (ibid). The small 
schools movement developed out of the notion that there needed to "exist a large number 
of individual small schools" that "could…serve as models to other schools and 
demonstration to the public that it is possible to reimagine education" (Hantzopoulos & 
Tyner, 2012, pg. xxvii). The small schools movement did not institutionalize the 
redistribution of wealth and resources among schools and neighborhoods, but rather 
sought to provide students in disinvested neighborhoods with choices as to where they 
went to school.  
The small schools movement took off in the early 1990s as breaking up large 
schools and increasing choice was embraced by the Dinkins administration as an ideal 
way to improve the city’s school system and lower its dropout rates. Dinkins, who 
pledged to be “the toughest mayor on crime this city has ever seen” also told the city’s 
parents to embrace “a new ethic of individual accountability and responsibility for your 
children and your family” (1990).  On January 14
th
, 1993, the New York Times reported 
that “The New York City Board of Education voted last night to give parents across the 
city the right to choose any city public school for their children -- space permitting -- 
creating one of the largest school-choice programs in the country” (Barbanel, 1993). The 
article went on to frame this development as part and parcel of the expansion of choice 
and competition: 
Supporters of the change, which builds on grass-roots choice plans adopted by 
some school districts, especially in Manhattan, and a broad national movement to 
promote choice in schools, hope that the competition will give principals and 
teachers the impetus to improve schools that are losing students (ibid).  
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Parents were given the option to transfer their kids to any other school in the city. The 
inter-city transfer option meant that if there was space in the desired school and 
transportation could be arranged, students could leave a failing neighborhood school and 
enroll elsewhere. Few students, however, were able to take advantage of the option 
because there was little space in these popular schools, and it was difficult to get 
permission to transfer(Hamman & Schenck, 2002).  
In an effort to expand student choice, Chancellor Joseph Fernandez supported 
New Visions and the Coalition Campus project to develop 40 new small schools, mostly 
high schools where the emphasis would be on small size and scale, individualized 
support, theme-based instruction and curriculum, and more student supports. New 
Visions opened another 15 schools in the mid-1990s. While the New Vision schools were 
additions to existing school system, the Coalition Campus was trying to close large 
schools and replace them with small schools. The NYC Annenberg Challenge project 
started developing more small schools. By 1999 they had 140 small schools serving 
50,000 students (Stiefel et al., 2000).  
Under Giuliani’s mayoralty, choice was dislodged from the social justice-oriented 
goals of the small schools reformers and mapped instead onto the logic of the free 
market. In 1997, there was a brief experiment with vouchers, which were given to 1,300 
kids from low-income families to use to attend private schools. The voucher experiment, 
which cost approximately $6 million, was funded by private foundation money, 
corporations, and Wall Street firms. The vouchers provided $1,400 per year for families 
to send their children to parochial schools whose tuitions cost closer to $2,500 per year- a 
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difference which privileged students from families with more money and resources. The 
New York Times reported:  
Students who received vouchers came from families that were somewhat more 
affluent than the families of rejected students; the families of accepted students 
were also somewhat less likely to receive food stamps, welfare or Medicaid, and 
the mothers had slightly more education(Hartocollis, 1997). 
Giuliani was faced by fierce resistance by school chancellor Rudy Crew, who eventually 
resigned over the voucher dispute, and the plan was ultimately defeated by teacher and 
community resistance, as well as opposition from the City Council. Poor test results 
sealed the fate of Giuliani’s voucher experiment, and it was ultimately dismantled (ibid).  
The 1990s did, however, see a sudden and rapid proliferation of small schools in 
impoverished urban areas. The movement "gained mainstream political support" as 
neoliberal education reforms "rose in tandem with the small schools movement" 
(Hantzopoulos & Tyner, 2012, pg. xxx). The growing standards, testing and 
accountability regime fixed on small schools as a cost-effective way to advance the 
growing corporate reform movement. Small schools, when linked with standards, high 
stakes testing, and accountability, were imagined to be both a more efficient and effective 
treatment for the culture of poverty. Large schools, in contrast, were seen as being 
inefficient, expensive, and producing inferior outputs (i.e. test scores and dropout rates). 
There was, however, no evidence that small schools cost less per pupil than large schools. 
In fact, studies found that the budgets per graduate of small and large high schools were 
similar, and that small schools were not any more cost effective than large schools, nor 
were they producing better test scores (Stiefel et al., 2000). City budgets, as Stiefel et al. 
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(2000) note, “are driven by policy decisions about how to allocate funding to 
schools…but the real question for policymakers involves the trade-offs between budgets 
and outputs" (pg. 37). Small schools, then, needed to be reworked in order to have a 
greater impact on efficiency and outputs. 
Lacking evidence that students at small schools performed better on standardized 
tests, and facing mounting pressure to lower dropout rates, raise standards, and increase 
the cost-effectiveness of schools, national and local policymakers in the 1990s 
increasingly turned their attention to intensifying market mechanisms to improve 
educational outputs and increase efficiency (Hamman & Schenck, 2002). As a result, 
there was an attempt in New York City to "move small schools to scale" while focusing 
solely on the "numeric essence of small” (Fine, pg. x, in Hantzopoulos & Tyner, 2012). 
This scaling up resulted in "a strategy that produced competing, overcrowded and 
underresourced small schools fighting with each other within the same building" as 
smalls schools, increasingly incorporated into the marketization of education, became "a 
technology of dispossession" (ibid). The bottom-up, community-based, and social justice-
oriented small schools movement became integrated with a top-down corporatized vision 
of school choice that reframed the goals of small schools within the competitive logics of 
capital.  
Small schools could improve disinvested neighborhoods more efficiently if they 
could inject more competition into the school system. As a result, parental involvement in 
most small schools
3
 was redefined as consumer participation in the educational 
                                                        
3 For examples of democratic, social-justice oriented small schools, see 
Hantzopoulos, M., & Tyner, A. R. (2012). Critical Small Schools: Beyond Privatization 
in New York City Urban Educational Reform. IAP. 
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marketplace, whereby parents could hold schools accountable by moving their children, 
lowering the market share of both large and small competing schools.  By 2002, the small 
schools movement had been taken up by corporate reformers as a vehicle for advancing 
market-driven solutions to educational issues. Scaling up was crucial to putting the 
coercive law of competition into motion. Thus, backed by a new billionaire Mayor with 
control over the school system, and millions in philanthrocapital, The New Century 
Schools Initiative (NCSI) opened up hundreds of new small schools to unleash the 
coercive law of competition upon the city's struggling school system. 
The corporate cooptation of the small schools movement occurred around the 
same time that charter school proliferation became official education policy in New 
York. New York State created its first charter law in 1998 under Governor Pataki. The 
statewide cap in 1998 was 100 charter schools, and there were only two authorizers: 
Charter Schools Institute of the State University of New York (SUNY), and the New 
York Board of Regents
4
. The state reached the cap of 100 in 2006, with charter schools, 
the majority of which were in New York City, serving 22,000 students. In 2007, under 
pressure from Mayor Bloomberg and corporate lobbyists, Governor Spitzer raised the cap 
to 200, and 50 of the new 100 charter schools would serve New York City (Stulberg, 
2010; Ravitch, 2011).  
No Child Left Behind, mayoral control, and the neoliberal encroachment 
Because elite class power can “both feed off and nurture specific state 
apparatuses” (Harvey, 2005, p. 35), those apparatuses (e.g. schools, courts, hospitals) 
                                                                                                                                                                     
 
4 Initially, charters opening with more than 250 students were required to have 
unionized teachers. 
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come to embody the interests of dominant groups. Pauline Lipman (2005) explains how 
No Child Left Behind (NCLB) is “part of a neoliberal global economic and social agenda 
to maximize profits by promoting the primacy of the market, reducing the cost of labor, 
and privatizing all spheres of economic and social life” (p. 101). NCLB’s rigid standards 
and punitive accountability measures have resulted in school takeovers by for-profit 
Education Management Organizations (EMOs) and private nonprofit Charter 
Management Organizations (CMOs). NCLB has increased private sector involvement in 
education not only through linking funding streams to philanthrocapital, but also by 
privatizing teacher education and professional development, standards development, 
curriculum development, and testing. NCLB has created a multi-billion dollar industry 
for the burgeoning textbook and technology corporations that feed off the standards-
testing-accountability nexus. In one of his final speeches as president, George W. Bush 
nicely summed up the underlying assumptions and free market ideologies of NCLB: 
Measuring gives parents something to compare other schools with. You 
oftentimes hear, oh, gosh, I wish parents were more involved. Well, one way to 
get parental involvement is to post results. Nothing will get a parent's attention 
more than if he or she sees that the school her child goes to isn't performing as 
well as the school around the corner.  
Measurement is essential to success. When schools fall short of standards year 
after year, something has to happen. In other words, there has to be a consequence 
in order for there to be effective reforms. And one such thing that can happen is 
parents can enroll their children in another school. It's -- to me, measurement is 
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the gateway to true reform, and measurement is the best way to ensure parental 
involvement.  
Where small schools sought to involve parents in shaping curriculum, pedagogy, and the 
school culture, NCLB frames parents as consumers, equitably positioned to make rational 
decisions in the educational marketplace based on schools’ test scores. Bush goes on to 
frame the marketization of education as a vehicle for parent empowerment: 
By the way, school choice was only open to rich people up until No Child Left 
Behind. It's hard for a lot of parents to be able to afford to go to any other kind of 
school but their neighborhood school. Now, under this system, if your public 
school is failing, you'll have the option of transferring to another public school or 
charter school. And it's -- I view that as liberation. I view that as empowerment. 
In a piece for the New York Review of Books (2012), Diane Ravitch argued that, contrary 
to Bush’s claims, NCLB actually empowers capital: 
The corporate reformers believe that entrepreneurship will unleash a new era of 
innovation and creativity, but it seems mostly to have unleashed canny 
entrepreneurs who seek higher test scores by any means possible (such as 
excluding students with disabilities or students learning English as a second 
language) or who seek maximum profit. 
Bloomberg’s education reforms are a prime example of using business models and free 
market ideology to design and implement educational policy. These reforms are both 
symptomatic of and a driving force behind the larger globalized neoliberal project. Their 
most pronounced manifestations are local, but the sweep of their influence, and the 
discourses in which they participate, are global.  
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Bloomberg’s reforms emerged within an educational context shaped largely by 
NCLB and are perhaps among the policy’s most thoroughly deployed transformations. As 
with other neoliberal mutations, these reforms required a highly authoritarian governing 
body and organizational structure (Harvey, 2003, 2005; Klein, 2008). Elected in 2001, 
Bloomberg immediately centralized control over the city’s Department of Education. The 
mayor and his appointed chancellor Joel Klein developed the mayorally appointed and 
controlled Public Education Panel to replace the New York City Board of Education, 
further cementing centralized control by dismantling community structures and channels 
for actualizing dissent. Through concentrating governance and management in a panel of 
mayoral appointees rather than community run Boards of Education, Bloomberg worked 
to disempower parents and teachers in a process of consolidation of control that would 
expand and evolve throughout his terms as mayor. Furthermore, a massive influx of 
capital from foundations like The Gates Foundation, The Walton Family, The Broad 
Foundation, as well as hedge fund managers like Anchorage Capital Partners, Greenlight 
Capital, and Pershing Square Capital Management (Gabriel & Medina, 2010), have 
extended elite class power more deeply into education, as billionaires from the private 
sector found themselves with increasing influence over educational policy under 
Bloomberg’s administration.  
As a result of a mix of federal mandates from NCLB and considerable new 
inflows of private capital, there was an unprecedented growth in the number of charter 
schools, as competition and privatization became cornerstones of the Bloomberg 
administration’s reform agenda. As a result of pressure from Bloomberg as well as the 
millions spent by hedge fund managers on lobbying the state legislature, then Governor 
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Paterson raised the state cap on charters to 460, with a cap of 214 in New York City. As a 
result, New York received $700 million in Race to the Top money, $170 million for 
school districts and charter schools, and another $150 million for private vendors who 
provide the products and services needed to maintain the state’s standards, testing, 
accountability regime (The University of the State of New York, The State Education 
Department, 2012).  In 2010, there were 100 charter schools in New York City. Today, 
out of 208 charter schools in New York State, 183 of them are in New York City and 
serve 47,000 students. They enroll approximately 4 percent of the city’s students, but in 
the neighborhoods where they are located in concentration, charters enroll approximately 
25 percent of the students. With the cap raised to 460, school choice advocates expect 
student enrollment in charter schools to explode in the years to come 
(nyccharterschools.org). To Bloomberg’s consternation as well as that of the hedge fund 
managers, the 2010 bill mandated that all new charters be run by private nonprofit 
organizations (Charter Management Organizations or CMOs), though a handful of for-
profit Education Management Organizations (EMOs) remain. Co-location policy 
remained untouched, however, and remains a key strategy in making charters competitive 
with public schools. Under Bloomberg’s mayoralty, two-thirds of New York City’s 
charter schools were allowed to co-locate with public schools at no cost in rent (Gabriel 
& Medina, 2010).  
Marx’s coercive law of competition, Race to the Top, and the school choice paradigm 
Charter school reforms are premised on the idea that injecting competition and 
“choice” into public education will produce better schools and teachers, and will leave 
students better prepared to participate in the global economy. To put it briefly, the school 
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choice paradigm is a mechanism for market expansion in education. It argues that 
education policy should create a landscape within which schools have to compete with 
one another for students and the funds that come with them. These pressures will 
incentivize innovation and entrepreneurship in education, but in order for charters to 
exert sufficient pressures on public schools, charters must be scaled up in order to 
become a palpable threat to the survival of public schools. The resulting improvements in 
school organization, curriculum, pedagogy, and other practices, policymakers argue, will 
provide the U.S. with a more productive labor force and help the nation re-establish its 
dominance in the global economy. In May of 2013, when President Barak Obama 
officially declared National Charter School Week, he made explicit the connection 
between charters, globalization, and the labor force, proclaiming:  
America's success in the 21st century depends on what we do today to reignite the 
true engine of our economic growth …We need to equip all our students with the 
education and skills that put them on the path to good jobs and a bright future -- 
no matter where they live or what school they attend. Charter schools play an 
important role in meeting that obligation. 
Entrepreneurialism and innovation require a certain form of state regulation that supports 
private ownership or provision of services- a central tenet of neoliberal economics 
(Harvey, 2005; Harcourt, 2012). Following Harvey (2005), the role of the state under 
neoliberalism then is to create an institutional framework that supports and facilitates 
competition and marketization in order to improve education. Obama’s support of 
charters reflects this role of government as he goes on to proclaim his and the nation’s 
support of charters as “learning laboratories” where increased “flexibility” spurs 
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excellence “in communities with few high-quality educational options,” thus “widening 
the circle of opportunity for students who need it most” (2013).  
The kind of framework described by Harvey (2005) is institutionalized in 
education under Race to the Top- a cluster of education reforms that were part of a larger 
economic stimulus package signed by Obama in February of 2009. Race to the Top 
money involves a $4.35 billion increase in federal funding for education, which if 
distributed evenly across the country, would amount to an $80 million increase in 
revenue for each state (Spring, 2012; Fabricant & Fine, 2012). The policy asserts criteria 
that states must meet in order to receive grants for education, including adopting 
standards like the Common Core and standardized, internationally benchmarked 
assessments- two developments which have induced a spasm of competition among 
private sector providers of testing and test preparation materials. Also included in Race to 
the Top is the requirement that states lift caps on charter school proliferation. As a result, 
in 2010, New York State raised its cap on charters from 200 to 460, embraced the 
nationally benchmarked standards of the Common Core, revamped its testing regime, and 
strengthened the links of test score data to teacher evaluation. To meet the policy’s 
requirements regarding data gathering, the state unleashed a plan to gather student data 
and store it in a cloud-based data storehouse operated by a privately owned nonprofit 
organization (Maxwell, 2014).  
The logic linking competition to innovation underlies federal education policies 
like Race to the Top, which uses federal funding to promote charter school proliferation. 
Innovation, under NCLB and RttT, however, has so far amounted to little more than 
increased testing and developing “best practices” for test preparation, while mobilizing 
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anti-labor punitive accountability mechanisms. Hollow as it may be, “innovation” is 
invoked again and again in school choice discourse. Arne Duncan, during a keynote 
speech delivered at the National Alliance for Public Charter Schools, argued that  
the benefits of high-performing charters cannot reach the majority of students 
who most need them unless effective innovations from charters are widely 
deployed both in traditional public schools and throughout the charter sector 
(2013).  
Following Duncan, “delivering on the dream” of charters rests on the following 
assumptions: a) Innovation in education is the key to creating economic growth and 
upward mobility for students; b) Developing innovative practices requires the 
“flexibility,” “cost-efficiency,” and “the data-driven instruction and enhanced 
accountability of the best charters”; and c) Charter schools must “take innovation to 
scale” in such a way that their mass proliferation exerts an overwhelming pressure on 
public schools to model themselves after their competitors (ibid). Drawing on Harvey’s 
(2005) analysis of neoliberalism, the role of the state then is to create the institutional 
framework that will “deliver the dream.”  
 Karl Marx’s (1867) concept of the coercive law of competition is useful in 
thinking through the logic of the school choice paradigm. In the choice paradigm, 
traditional public schooling is seen as coercive, as the government, with its monopoly 
over schools, mandates and enforces regulations and bureaucratic obstructions which 
inhibit the development of the kinds of educational innovations needed to create equal 
opportunity, upward mobility, and global economic dominance for the U.S. In contrast, 
charter schools provide greater freedom: flexibility for innovation by teachers and school 
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leaders, and “free” choice for parent-consumers in the educational marketplace. But, 
following Marx’s coercive law of competition, inserting market practices into education 
coerces all schools into taking certain measures in order to stay competitive, and thus to 
survive. Like the factories of Marx’s time, schools are forced to increase productivity and 
cut costs in order not to lose their market share of students and to remain competitive. 
These imperatives were among the key accumulation strategies of capitalism in the 19
th
 
century and remain so today. Increased productivity and cost-cutting drive outsourcing, 
wage suppression, mechanization, as well as attacks on unions, healthcare benefits, and 
pensions. What happens when increased productivity and cost-efficiency become 
strategies for providing education services? What becomes of education when it is 
transformed from a public good to a “consumer-driven commodity” (Lubienski, 2006, p. 
3)? What kinds of strategies will schools use in order to improve their market position, 
and what impact will these strategies have on educational opportunity and quality for 
poor youth of color?  
The choice paradigm, as articulated by Obama and Duncan, assumes first and 
foremost that the flexibility afforded to charters will result in innovations that will 
improve teacher and student performance, as measured by standardized test scores. 
Second, the paradigm assumes that innovations in the educational private sector are 
limited to groundbreaking organizational, technological, pedagogical, and curricular 
developments, and that these are the aspects of market competition that will influence the 
public schools. Furthermore, Obama and Duncan, along with other elite charter advocates 
like Bill Gates, Eli Broad, and Michael Bloomberg, contend that such developments will 
translate into increased wealth for students, communities, and U.S. society. Finally, as 
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Marx’s analysis points out, there is an underlying assumption at work in the choice 
paradigm that the coercive laws of competition will improve the efficiency and 
effectiveness of the public school system writ large. Competition, then, is part of a 
systemic restructuring of public education.   
These imagined solutions to educational inequality are problematic for multiple 
reasons. First, a recent study by Christopher and Sarah Lubienski of the University of 
Illinois compared nationwide scores of charter and public school students on the math 
exam of the National Assessment of Educational Progress (NAEP). They found that 
charters were performing below their public school counterparts, and, when they 
controlled for class, race, and location, charter school students were often performing at a 
level months behind their peers in public schools (Crawford, 2013). A similar study by 
the Center for Research on Education Outcomes (CREDO) found that only 17% of 
charter schools were performing better than public schools, while 37% were performing 
significantly worse, and 46% displayed no significant difference (CREDO, 2009, cited in 
Lipman, 2011). There is little evidence to support the notion that the autonomy and 
flexibility afforded charters actually lead to innovations that improve student test scores. 
Second, data suggests that competition actually exerts a downward pressure on 
educational quality in both public and charter schools (Ravitch, 2011; Lipman, 2005, 
2011). Competitive pressure within a context of high stakes standardized testing and 
punitive accountability can result in a narrowing of curriculum and a pedagogy of 
‘teaching to the test.’ This creates a “dual curriculum”- basic skills and test prep for poor 
and working class students of color, and a rich and varied curriculum for their middle and 
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upper class white peers (Lipman, 2005)- a race and class dynamic similar to the unequal 
effects of drug policies and drug courts.  
Furthermore, as schools compete for students, instead of experimenting with new 
methods, both charters and public schools tend to lean on traditional and outdated 
methods and curriculum, just as the drug court leans on the prison. For charters, this is in 
part a marketing strategy of adopting “a culture that parents feel is tried and true, and 
what they experienced when they were at school” (Crawford, 2013). For public schools, 
as well as many charters, punitive accountability mechanisms like teacher evaluations, 
firings, and school closings, incentivize many teachers and school leaders to achieve 
higher test scores via drills and rote learning instead of individualized, culturally relevant, 
and critical pedagogy. Curriculum narrows as schools make cuts to the arts, science, 
music, and the humanities in order to reallocate limited resources to test preparation and 
basic skills. The threat of school closure in New York City is palpable, as it is directly 
linked to scores on standardized tests. For example, a 2013 study by the Independent 
Budget Office showed that, of the 26 New York City public schools slated to close in 
2013, all 17 elementary schools exhibited ELA and Math test scores below the 40% 
mark. All 8 high schools on the closure list had a larger share of incoming 9
th
 graders 
with scores below 62% on the 8
th
 grade ELA test and below 67% on the 8
th
 grade Math 
test (New York City Independent Budget Office, 2013). 
Competition creates a profound pressure to improve test scores, leading to a 
consequential narrowing of curriculum, a tilted focus on basic skills, and an unhealthy 
bias towards teaching to the test. Such are some strategies embraced by many teachers 
and school leaders in their efforts to survive in the education marketplace (Lipman, 2011; 
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Ravitch, 2011). A report from the Center on Education Policy (2007) showed that, 
nationwide, the majority of school districts were increasing time for reading and math in 
elementary schools, while reducing time for other subjects by approximately one-third. 
62 percent of districts across the nation reported increased time spent on ELA and Math 
in elementary school; 20 percent of districts increased time in middle school. For districts 
that reported increases, the average increase in English was 46 percent and 37 percent in 
math. As a result, 44 percent of districts reported cutting time from one or more other 
subjects including science, social studies, art, music, and physical education. Others 
reported cuts to lunch and recess as well.  Overall, the report found an average reduction 
of 31 percent in the amount of instructional time allotted to these subjects since 2001-02. 
84 percent of districts reported that they have altered their reading curriculum to 
emphasize content on standardized tests, 79 percent similarly altered their middle school 
English curriculum, and 76 percent did the same in their high schools. 81 percent of 
districts changed their math curriculum at the elementary and middle school levels to 
match tested content, and 78 percent made similar changes to their high school math 
curriculum (Center on Education Policy, 2007).  
Furthermore, the idea that the pedagogical and curricular advancements 
developed in charters will, under the coercive laws of competition, be reflected in public 
schools as they struggle to maintain their competitive edge is a dangerous assumption 
that overlooks a host of of productivity-enhancing and cost-cutting strategies that are 
detrimental to teachers, students, and families. Marx’s analysis of the impact of 
competition in industry showed how competition forces factories to intensify labor, to 
lower costs by attacking wages and benefits, to mechanize as much as possible, to seek 
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out cheaper raw materials, and to produce as efficiently as possible- all of which lead to 
increased exploitation of, and worse living conditions for, the working class and poor 
(1867). The law of coercive competition, applied to education, points to the problematic 
ways charters remain competitive. First, teachers tend to be non-unionized, lower paid, 
working longer hours than those in public schools, and often assigned tasks that, in public 
schools, are the domain of other school employees (Lipman, 2011). Furthermore, the race 
to cut costs has forced both charters and public schools to increasingly rely on “low-cost-
short-term” or “transitory educators” like those produced by Teach for America 
(Fabricant & Fine, 2012, p. 20). As a result of these factors, charters exhibit a high 
turnover rate of teachers which exacerbates instability for students and schools. When a 
charter or public school closes, hundreds of students’ educations are disrupted (Lipman, 
2011; Fabricant & Fine, 2012), and they and their families are forced to perform unpaid 
intellectual, physical, and emotional labor as they seek out schooling elsewhere. 
Another impact of the coercive law of competition on charters is increased 
spending on marketing and public relations (Lipman, 2011). These are funds that could 
otherwise be spent on educational resources. Just recently, Eva Moskowitz and the Hedge 
fund-backed Families for Excellent Schools spent close to $5 million on a massive PR 
campaign to attack, and defeat, Mayor DeBlasio’s attempt to deny three charter schools 
rent-free space in public school buildings(Hernández & Craig, 2014). From 2010-2011, 
New York City's Success Academy Charter Schools Inc., run by former City 
Councilwoman Eva Moskowitz, spent $883,119 on flyers, bus stop ads, internet ads, and 
"an army of paid recruiters who go door-to-door soliciting student applications" 
(Gonzalez, 2012). Another $1.3 million was spent on networking and outreach, including 
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$243,150 paid to the PR firm SKD Knickerbocker and $129,000 to a consulting firm 
founded by David Axelrod, President Obama's chief strategist. An additional $912,000 
was spent by Success Academy's first seven schools on more student recruitment via 
advertising and branding firms. The total spent on marketing and PR for 2010-2011 was 
$3.4 million (ibid). Between 2007 and 2009 alone, Harlem Success spent $1.3 million on 
marketing. $1 million of that money was spent on student recruitment efforts including 
posters, brochures, internet and radio ads, and door to door solicitations (Gonzalez, 
2010).  In 2008, private sector educational entrepreneurs in New York City joined with 
the neoliberal think tank Democrats for Education Reform (DER) to unleash a mass wave 
of publicity campaigns designed to scandalize public schools in poor neighborhoods and 
promote charter schools as the only solution. In Harlem alone, DER embarked on a 3-
month long campaign distributing fliers that reinforced this message. As a result, 5,000 
people showed up for a Success Charter Network lottery, where 3,000 students applied 
for 600 seats (Fabricant & Fine, 2012). Similar to Marx’s industrial reserve army, the 
coercive laws of competition in education pit working class and poor families against one 
another as they compete for extremely limited spaces in well-advertised charter schools. 
This competition and the instability it creates puts pressure on the city and state to help 
corporate reformers like Moskowitz and her team of hedge fund millionaires to open 
more schools (Gonzalez, 2010). Meanwhile, marketing and PR campaigns funnel more 
public money into private firms, while provoking and exploiting the unpaid labor families 
undertake as they seek out a quality education that is no longer guaranteed to them by the 
state.  
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Furthermore, because charters receive less funding from the state, and urban 
public schools must contend with the low property values that form their tax base, both 
seek out additional revenue streams from corporate philanthropy. The implications of this 
are twofold: First, competition is intensified as schools compete not only for students but 
also for philanthro-capital and the support of business leaders. Charters, as the market-
modeled darlings of the corporate community, receive additional millions in subsidies 
from corporate and hedge fund philanthropic organizations. Though charters receive 
l20% less per child than traditional public schools, a vast and seemingly endless inflow of 
foundation money has given them a significant competitive edge. Gates Foundation alone 
has given charters at least $137 million within the last few years. Gates, Walton, and 
Broad family philanthropies combined have given at least $600 million to charter schools 
and organizations. As a result of private financing, The Harlem Children Zone’s per-
capita investment is three times that of New York City traditional schools’ per student 
spending (Fabricant & Fine, 2012). The reliance of charters and public schools on 
philanthrocapital further blurs the borders between the public and private spheres, and 
increases corporate control over schooling, as billionaires like Bill Gates and Eli Broad 
become increasingly involved in education policymaking and governance. The choice 
paradigm has therefore been part and parcel of the restoration of elite class power 
(Harvey, 2005), as a new corporate power bloc gains increasing influence over the 
formation of social and economic policy.  
The coercive law of competition also has important spatial implications, 
especially in New York City, where charter school co-location has emerged as a cost-
saving strategy for charter entrepreneurs. Co-location was a major educational agenda 
 195 
under former mayor Michael Bloomberg, though today it faces some challenges under 
current mayor Bill DeBlasio. Under Bloomberg, the city used its vast resources and 
command over built space to help charter schools remain competitive by providing them 
with rent-free space in buildings that were also occupied by public schools. A recent 
study published by the New York City Independent Budget Office (2011) compared the 
funding of traditional public schools with charter schools: 
 
Public Funding Per General Education Student 2008-2009 2009-2010 
Traditional Public Schools $15,672 $16,011 
Funding of Charters in DOE Buildings $16,373 $16,660 
Difference from Traditional Public Schools $701 $649 
Funding of Charters in Private Space $13,661 $13,653 
Difference from Tradition Public Schools ($2,011) ($2,358) 
 
 
Almost two-thirds of charter schools in New York City are in public school buildings, 
and the space and services these schools receive for free amounts to a total average 




Debt Service $1,346 
      $2,712 
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With approximately 35,478 students attending co-located charter schools in FY2012, this 
amounts to a public subsidy of more than $96 million for 2012 alone. This funneling of 
public money and public space into the private sector means that one effect of the 
coercive law of competition on public schools is, in fact, the draining of potential revenue 
for the city’s public schools and other services (Hamson, 2011; IBO, 2011). This in turn 
undermines their ability to compete, for an additional $96 million could help public 
schools provide smaller class sizes, attract more experienced teachers, and develop the 
kinds of innovative pedagogy and curricula that the choice paradigm claims to encourage.  
Finally, the coercive law of competition, and the cost-cutting, productivity- and 
efficiency-oriented strategies it induces, has resulted in a disproportionately low 
enrollment of Emergent Bilingual students (EBs)
5
 and Students with Disabilities in 
charter schools. The Civil Rights Project (2010) report Choice without Equity: Charter 
School Segregation and the Need for Civil Rights Standards points out that one-fifth of 
children in the U.S. come from homes where the parents don't speak English, a tenth are 
classified as English language learners (ELLs), and civil rights law requires that charter 
schools provide educational services to these students. Data gathered by the study, 
however, suggests that there is a disproportionately low enrollment of ELLs. Charter 
schools also serve a disproportionately low number of students with disabilities than 
public schools. They do this by using "counseling mechanisms during the charter 
admissions process to deter students who participate in Special Education programs" (p. 
                                                        
5 The term Emergent Bilingual (EB) will be used, when possible, instead of English 
Language Learner (ELL), as the former emphasizes students’ bilingual development, 
and views students’ linguistic repertoire as a resource, rather than a deficit. 
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16). Similar tactics are taken with Emergent Bilingual students, as parents are often 
informally counseled “that the school is not a good fit, or the school does not provide the 
necessary services” (Lipman, 2011, p 140). Thus charter schools embrace exclusionary 
strategies to improve their market position (Lubienski, Gulosino, & Weitzel, 2009). 
Furthermore, the political economic dynamics of the choice paradigm have 
important implications for the race and class disparities displayed by charter school 
enrollments, for "the rapid growth of charter schools has been expanding a sector that is 
even more segregated than the public schools" (Frankenberg, Siegel-Hawley, & Wang, 
2010, p. 5). Because they are located in urban areas, charter schools "enroll a 
disproportionate share of black students and expose them to the highest level of 
segregation" such that "almost a third end up in apartheid schools with zero to one 
percent white classmates" (ibid). Segregation in schools in general has been increasing 
for the last twenty years, but students in charter schools are more likely attend segregated 
schools. Drawing on national data, this study from the Civil Rights Project shows that 
"seventy percent of black charter school students attend intensely segregated minority 
charter schools," which amounts to "twice as many as the share of intensely segregated 
black students in traditional public schools" (ibid, p. 8). Forty-three percent of black 
charter school students are enrolled at highly segregated schools- approximately three 
times the number of black students in public schools. Fifty percent of Latinos attending 
charter schools are enrolled in highly segregated schools (ibid).  
In New York City, "racial segregation may be even more tightly linked to poverty 
concentration in charter schools" (Frankenberg, Siegel-Hawley, & Wang, 2010, p.78).  In 
the New York metropolitan area, charter school enrollment is 26 percent Latino, 66 
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percent Black, and 5 percent white. Public schools enroll 27 percent Latino, 20 percent 
Black, and 42 percent white. 85 percent of charter students attend intensely segregated 
minority schools, compared to 32 percent of white charter students. Charter schools 
operate at the intersection of race and poverty, for at least 90 percent Black and Latino 
charter school students were also from low-income, poverty level households. Poverty is 
concentrated in charter schools, as Black and Latino charter school students attend 
schools where 60% or more of the students come from households existing at or below 
the poverty level (ibid). One impact is that, as students leave public schools, the flow of 
money that follows them to charters drains overcrowded public schools in high poverty 
neighborhoods of much needed funds. Because the market for charter schools in New 
York City is primarily located in impoverished neighborhoods in the urban core, this 
intersection of poverty and segregation means that urban public schools serving primary 
African American and Latino students are being drained of crucial revenue at the same 
time that their highest performing students are transferring to charter schools. With 
school closings intensifying already overcrowded classrooms, these conditions make it 
extremely difficult for public schools garner the kinds of standardized test scores they 
need in order to avoid being turned around or closed altogether.   
A second impact is that as African American and Latino parents navigate the 
constraints of urban poverty and educational disinvestment in New York City (Pedroni, 
2007; Lipman, 2011), their embrace of charter schools, and the desire to get their child 
enrolled in one, creates a small but vocal constituency in the urban core who will rally in 
support of charter school expansion and corporate reform of education. Third, the 
intersection of poverty, race, and the coercive law of competition in education means 
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that, as New York City charters cut costs in order to enhance their market position, the 
negative educational impact of those cuts is disproportionately borne by poor youth of 
color attending highly segregated charter schools. This is a form of “targeted 
abandonment” (Harvey, 1989b) as African American and Latino youth and their parents, 
abandoned by the state to fend for themselves in the educational marketplace, bear the 
brunt of the harms associated with the coercive law of competition as available 
educational infrastructure is hollowed out, if not dismantled altogether.   
Obama and Duncan avoid the language of competition when they praise charter 
schools, and couch their support in a pro-school choice rhetoric centered on claims 
around equal opportunity in education and preparation for the labor market. The 
discourse around options, innovation, educational excellence, and human capital omits 
discussion of the impact of inequality on the dynamics of the education marketplace, and 
ignores the harms that emerge from the material and ideological conditions of a policy 
landscape marked by competition. Like the drug court paradigm, the choice paradigm, in 
spite of its claims, is race and class-blind and as such promotes practices that reproduce 
social and economic inequality. Crucial discussions of racial discrimination, segregation, 
and the uneven distribution of wealth and harm along lines of race and class are crowded 
out by a dominant discourse that emphasizes the “dreams” rather than the “gritty 
materialities” (Apple, 2004) of school choice.  
 
 




Towards a Conjunctural Analysis 
My argument so far has been that drug policy and education policy since the mid-
1970s have been part of a larger interlocking neoliberal state project to reassert official 
authority challenged by the movements of the 1960s and early 70s. This project involved: 
1) reconfiguring the political, economic, and cultural terrain in order to reestablish the 
class power of economic elites; 2) reasserting racial hierarchies threatened by social 
movements, urban uprisings, and crises in white supremacy (Melamed, 2006); and 3) 
dismantling the welfare state, while creating new state apparatuses and realigning 
existing ones in order to meet the needs of increasingly financialized global capital. This 
dissertation has shown how these changes have exacerbated inequality, resulting in an 
intensified downward distribution of harm along lines of race and class over the last 40 
years, while wealth and resources have been funneled up the social ladder, away from the 
city’s neediest populations. The dissertation examined the ways in which the Rockefeller 
Drug Laws of 1973, New York’s prison building/filling project, and drug court reforms 
emerged out of, and responded to, the racial capitalist conditions of a city in the midst of 
cultural and political economic upheavals. It treated education policy and discourse 
similarly, analyzing how federal and local policies like ESEA and decentralization were 
shaped by the dynamics of racial capitalism, and how education reforms, including 
charter schools, worked materially and ideologically as state strategies for facilitating the 
penetration of education by market forces, while reframing the instability caused by 
waves of disinvestment and dispossession in the urban core as the product of cultural and 
racial deficits. Like the legal architecture attached to criminalization, education policies 
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and reforms contribute to the uneven distribution of wealth and harm along lines of race 
and class. 
It’s axiomatic within Marxist theory that capitalism creates crisis at the same time 
that it requires a modicum of stability in order to maintain profit flows. Developments in 
education and drug policy have sought to manage the multiple crises that emerge 
alongside the neoliberalization of New York City. They produce and deploy 
representations of racial subjects (Melamed, 2006) that facilitate a profound delinking of 
inequality from the political economy by criminalizing and stigmatizing poor people of 
color. Criminalization and education worked together to naturalize the unequal outcomes 
of racial capitalism by discursively militating against a critical historical consciousness of 
inequality and its embeddedness in shifting relationships between the state, race, and 
capitalism. Reforms in drug and education policy also maintain inequality by producing 
the legal and material infrastructure needed to manage potentially “dangerous” surplus 
populations (Gilmore, 2007). In doing so, these state apparatuses mitigate the instability 
caused by cuts in social expenditures, the “hyperextraction of surplus value from 
racialized bodies” (Melamed, p. 1), rising unemployment and poverty, and the continued 
upward distribution of wealth and resources.  
Neoliberal reforms, as solutions to social problems, are predicated on the notion 
that the market, if left to its own devices, can improve the well being of all people. Yet 
neoliberalism has not created more social equality or social justice; neoliberalism, or 
policy in the defense of the already-privileged, has generated profound instability 
threatening not only its legitimacy as a political economic project, but also the security of 
those who have benefited from this particular historical phase in racial capitalism. Under 
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neoliberalism, “freedom” is recast as freedom from public regulation through the singular 
elevation of market-regulation; “liberty” is the liberty of the autonomous individual 
impeded by no obstacles or restraints based in social ideals of diversity, inclusion, 
redistribution, multiculturalism, or compensatory recognition of historical injustices. 
However, this neoliberal age of the past several decades has decisively improved only the 
lot of the already-privileged. With specific regard to the domain of this dissertation, 
neoliberal reforms, like charter schools and drug courts, have undermined the public 
sector and degraded mass experience among large sectors of the population. They are 
examples reformist reforms, as Gilmore (in Berger, 2014) refers to them, which serve as 
realignments that maintain the status quo, as opposed to non-reformist reforms which set 
their sites on structural change. This dissertation has argued that charter schools and drug 
courts, as examples of reformist reforms, “recreate” and “preserve” white privilege and 
class inequalities (Leonardo, 2007), allowing the creative destruction of neoliberal 
urbanization to continue unabated.  
This final chapter of the dissertation sets out to identify and theorize on some 
important areas of conjuncture for drug policy and education policy, and reforms in both 
arenas. It is a way of asking “Why this constellation of reforms? Why here, in this place, 
and now?” Tabb (1982) speaks of economic restructuring as a “single reality” of creation 
and destruction, and this chapter attempts to map how education and drug policy reforms 
emerge within that “single reality” as products of, and responses to, crises of racial 
capitalism. Ruth Gilmore (2007) defines crisis as a rupture whereby social reproduction 
ceases to be able to occur within existing frameworks and conditions.  Following Hall et 
al. (1978) and Clarke (2010), a crisis is also a point at which different tensions, 
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antagonisms, and contradictions come together. As these chapters have shown, the 
neoliberalization of New York City was a response to a web of political, economic, and 
racial crises that beset the welfare state. Neoliberalization has also created its own waves 
of interlocking crises: the economic and racial, as well as a crisis of the state and of 
political legitimacy. And looking more closely, these have been articulated in crises of 
prison overcrowding and funding, and an ongoing legitimacy crisis for the state’s 
policing apparatus. They have been articulated through multiple education crises, real and 
manufactured, material and symbolic.  
Developments in education and criminal justice express the “complex links" that 
make up these multiple crises, and reflect how the state uses shifting strategies to manage 
them, balancing consent and coercion (Hall et al., 1978; Clark, 2010). In what follows, I 
will identify and theorize on what I see as some key areas of conjuncture in how 
education and drug policy reforms have been imagined and deployed by the state as 
solutions to the crises entangled within the dynamics of urban poverty. First, I will 
analyze the development of managerial simplifications in public education and criminal 
justice as a case study to explore how mutually reinforcing shifts within these two “core 
organs” (Wacquant, 2010, p. 200) of the state enhance its capacity to manage the 
contradictions of racial capitalism.  To do so, I will begin by relating James C. Scott’s 
(1998) concepts of simplification, legibility, and coherence to the logics of neoliberal 
statecraft. Next, I will use Scott’s conceptual tools to illuminate how the market-based 
and actuarial ideologies of “the new managerialism” (Garland, 2001) extend across and 
through the institutional spheres of both education and criminal justice, producing “gritty 
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materialities” (Apple, 2004) and discourses that assert the capacity, or power, of the 
neoliberal state.   
Second, I will analyze the relationship between drug courts, charter schools, and 
what has come to be known as the Nonprofit Industrial Complex (NPIC). This term 
emerges from The revolution will not be funded: Beyond the nonprofit industrial 
complex, the seminal work on the NPIC edited by INCITE! Women of Color Against 
Violence, in 2007. According to INCITE! member and author Andrea Smith, the NPIC  
manages and controls dissent by incorporating it into the state apparatus, 
functioning as a ‘shadow state’ constituted by a network of institutions that do 
much of what government agencies are supposed to do with tax money in the 
areas of education and social services. The NPIC functions as an alibi that allows 
government to make war, expand punishment, and proliferate market economies 
under the veil of partnership between the public and private sectors (p. 9). 
Drug courts, like charter schools, are sites where the public and the private intersect and 
blur in both structural and ideological relationships. These relationships “link political 
and financial technologies of state and owning class control with surveillance over public 
political ideology, including and especially emergent progressive and leftist social 
movements” (Rodriguez, in ibid, p. 8). Drug court and charter school reforms will be 
examined not as the sites of transformative social action they claim to be, but rather as 
examples of reformist reform that uphold the status quo by extending the NPIC.  
Finally, the chapter will conclude with an analysis that interweaves the theories of 
Michel Foucault and Jodi Melamed (2006) to consider the how education and drug policy 
come together within the official anti-racism of the state, and the relationship between the 
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racial subjects such discourse engenders and the production of neoliberal subjectivity. By 
prescribing limits as to what is good, possible, and real in the world (Therborn, 1980), 
official anti-racism orients us towards certain activities and away from others. For 
neoliberal subjects, this means thinking and acting in ways that are amenable to the 
dynamics of this particular historical phase in racial capitalism. This entails becoming 
self-surveilling and self-responsibilized “entrepreneurs of ourselves” (Foucault, 2010), 
capable of managing, on our own, the risks that threaten our well-being, as well as 
minimizing the risks we may pose to U.S. society. Neoliberal discourse around markets 
and individualism is therefore linked to an official anti-racism that addresses the unequal 
distribution of risk and harm along lines of race, attributing it, however, to racial and 
cultural deficits rather than structural and ideological forces.  
Building Neoliberal State Capacity 
In her political economy of California’s massive prison-building project, Ruthie 
Gilmore (ibid) conceptualizes state power not as a “thing,” but in terms of the state’s 
capacity to organize the material and symbolic relationships that make up production. As 
a result, she argues, the state itself is a fluid, dynamic institution constantly adjusting in 
order to maximize its capacity. Just as state power is not a “thing,” the state itself is not 
monolithic- rather it is composed of a similarly dynamic ensemble of subinstitutions (e.g. 
education, criminal justice, public health, transportation) that, though varied in their 
purposes and forms, “get direction from the prevailing platforms and priorities of the 
current government” (ibid, p. 28; see also Wacquant, 2010; and Bourdieu, 1994). The 
priority of the neoliberal state is developing an institutional framework that disembeds 
capital from social and political constraints, intervenes to open new markets while it 
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protects and deregulates extant ones, and maintains a modicum of stability to ensure that 
unrest does not disrupt or slow accumulation (Harvey, 2005). To do so is no small task, 
and the conditions under which this occurs are unstable. As such, the state must 
continually optimize and enhance its capacity to “get a handle on its subjects and their 
environment” (Scott, 1998, p.7). 
To that end, the neoliberal state is a racial capitalist state, attempting to structure 
the changing relationships between race and capitalism. The racism of the neoliberal state 
lies in the orientation of its institutions towards “the state-sanctioned or extralegal 
production and exploitation of group-differentiated vulnerability to premature death” 
(Gilmore, 2007, p. 28). That is, the neoliberal state’s capacity for maintaining race and 
class hierarchies that map “the organization of labor markets and the socio-spatial control 
of wealth” (ibid, p. 26) depends on certain “institutional pressures and effects” that 
produce “the conditions, directly or indirectly, that serve to foreshorten life directly but 
also foreshorten life’s opportunities” (Goldberg, 2009, p. 26). And so it is that neoliberal 
states, insofar as they are “driven by utopian plans” of the free market and “an 
authoritarian disregard for the values, desires, and objections of their subjects, are indeed 
a mortal threat to human well-being” (Scott, 1998, p.7), and, in the U.S., threatening in 
particular to the well-being of poor people of color.  
Neoliberalism has not created the “crisis-free world order” its advocates promised 
once market deregulation was in place. Rather, increased deregulation and 
monopolization, along with the “hyper-mobility of financial capital” have “aggravated 
uneven development and volatility” (Ginden & Panitch, 2012, p. 17). The neoliberal state 
faces a political predicament- for as its economic and social policies increase instability, 
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mass stagnation in living standards and outbursts of chaos, its capacity to “regulate the 
poor” has diminished with the waning of the welfare state (Piven and Cloward, 1993; 
Wacquant, 2010). This section looks at similar developments in education and crime 
control in order to analyze the enhancement of neoliberal state capacity. It is designed to 
rethink the ways that social problems are constructed and their solutions imagined, and 
how such processes relate to state power. The changing relationship between the state and 
capitalism in the U.S. under neoliberalism demands new ways of seeing and thinking 
about how state power is deployed to contain the instability and crises produced by 
macroeconomic policies. This section considers how the spheres of public education and 
crime control brace up the neoliberal state as it seeks to “produce stability and growth in 
the general political economy, especially if equity is no longer on the agenda” (Gilmore, 
2007, p.22).  
Simplification and legibility 
 In Seeing like a State, James C. Scott (1998) begins with an analogy between 
statecraft and agriculture, noting that agriculture is:  
a radical reorganization and simplification of flora to suit man’s goals. Whatever 
their other purposes, the designs of scientific forestry and agriculture and the 
layouts of plantations, collective farms, ujamaa villages, and strategic hamlets all 
seemed calculated to make the terrain, its products, and its workforce more 
legible- and hence manipulable- from above and from the center. (p. 2) 
The state takes complex social practices and creates “a standard grid” whereby these 
practices can be “centrally recorded and monitored” (ibid, p.2). He goes on to analyze a 
number of historic state strategies, ranging from the creation of permanent last names to 
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the design of urban spaces, in order to sketch out the ways in which simplification and 
legibility function as techniques by which the state enhances its capacity to control 
populations and serve the economic interests it represents. For example, returning to 
forestry, the range of possible uses for, and meanings of, a tree, are “replaced by an 
abstract tree representing a volume of lumber or firewood” that embodies a surplus value 
waiting to be extracted. As a result, “the forest as habitat disappears and is replaced by 
the forest as an economic resource to be managed efficiently and profitably” (ibid, p. 13).   
 Simplification, then, is the social construction of a “selective reality” through a 
“narrowing of vision” that “brings into focus certain limited aspects of an otherwise far 
more complex and unwieldy reality,” making “the phenomenon at the center of the field 
of vision more legible and hence more susceptible to careful measurement and 
calculation” (ibid, p.11). Legibility, according to Scott, means the state can read and 
construct meaning around the categories, typifications, descriptions, and aggregations 
produced by the varied processes of simplification, and, because of this knowledge, can 
design, enhance, and evaluate its targeted interventions into social life. A simplified and 
legible representation, whether through, say, cartography, architecture, the media, or an 
education policy like Race to the Top, is an ideological tool for remaking reality and 
justifying certain kinds of symbolic and material interventions into that reality. Such 
processes allow economic elites to augment and protect their wealth and class power. As 
Scott puts it, “the legibility of a society provides the capacity for large-scale social 
engineering” whereby capitalist entrepreneurs use “state action to realize their plans” (p. 
4).  
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 Under the neoliberal state, simplification and legibility take shape as social 
engineering projects that facilitate privatization, deregulation, and flexible accumulation. 
Neoliberal policy re-engineers the social contract with all non-owning classes, regardless 
of race or gender. However, in impoverished urban neighborhoods in cities like New 
York, these projects work as technologies of racial control, legitimizing the wealth and 
status of White elites on the one hand, while dealing with surplus, marginalized, and 
dissident populations of color created by neoliberal policies on the other. They project 
visions of order and disorder: according to Scott, simplification processes narrowly 
define problems, often in distorted ways. Extending his theory to neoliberalism, I argue 
that, by making issues legible within the logic of the neoliberal state, simplifications 
allow for neoliberal policies to emerge as imagined solutions. For example, simplifying 
the geopolitical, economic, cultural, and environmental complexities of U.S. oil 
consumption to a cost-benefit analysis makes the issue legible within a dominant 
neoliberal logic that emphasizes efficiency and deregulation (see, e.g., Los Angeles 
Times, December 13
th
, 2013). Such representations are discursive supports for state-
sponsored projects of accumulation by dispossession (Harvey, 2003), such as the 
“terrestrial skinning” (Klein, 2011) of the Alberta Tar Sands in Canada and the 
construction of the Keystone XL pipeline in the U.S. Along similar lines, in Business 
Week, the arrest of environmental activists protesting the pipeline was simplified to a 
conflict between local law enforcement and “self-appointed eco-anarchists” (Texas Land 
Commissioner Jerry Patterson, as quoted in Business Week, December 20
th
, 2012). Such a 
representation is similarly legible within neoliberal logic: it legitimizes state suppression 
of unrest by invoking the cultural trope of law and order. At the same time, it 
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depoliticizes the tensions that exist between environmentalists and impoverished rural 
Texans whose surplus labor and land are byproducts of state-subsidized corporatization 
and mechanization of agricultural production and ranching. 
Coherence, governmentality, and the neoliberal imagination 
 Thus, according to Scott, simplification and legibility are ways of thinking about 
how forms of knowledge are related to the exercise of state power. A third conceptual 
tool, that of coherence, is needed to show how mutual intelligibility among these narrow 
representations is integral to the perceived legitimacy of the neoliberal state. Coherent 
simplifications brace each other up as they inform larger decisions over what ‘counts’ as 
data, provide similar ideological justifications for unjust material outcomes of policies, 
and combine to crowd out alternative or dissident perspectives. What this chapter goes on 
to argue is that, underpinning the seemingly autonomous institutional spheres of 
education and criminal justice, is a common political rationality- a system of knowledge 
that “constitutes the intellectual processing of the reality which political technologies can 
then tackle” (Lemke, 2001, p. 1). That is, because education and criminal justice are core 
apparatuses that, along with other subinstitutions, constitute the neoliberal state, their 
policy instruments create varied yet coherent simplifications that define problems in ways 
that are mutually reinforcing and amenable to neoliberal solutions. In doing so, they work 
in conjunction to advance the racial and economic projects of the neoliberal state.  
 Coherence among its subinstitutions allows the neoliberal state to assert itself as a 
cohesive leviathan drawing on a stable political rationality to govern its subjects. Michel 
Foucault’s concept of governmentality demonstrates how coherence reinforces and 
extends the neoliberal state’s capacity. Governmentality entails a) the delineation of 
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conceptual frameworks that are used to construct a problem and provide strategies for 
interventions and solutions; and b) mechanisms and processes for the control or 
management of individuals, groups, and populations (Lemke, 2001). Governmentality is 
the top-down, hierarchical exercise of power and knowledge: the construction of 
knowledge about people as the means by which a small body of elite authorities can 
“govern in light of that knowledge” (Rose, O’Malley, and Valverde, 2006, p. 87). 
Governmentality increases neoliberal state capacity by further integrating an oligarchic 
state institution with its various subinstitutions through the construction, circulation, and 
enforcement of knowledge. The state can more effectively manage the instability caused 
by neoliberal social and economic policies when its ensemble of subinstitutions enacts 
“shared modes of problem formation…formulated within shared rationalities or styles of 
thinking” (ibid, p. 88). 
 Coherence, then, is the quality that allows these rationalities and ways of thinking 
to be shared, and therefore what makes governmentality, as a technique of state power, 
possible. Governmentality would not enhance state capacity if the knowledges being used 
to govern were disjointed, garbled, or contradictory. For a subinstitution like the public 
education system to deploy simplified knowledge in the interest of neoliberal social 
engineering and control, that knowledge must be comprehensible, organized, and 
schematic enough to be consistent with the dominant neoliberal logic of the state as 
constructed by its other core subinstitutions. Consider, for instance, the school to prison 
pipeline. Simplifications that represent students who “drop out” of high school as 
failures, lazy, or otherwise deficient are coherent with simplifications of “juvenile 
delinquency” that represent criminalized youth as deviant. Both are supported by an 
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ideology of individualism that pins responsibility onto the young person by reducing his 
or her situation to the outcome of free and rational choice in an open marketplace of 
possibilities. Furthermore, each representation crowds out alternative discourses around 
the structural impediments of racism and social class. Taken together, these 
simplifications around schooling and crime congeal into a conceptual framework that 
imagines state intervention in the form of “police in the hallways” (Nolan, 2011) as a 
response to a social problem with complex structural roots. The resulting school to prison 
pipeline puts into motion a “vision of social control” (Cohen, 1985) that is coherent 
within a neoliberal logic that upholds surveillance and incarceration as imagined 
solutions to educational problems produced by macro-level structures and ideologies 
around race, class, and gender (Ferguson, 2001).    
Managerial simplification and state capacity 
 In what follows, I will examine accountability regimes within U.S. criminal 
justice and education systems as a case study to illuminate how coherent policy 
developments around schooling and policing work to enhance neoliberal state capacity. 
To do so, I will use Scott’s concept of simplification to rethink the shift, across policy 
arenas, to what sociologist David Garland (2001) refers to as the new managerialism. 
Summarizing Garland, in this mode of simplification, market ideologies and actuarial 
discourses and practices dominate, characterized by the construction and deployment of 
efficiency-oriented categorizations, mandates, rewards, and sanctions. Private sector 
practices are injected into public policy instruments. Policies mandate certain practices 
designed to assess and intervene in a perceived level of risk in a population, group, or 
social space, and schools and police departments, evaluated in terms of the cost-
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effectiveness with which they enact these mandates, are rewarded or punished according 
to the outputs they produce.  
 These policies hold appeal across the political spectrum, braced up as they are by 
technocratic “claims to be economically rational alternatives to previous arrangements” 
of the welfare state (ibid, p.189). In both criminal justice and education, the new 
managerialism has meant that simplified representations of complex issues take on great 
significance, top-down strategies shape orientations and behavior at the micro, local-
level, and rewards and sanctions become the primary techniques of control. 
 In criminal justice, the goal of rehabilitating the individual was transformed into 
the goal of identifying and managing unruly surplus populations. In the U.S., this took 
shape within the context of a “war on drugs” which took for its target African Americans 
and Latinos living in impoverished urban areas. As part of the expansion of the war on 
drugs, new and more refined mechanisms for policing and disciplining developed that 
expanded the scope and reach of the criminal justice system, allowing for an increasing 
number of poor people of color to be policed “in ways that use least resources to achieve 
maximum effect” (ibid, p. 189). In education, schooling has similarly been saturated by 
market ideologies around cost-effectiveness, the centralization of power, the fetishization 
of efficiency and coercive competition as engines for educational equality, and an 
auditing culture fixated on outputs. The No Child Left Behind Act, Race to the Top, and 
most recently the Partnership for Assessment of Readiness for College and Careers 
(PARCC) exemplify education’s penetration by the market, as they mandate standards, 
high stakes testing, and punitive accountability measures as policy instruments that 
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promise to simplify and manage the messy world of unequal education in efficient and 
legible ways.  
 As managerial simplification permeated both education and criminal justice, it 
made them legible and coherent, for “economic modes of reasoning were available, 
transferable, and appeared to work, or at least satisfy funding authorities who 
increasingly demand that the activities they financed be monitored and assessed in this 
way” (ibid, p.190).  Coherence emerges as federal education and criminal justice policies 
mandate “a ragbag of techniques, models, analogies, and recipes for action that are 
loosely bound up together by their appeal to economic rationality” (ibid). This shared and 
mutually reinforcing “appeal to economic rationality” expands state capacity because it 
constructs a terrain for legitimate state intervention. Efficiency and accountability emerge 
as sensible ways of solving complex social problems. The ideological functions of 
managerial simplifications become concrete: once operationalized via education and 
criminal justice policies and instruments, these coherent ways of reasoning, seeing, and 
doing make possible the kinds material developments that advance the racial and 
economic projects of the neoliberal state (Harcourt, 2011).  
The drug war and the science of filling cages 
 Since the late 1970s, poor people of color living in disinvested urban areas have 
faced massive cuts to public housing and other welfare supports while more and more 
public money has been funneled into subsidizing the commercial and corporate 
development that, alongside gentrification, confers the dominance of elites over built 
space in many cities (Harvey, 2005; Moody, 2007; Smith, 1996). At the same time, the 
federal war on drugs earmarked billions in federal money to “substantially increase the 
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number of law enforcement officers interacting directly with members of the community 
(`cops on the beat'),” as well as to “encourage the development of new technologies to 
assist State, Indian tribal government, and local law enforcement agencies in reorienting 
the emphasis of their activities from reacting to crime to preventing crime” (Violent 
Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994). Crime prevention meant the 
increased targeting of open-air spaces in “hot spot” neighborhoods using surveillance 
technology and proactive policing techniques like “stop and frisk” (White, 2011). The 
federal government provided economic incentives and accountability mechanisms to 
operationalize and monitor these local policing efforts. For instance, The Violent Crime 
Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994 set aside $1.3 billion in 1995, $1.85 billion in 
1996, and $1.95 billion in 1997 for local police departments. However, to renew a grant, 
police departments had to “demonstrate significant progress in achieving the objectives 
of the initial application,” that is, provide quantitative data indicative of increased arrests 
and convictions.  
 In New York City, this accountability process took shape as COMPSTAT, (now 
common in many cities in the U.S. and Europe). COMPSTAT, introduced by NYPD 
police commissioner William Bratton in 1994, was a mechanism for gathering data on 
crime and arrests within individual precincts. This data was used to produce weekly 
statistical reports that would be analyzed at regular headquarters meetings during which 
precinct commanders would be interrogated on their results (Parenti, 2008). COMPSTAT 
was part of an organizational change that decentralized responsibility for producing 
arrests, shifting it from Headquarters to precinct commanders, thereby assessing the 
impact of policing at the precinct level and holding individual precincts and officers 
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accountable for producing arrests. In addition to holding precincts accountable, the data 
gathered by the COMPSTAT approach was used for “geographic mapping to identify 
problem places and to target police resources to those specific places” (White, 2011, p. 
19). This process came to be known as ‘hot spot’ policing. This mode of managerial 
simplification was multifaceted: states and municipalities are provided with substantial 
amounts of federal money to a) increase their police force; b) increase surveillance of 
particular neighborhoods; c) incentivize arrests, convictions, and lengthy sentences; d) 
develop actuarial systems of managing risk and standardized, outcomes-based 
accountability measures for police departments, courts, and other institutions; and e) 
partner with the private sector to fund, design, and build prisons as well as net-widening 
‘alternatives to incarceration’ like drug courts. 
 The drug war’s managerial emphasis on incentives and accountability increased 
proactive targeting by the police (e.g. broken windows policing and stop and frisk) of 
spaces already identified as high-crime (hot spots). These practices contribute to the 
racial disproportionality in arrests, convictions, and sentencing. COMPSTAT reports and 
the punitive accountability mechanisms attached to them drew on a similar theory of 
motivation as comparable developments in education. Competition and accountability 
would increase pressure on police officers to produce arrests, which would eventually 
decrease the overall crime rate and improve the quality of life in the city. But because 
structural inequality shapes the way individuals navigate drug policies like the 
Rockefeller Drug Laws, (Acker, 2002), many drug users and sellers who live in poverty 
are positioned to participate in open-air drug markets, which increases their vulnerability 
to this intensified policing. Hot spots are identified based on surveillance of this activity, 
 217 
and inform law enforcement resource allocation. As a result, police focus their efforts on 
arresting people in impoverished neighborhoods that “lack the kinds of spatial and social 
barriers to outsiders (even police) that often characterize wealthier areas” (Lynch, 2012, 
p. 192).  
 These policies and practices culminate in the disproportionate arrest and 
incarceration of poor and low-income African Americans and Latinos living in 
historically disinvested urban neighborhoods. A report by the Drug Policy Alliance 
(2011) points out that “by 2003, African Americans were arrested for drug law violations 
at a rate 238 percent higher than whites… even though they use and sell drugs at rates 
comparable to whites” (p.8). Today, approximately two-thirds of prisoners serving time 
for drug offenses are African American and Latino (The Sentencing Project, 2014). But 
the simplification process cuts out discourses around the racial, political economic, and 
historical forces that have produced the conditions that make the mass incarceration of 
poor people of color possible. Simplification also militates against critical historical 
consciousness; it narrows the complexities of drugs, poverty, and race to a cluster of 
managerial issues centered on cost-effectiveness, measurable outputs, and accountability. 
 New York City’s drug courts are similarly reductive and selective in their 
representation of the relationship between addiction, crime, and mass incarceration. By 
steering some drug users away from incarceration, and using therapeutic jurisprudence 
instead of traditional criminal justice approaches to addiction, drug courts claim great 
success at reducing recidivism. Drug courts claim to be efficient and cost-effective, and 
thereby ease prison overcrowding and mitigate the fiscal burdens of mass incarceration. 
The political, economic, and racial dynamics that structure “group-differentiated 
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vulnerability” (Gilmore, 2007, p. 28) are simplified into a construction of incarceration as 
resulting from a chronic disease that obstructs self-control of behavior. The complex 
structural and discursive terrain that shapes drug use, dealing, and the carceral state more 
generally is simplified into a medico-behavioral representation of deviance. This 
profoundly race and class-blind simplification gives way to unevenly distributed forms of 
punitive accountability, such as disciplining practices ranging from public shaming to 
increased surveillance to prolonged periods of incarceration.  
 The discursive and structural nexus linking drug policy, policing, and poverty is 
essential to the expansion of neoliberal state capacity (Gilmore, 2007; Harcourt, 2011; 
Wacquant, 2010). First, the drug war harnesses and operationalizes managerial discourses 
and techniques that simplify poverty and drug use into a “language for doing and 
representing” (Garland, 2001, p.190). In doing so, COMPSTAT draws on a pseudo-
scientific discourse around data and statistics to justify highly racialized state 
interventions like criminalization, intensified policing, and mass incarceration. Second, 
the drug war operationalizes these simplifications as strategies and techniques for “the 
management of urban marginality” (Wacquant, 2010, p. 197). The state’s capacity is 
extended and refined through the economic and quantitative rationalization of practices 
like broken windows policing and stop and frisk that surveil, harass, discipline, and even 
physically remove and encage disproportionate numbers of poor people of color. Braced 
up by managerial simplifications and the policies they engender, the neoliberal state 
asserts itself as a carceral state, one that uses surveillance and punishment to manage the 
social insecurity and marginalization caused by neoliberal social and economic policies. 
In the process, it militates against urban uprisings by the poor like those that so 
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threatened elites during the crises and upheavals of the 1960s and early 1970s (Parenti, 
2008).  
 Finally, the neoliberal state’s capacity is enhanced through the “official racism” of 
a criminal classification system whereby “activities and profiles associated with a 
devalued racially identified population” come to be “treated more harshly than otherwise 
comparable activities or profiles of those not so devalued” (Goldberg, 2002, p. 244). 
Thus as the neoliberal state stops offering social and economic protections to manage the 
urban socioeconomic insecurity it creates- a precariousness disproportionately 
experienced by people of color- it reinvents and reasserts itself as a legitimate and 
indispensable institution by engaging the official racism of “the prison and its 
institutional tentacles” to “invisibilize problem populations” (Wacquant, 2010, p. 199).   
Testing, accountability, and invisibilization in education reform 
 Similar to Scott’s (1998) agricultural analogy, the new managerialism in 
education mandates a testing and accountability regime “calculated to make the terrain, 
its products, and its workforce more legible- and hence manipulable- from above and 
from the center” (p. 2). The corporatist, managerial reforms of the No Child Left Behind 
Act, and now Race to the Top, deploy policy instruments that simplify educational 
inequality by bringing test scores to “the center of the field of vision,” making teaching 
and learning “more legible and hence more susceptible to careful measurement and 
calculation” (ibid, p. 11). In doing so, the state reduces the complex sociocultural, 
cognitive, and affective practices that characterize learning to “a standard grid” by which 
student growth, codified now as test scores and embedded in simplified, technocratic 
discourse of achievement, can be “centrally recorded and monitored” (ibid, p. 2).  
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Following Wacquant (2010), managerial simplification in NCLB and RTTT, as in 
COMPSTAT, is not merely a “technical implement” or “appendage” for improving 
schools or society. Rather, it reworks education policy in such a way as to operationalize 
schooling as “a core organ of the state whose selective and aggressive deployment in the 
lower regions of social space” (p. 200) asserts the state’s capacity. Federal education 
policy deploys managerial simplifications that are “instrumental in imposing categories, 
upholding material and symbolic divisions, and molding relations and behaviors through 
the selective penetration of social and physical space” (ibid, p. 200-211).  That is, the 
new managerialism in public education, as exemplified by the simplifying technologies 
of the Common Core, scripted curricula, high-stakes testing, and punitive accountability, 
work in and through schools as forms of governance, ideology, and disciplinary 
mechanisms that, alongside shifts in criminal justice, continue to be crucial to the 
production of the neoliberal city. Furthermore, federal education policy is “part of a 
neoliberal global economic and social agenda to maximize profits by promoting the 
primacy of the market, reducing the cost of labor, and privatizing all spheres of economic 
and social life” (Lipman, 2005, p. 101). Managerial simplification in education, perhaps 
best exemplified by the rigid standards and punitive accountability measures of NCLB 
and RTTT, has resulted in school takeovers by for-profit Education Management 
Organizations (EMOs), school closings, and the proliferation of charter schools. These 
are examples of legislation and practices that favor individual responsibility, upward 
distribution of wealth and resources, increased privatization, and austerity measures 
regarding social services and expenditures.  
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 Managerial simplification in RTTT and NCLB is instituted and enforced through 
a mix of federal, state, and local governance structures that link funding and control to 
student achievement on standardized tests. However, the destruction of any “collective 
structures that could serve as an obstacle to the logic of the pure market” is central to the 
neoliberal project (Bourdieu, 1998, p.2). Thus, as with other neoliberal mutations, 
managerial reforms in education required an authoritarian governing body and 
organizational structure (Harvey, 2003, 2005; Klein, 2008). This is one way of thinking 
about New York City’s former mayor Michael Bloomberg immediately centralizing 
control over the city’s Department of Education. When the mayor and chancellor Joel 
Klein developed the Panel for Educational Policy to replace New York City’s Board of 
Education, they further cemented authoritarian control by dismantling community 
structures and channels for actualizing dissent and democratic participation in 
governance. By concentrating governance and management in a panel of mayoral 
appointees rather than community run Boards of Education, Bloomberg worked to 
disempower teachers, parents, students, and community members in a process of 
consolidation of control that would expand and evolve throughout his terms as mayor 
(O’Day, Bitter, and Gomez, 2011; see Lipman, 2011 for an analysis of mayoral control in 
Chicago). New York’s new mayor, Bill DeBlasio, took office in January of 2014 on a 
progressive platform that challenged several of Bloomberg’s education policies, 
particularly his stance on charter school co-location. But in spite of his progressive claims 
and his much publicized recent battle with New York’s more strident neoliberal Governor 
Cuomo over collecting rent from co-located charter schools, DeBlasio has embraced 
mayoral control of schools, by and large continuing the city’s tradition of blocking 
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democratic participation in educational policymaking. Furthermore, the interlocking 
agendas of dispossession and privatization continue, as the new mayor recently approved 
39 out of 49 new charter schools for the city. DeBlasio also allowed 14 charter schools, 
permitted to co-locate under Bloomberg’s reign, to move forward and take over valuable 
space belonging to public schools, in spite of the protests of students, parents, and 
community organizations. In total, the progressive mayor denied public space to only 
three charter schools Bloomberg had approved for co-location (Hill, 2014).   
 Centralized, authoritarian local control over education in New York City, coupled 
with increased federal and state interventions into education policy and practice 
throughout the 1980s, 90s, and 2000s, simplified the messy world of education through 
the top-down implementation of Common Core standards and scripted curricula linked to 
a high stakes testing regime monitored by school progress reports and quality reviews. 
Like COMPSTSAT, managerial education policies mandate data-driven systems of 
performance review and elaborate programs for meting out punishments and rewards if 
schools do not make “Annual Yearly Progress” according to the narrow, simplified vision 
of raised test scores.  In New York City, value-added teacher evaluation models go so far 
as to draw on student attendance and past test scores to predict how well he or she can be 
expected to perform on future standardized tests. Once this mark is calculated, teachers 
are held accountable for whether their students reach this projected score. If the average 
number of students score below the projected score, the teacher is labeled ineffective. If 
they score at or above the projected score, the teacher can be labeled effective or highly 
effective(Value-Added Research Center, 2010).  
 223 
Within New York’s testing and accountability regime, managerial simplification 
is coherent with its iteration in criminal justice and functions similarly. It is a technique 
by which the neoliberal state enhances its capacity by constructing a “selective reality” 
out of quasi-scientific educational data that obfuscates the racial and political economic 
forces that produce educational inequality and shape student performances (Anyon, 1997, 
2005; Leonardo, 2007; Lipman, 2005, 2011). Just as drug policy obscures and supports 
the structural and ideological roots of poverty by criminalizing and incarcerating the 
“black subproletariat trapped in the imploding ghetto” (Wacquant, 2010, p.198), No 
Child Left Behind and Race to the Top operate in conjuncture with criminalization as 
neoliberal “policy substitutes” for real economic reform (Anyon, 2011). By mandating 
elaborate processes of simplification that explain away the dynamics of racial capitalism, 
delinking inequality from its structural and ideological roots, standardized testing and 
value-added teacher evaluations represent these dynamics in a way that can be grafted 
onto individual schools, teachers, youth, and families. Managerial simplification 
rearticulates macroeconomic problems as educational failures. 
 Furthermore, the new managerialism in education reinforces neoliberal state 
capacity by stifling academic freedom and creating powerful obstacles for a critical 
education that would empower students to confront and challenge the structural 
inequalities, social costs, and harms produced by racial capitalism (Shor, 1992). 
Neoliberal capacity, codified pedagogically as “teaching to the test,” has created what 
Pauline Lipman (2005) refers to as dual education- an unequal education that reflects and 
embodies the “dual cities” described by Mollenkopf and Castells (1992): critical thinking, 
arts, music, and humanities for wealthier students; basic skills in literacy and math for 
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poorer students. Echoing Jean Anyon’s (1981) findings in her study on Social Class and 
School Knowledge, this polarized curricular and pedagogical distribution reproduces and 
exacerbates race and class inequalities caused by neoliberal social and economic policies, 
while simultaneously reinforcing the neoliberal state’s capacity to diminish resistance by 
limiting or constraining “opportunities to contest structural inequalities” (Duncan-
Andrade and Morrell, 2008, p. 10). Teaching to the test, scripted lessons, and a traditional 
curriculum can inhibit the creation of “conditions for suffering communities to hold 
structural and material inequities up to the light of inquiry.” This inquiry is “the 
recognition of the conditions of inequality and the desire to overturn those conditions for 
oneself and for all suffering communities” and is “the starting point and motivator for the 
urban educator and for the urban student” (ibid, p.10). Simplification in education 
militates against critical historical consciousness and resistance by narrowing the 
complexities of urban education to a cluster of managerial issues centered on efficiency, 
standardization, and measurable outputs.  
 Thus, the overall effect of reform like Race to the Top, according to Obama’s 
former education adviser Linda Darling-Hammond, is to “increasingly destabilize schools 
and neighborhoods, making them even less desirable places to work and live and 
stimulating the flight of teachers and families who have options.” They fail to “stem the 
rapid slide of families into poverty, homelessness and food insecurity; address the 
inequitable distribution of state and local funds to schools; to improve teaching and 
learning conditions in underfunded, high poverty schools; or to recruit and train expert 
teachers who will stay in these schools and stop the revolving door of untrained novices 
who leave children farther behind ” (Darling-Hammond, 2012, p. 11). As state and city-
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led projects of neoliberal urbanization disinvest in the public sphere in order to advance 
plans for urban renewal, gentrification, and central business district development, 
education and criminal justice provide mutually reinforcing strategies for social control 
of the disinvested, dispossessed, and dislocated.  
Unpacking hegemony 
 Like Foucault’s notion of governmentality, Antonio Gramsci’s theory of 
hegemony also hinges on the neoliberal state’s need for coherence among constitutive 
subinstitutions like education and criminal justice. Coherence is what allows these 
subinstitutions to congeal, however contingently, into the institution of the neoliberal 
state. As the neoliberal state works to “integrate state decision-making into the dynamics 
of capital accumulation and the networks of power that are in the process of restoration” 
(Harvey, 2005, p. 76), it must constantly reconfigure its subinstitutions and practices. 
Testing and accountability reforms mandated by NCLB and corporate reformers like 
Michael Bloomberg, like shifts in policing brought on by COMPSTAT and alternatives 
to incarceration like drug courts, are reformist reforms that protect uneven power 
relationships. They are reconfigurations and realignments that brace up neoliberal 
hegemony through the production and enactment of simplifications that enhance the 
state’s capacity to maintain the already-existing race and class hierarchies that map “the 
organization of labor markets and the sociospatial control of wealth” (Gilmore, 2007, p. 
26-28).   
  Following Gramsci, neoliberal hegemony, an entanglement of ideological and 
material forces mixing consent and coercion, allows for elite dominance over the state 
and its subinstitutions in order to further integrate these institutions within the logic of 
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capitalism. In Gramsci’s framework for thinking about power, ideologies are descriptions 
of the world that help secure and stabilize hegemony- that precarious dominance exerted 
by elites over non-elites as they balance force and consent (Crehan, 2002, p. 200). 
Ideologies are narratives that claim progress, naturalness, and inevitability, and crowd out 
political economic and racial analyses of hegemony. Embedded in a variety of cultural 
forms, ideologies describe the world in a way that makes power relations invisible, 
construing neoliberal hegemony not as an economic or racial project bound up in 
exploitation, dispossession, and repression, but simply as “the way the world works.”  
 The neoliberal state falls into crisis because it is riddled with contradictions (see, 
e.g., Harvey, 2005, p. 79-81). Hegemony, therefore, is never fixed or guaranteed, and 
securing accumulation, while maintaining legitimacy and social control, requires state 
apparatuses to move back and forth between varying degrees and forms of coercion and 
consent. Sustaining the racial capitalist conditions for accumulation requires the 
neoliberal state to constantly find new or modified ways to construct consent and unleash 
the violence of its coercive powers upon particular racial groups. What this section argues 
is that the adaptability of the neoliberal state depends on the ongoing production of an 
evolving set of coherent simplifications that, through a multi-institutional nexus of policy 
controls, reinforce race and class hierarchies and produce the material and ideological 
conditions required to maintain accumulation.  
 In the current Great Recession, unemployment hovers between 17 and 13 
percent(Krugman, 2014) while gaps in wealth between white families and Latino and 
African American families continue to increase (Lowrey, 2013). In a context of such 
pronounced inequality, the neoliberal state would not be able to maintain its appearance 
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legitimacy if its education system produced and privileged radical, collectivist, social 
welfare-oriented representations, while its criminal justice system privileged 
depoliticizing simplifications around deviance, individual responsibility, and just deserts. 
Such incoherence would destabilize the socially constructed “common sense” around free 
markets, competitiveness, and individual responsibility that undergirds neoliberalism and 
its crises. A hypothetical contradiction like this could potentially undermine consent to 
hegemony by opening up space for alternative and dissident discourses. The resulting 
fragmentation would diminish the state’s capacity to advance the interests of racial 
capitalism because the “institutional framework” and “culture of entrepreneurialism” 
required to forge consent to neoliberalism (Harvey, 2005) would be misaligned. 
 Therefore, neoliberal hegemony requires coherence in the ways that public 
education and crime control continually tweak the balance between consent and coercion, 
as they adapt to the ongoing crises and contradictions inherent to the dynamics of racial 
capitalism. At the same time, and for this very reason, the construction and preservation 
of coherence is an unfinished and fragile enterprise, laden with “radical possibilities” for 
social justice-oriented transformations (Anyon, 2005). As such, teachers, students, 
scholars, and activists must work to unpack neoliberal hegemony in such a way as to 
make visible, historicize, and denaturalize the clusters of simplifications that misrepresent 
our worlds. We must destabilize them through interdisciplinary and collaborative critique 
and action, generating alternative discourses with our minds and our bodies. And we 
must consider, in the broadest sense, how the collective struggle for racial and economic 
justice means taking on the interlocking state projects of miseducation and incarceration. 
Prison abolition, decriminalization, and struggles for educational equity must themselves 
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be interlocking, bottom-up projects of resistance, with a coherence of their own. To form 
a broad-based social movement, these struggles must not be grounded in dismal sets of 
narrow simplifications that atomize and divide them, but rather in a nuanced and 
sweeping vision of economic and racial justice that highlights their conjuncture and 
continuity. 
Charter Schools, Drug Courts, and the Nonprofit Industrial Complex 
 At the same time that standards and accountability were gaining steam, and the 
war on drugs was being ramped up in the 1980s and 90s, there was a mass proliferation 
of tax-exempt nonprofit social justice organizations registered with the IRS for 501(c)(3) 
status. The city saw a range of organizations emerge to take up various services; for 
example, The Doe Fund began in the early 1980s to provide services to the city’s 
homeless, while Manhattan Youth Baseball was established in 1990 to provide athletic 
and other educational opportunities for poor youth. The rapid growth of this nonprofit 
sector emerged from the dismantling of the welfare state and the political economic shift 
to neoliberalism. This transformation exacerbated inequality, particularly in urban areas. 
The creative destruction of neoliberal urbanization “produced and reproduced a 
regressive redistribution of real income that benefited the rich at the expense of the 
poor… creating in the context of urban geographies and the interrelations of social 
processes and spatial form a fertile terrain for the cumulative aggravation of 
injustices”(Soja, E., 1997, p. 181). As welfare state apparatuses were destroyed or 
transformed, and federal, state, and local governments engaged in the “targeted 
abandonment” (Harvey, 2006) of the urban core, provision of social welfare and control 
was shifted to private sector providers, many of which were nonprofit organizations 
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(Piven & Cloward, 1993). Under such arrangements, philanthrocapital flows into a 
burgeoning private sector via tax-deductible grants from private foundations. Between 
1953 and 1978, the number of nonprofits expanded from 50,000 to approximately 
300,000. By 1998, there were 734,000 nonprofits in the U.S. By 2007, that number had 
grown to 837,027 nonprofit organizations in dealings with foundations carrying over 
$500 billion in worth and injecting approximately $33.6 billion each year into the private 
nonprofit sector (INCITE! 2007). According to the IRS, a 501(c)(3) organization 
Must be organized and operated exclusively for exempt purposes… and none of 
its earnings may inure to any private shareholder or individual. In addition, it may 
not be an action organization, i.e., it may not attempt to influence legislation as a 
substantial part of its activities and it may not participate in any campaign activity 
for or against political candidates...The organization must not be organized or 
operated for the benefit of private interests, and no part of a section 501(c)(3) 
organization’s net earnings may inure to the benefit of any private shareholder or 
individual (irs.gov). 
The borders that mark the contours of private and public interests are unstable and blurry 
at best. For instance, donations made by corporations, hedge funds, and other foundations 
to nonprofits are tax deductible- that is, they lower the donor’s taxable income and thus 
their tax bill (ibid). As a result, less elite money is funneled into the public coffers 
because it is sheltered in foundations. Furthermore, foundations make money for 
capitalists, as they invest their foundation assets and watch them grow. Foundations only 
have to payout 5 percent of their assets each year, but this 5 percent can go to 
administrative costs, rents, salaries, future projects, and fees paid out to trustees. Between 
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1972 and 1996, "the 200 largest foundations yielded an average return of 7.62 percent 
annually on their investment returns while paying out an average of 4.97 percent" (Ahn, 
in INCITE! 2007, p. 67). Because the money that flows through nonprofits is outside 
public control, these organizations are not accountable to communities, neighborhood 
groups, or local political representatives. At the same time, private sector nonprofits, like 
their for-profit cousins, are similarly caught up in the coercive law of competition, and 
are therefore vulnerable to the compulsions of outsourcing, expansion, cost-cutting, wage 
suppression, anti-unionism, efficiency optimization, mechanization, and other strategies 
to help them secure their market share of clients, grants, and foundation support and 
make efficient use of limited funds. Thus, they are coerced by market dynamics and their 
dependency on corporate philanthropy and grants from the neoliberal state into 
privileging and advancing certain private interests.  
 Nonprofits blur the border between public and private interests by 
institutionalizing links between the public sphere and the private for-profit sector. For 
instance, for-profit companies that provide construction, infrastructural development and 
maintenance, management, clerical services, technology, IT support, and other materials 
become stakeholders in the advancement of the nonprofit sector, as it provides them with 
ample profit-making opportunities. For instance, for-profit big pharma and surveillance 
technology companies contribute substantial funding for nonprofit drug court advocacy 
organizations. Particularly relevant to New York City’s nonprofit charter school sector is 
the involvement of for-profit real estate interests who buy cheap buildings in disinvested 
neighborhoods and operate as landlords leasing these spaces at bloated rates to charter 
school tenants (Fabricant & Fine, 2011). Lastly, though their IRS status prevents 
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nonprofits from lobbying and contributing to political campaigns, there are no limits 
placed on their advocacy work. In 2008, 73 percent of nonprofit organizations were 
working on a range [“OF”]advocacy activities(Silverman & Patterson, 2011) designed to 
shape and inform public opinion and policy agendas. In this way, nonprofits are a vehicle 
by which elites, through their economic and social capital, are able to influence 
policymaking at multiple sites and scales in order to advance their class interests.  
 In The revolution will not be funded: Beyond the nonprofit industrial complex 
(INCITE! 2007), Dylan Rodriguez defines the nonprofit industrial complex (NPIC) as: 
a set of symbiotic relationships that link political and financial technologies of 
state and owning class control with surveillance over public political ideology, 
including and especially emergent progressive and leftist social movements (8). 
The fuzzy borders of “private interest” as defined by the IRS refer solely to the economic 
activities of nonprofits. As discussed in the above section, nonprofits do in fact create 
profits for a variety of private sector stakeholders. What Rodriquez is emphasizing, 
however, is how developing the NPIC is mutually beneficial to the state and capital 
because nonprofits engage in the ideological management of dissident grassroots 
organizations and movements. Andrea Miller (INCITE! 2007) elaborates that the NPIC 
“manages and controls dissent by incorporating it into the state apparatus” while 
proliferating “market economies under the veil of partnership between the public and 
private sectors” (ibid, p. 9). The NPIC, then, is a lens for thinking about how the public 
and private sectors have been realigned in such a way as to refine and expand social 
control on the one hand while siphoning off public money into the private sector on the 
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other. This critique, of course, stands in stark contrast to dominant discourse around the 
nonprofit sector, as put forth by NYC Nonprofit Assistance: 
New York City has a large nonprofit sector unmatched by any other city in size 
and scope of services. The nonprofit sector employs more than half a million New 
Yorkers, serves as a critical economic engine in many New York City 
neighborhoods, and provides crucial social services and enriching cultural 
programming to residents and visitors. The sector also comprises environmental 
groups and world-class educational and health care organizations that help to 
shape and sustain the city (nyc.gov).  
As the city withdrew from social provision, and budgetary constraints undermined the 
expansion of its regime of mass incarceration, the nonprofit sector stepped in to both care 
for and control the city’s poor. Because a “strong nonprofit sector… helps to keep New 
York City strong” (ibid), the city provides a number of supports to advance the NPIC. 
There are 35,000 nonprofits in New York City, 2,500 of which are "doing business with 
the city" (ibid). The city seeks to help the NPIC grow through programs aimed at 
"reducing costs," "improving contracting procedures," and "strengthening nonprofits" 
(ibid). To that end, and in the spirit of public-private partnership that undergirds the 
NPIC, the city partnered with the nonprofit private sector to create the Strengthening 
Nonprofits Task Force (SNTF). The SNTF has developed and implemented a range of 
supports including GreaterNY, a "public-private initiative that has led to deeper civic 
engagement by business leaders and enhanced nonprofit capability" as well as Group 
Purchasing, "an opportunity for New York City funded nonprofits to access discounts on 
a wide range of goods and services" (nyc.gov). Further financial assistance is provided to 
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nonprofits through The Mayor's Office of Contract Services and the Fund for the City of 
New York (a nonprofit headed by an elite board of directors)- a public-private 
partnership that provides interest free cash loans to help grow the city’s nonprofit 
organizations. 
 Drug courts and charter schools are examples of what Ruth Gilmore (in Berger, 
2014) refers to as reformist reform: policy realignments that “tweak Armageddon” and 
uphold the status quo. Radical movements, instead, seek nonreformist reform- “deliberate 
change that does not create more obstacles in the larger struggle” (p. viii). Drug courts 
and charter schools are bound up in the “single reality” (Tabb, 1982) of neoliberal 
reformist reform and are mutually reinforcing in their embrace of, and by, the ideologies 
and structures of the NPIC. This section of the chapter will examine some of the ways 
that drug courts and charters, as reformist reforms, draw on and extend the NPIC, thereby 
reinforcing elite class power and maintaining racial hierarchies. INCITE! (2007) provides 
a useful framework for analyzing the NPIC by considering the ways that capital and the 
state rely on the NPIC to: 
 monitor and control social justice movements; 
 divert public monies into private hands through foundations; 
 manage and control dissent in order to make the world safe for capitalism; 
 redirect activist energies into career-based modes of organizing instead of 
mass-based organizing capable of actually transforming society; 
 allow corporations to mask their exploitive and colonial work practices 
through 'philanthropic' work; 
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 encourage social movements to model themselves after capitalist 
structures rather than to challenge them (p. 3). 
These functions of the NPIC will be used as strands for teasing out the ways that the 
material and ideological links among charter schools, drug courts, nonprofits, and 
foundations reinforce race and class inequalities by impeding, redirecting, and co-opting 
radical campaigns for racial and economic justice. At the same time, these strands will 
help identify how drug courts and charters expand the NPIC itself as an industrial 
complex. For instance, the New York Times reported that, in 2012, U.S. nonprofits had 
absorbed over $300 billion in foundation money and are growing at a faster rate than 
business or government sectors (Buffett, 2013). Drug courts and charter schools then, are 
mutually reinforcing state apparatuses for which a crucial point of conjuncture is their 
advancement of neoliberal reformist reform by expanding the nonprofit industrial 
complex.  
Education and “creative capitalism” 
As Lipman (2011), Fabricant & Fine (2012), and Hantzopoulos & Tyner (2012) 
have shown, school choice as we know it today is linked to the early efforts of educators, 
parents, and community members living and working in disinvested urban areas who 
were seeking to create safe and progressive alternatives to the large deteriorating high 
schools of the urban core. The small schools movement was, initially, a grassroots social 
movement that sought to transform the urban educational landscape. They were, as 
Michele Fine (in Hantzopoulos & Tyner, 2012) puts it, "designed and constructed with a 
rich sense of justice and democracy; a place where educators, parents, community and 
youth would come together to build knowledge, capacity and community power" (p. ix). 
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This coalition "insisted that children of poverty deserve the same education as children of 
elites" (ibid). Bloomberg, with millions in backing from the Gates Foundations, scaled up 
the small schools movement in the early 2000s into a "technology of dispossession," co-
opting the small schools movement such that it "became the chrysalis for hatching 
charters, the sac for drip fed privatization into the public school system" (p. x). The 
“activist energies” (INCITE! p.3) behind the small schools movement were largely 
directed away from capacity building at the school and community level, and redirected 
into navigating the reconfigured landscape created by the injection of competition into 
educational policy and practice.  
Between 2000 and 2008, the Gates Foundation alone donated $2 billion to 
advance school choice by breaking up large high schools and proliferating alternative 
small schools (Ravitch, 2011). Gates was not seeking to alter capitalist relations of 
production that produce poverty and disinvestment; nor was he looking to use his wealth 
to build capacity at the grassroots level in poor neighborhoods. Rather, he was cementing 
elite control over education by calling for a “creative capitalism” with a “twin mission: 
making profits and also improving lives for those who don't fully benefit from market 
forces” (Gates, B. quoted in Guth, 2008). Gates frames capitalism as the cure for poverty: 
If we can spend the early decades of the 21st century finding approaches that meet 
the needs of the poor in ways that generate profits for business, we will have 
found a sustainable way to reduce poverty in the world (ibid).  
Undergirding the nonprofit industrial complex is the institutionalization of the notion that 
philanthrocapital can "stretch the reach of market forces" (ibid) in order to reverse the 
effects of poverty in areas ranging from education to public health to crime control. 
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According to Gates, by “reaching out to various industries -- going to cellphone 
companies, banks and more pharma companies -- and talking about how...they can do 
these things"(ibid), elite capacity and free market ideology can congeal into a top-down, 
profit-maximizing force that can solve the very problems it creates. Rather than 
increasing wages, benefits, creating well-paying jobs, or paying higher taxes, Gates and 
his corporate allies at the World Economic Forum advance a form of “good corporate 
citizenship” in the form of public-private partnerships through which state institutions 
partner “with companies to apply the resources and competencies of business for the 
benefit of all” (World Economic Forum Annual report, 2006, p. 27). Public-private 
partnerships redirect social justice movements for economic and racial justice towards 
technical solutions for educational issues caused by poverty: 
Through a sustainable and collaborative approach, new technologies, especially in 
information and communication technology (ICT), have modernized educational 
systems, skills development and quality learning (ibid, p. 28).  
The gap between the rich and the poor is not due to structural exploitation and racism, but 
rather is caused by “a divide between those who have access to the benefits of technology 
and those who do not” (ibid, p. 29). At the same time as redirecting activism and 
managing the discourse around poverty, nonprofits pump public money into private 
hands through increasing investment in technology, as equity is reframed as 
modernization through marketization.  
Gates’ vision of “creative capitalism” is one in which the nonprofit sector, by 
absorbing foundation money, operationalizes corporate visions of education reform 
which claim that school choice can help poor youth of color transcend the changes in the 
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global economy that have produced unemployment, disinvestment, dislocation, and 
dispossession in the urban core. In a 2006 interview for the World Economic Forum, 
Thomas Friedman, columnist for the New York Times, and Bill Gates discussed the 
statement by Intel CEO Craig Barrett that “his company could thrive without ever hiring 
another American.” Gates asserted that, rather than concern themselves with the 
movement of jobs overseas, “Americans should be more concerned with education.” 
Through his foundation money, Gates puts wheels on this vision by investing billions in 
nonprofit school choice advocacy organizations and nonprofit charter schools, based on 
the assumption that students can overcome structural obstacles by being “given 
incentives to excel” in learning environments where there is “a different type of personal 
management system…and the technology they use tends to be more advanced.”  
Nonprofit charter schools and their advocacy organizations emerge as vehicles for 
extending elite control over education policy and practice. The philanthropic work of the 
Gates Foundation, among others, “manages and controls dissent” to the disequalizing 
effects of globalization “by incorporating it into the state apparatus” as education reform 
is presented as the solution to social and economic problems. At the same time, Gates 
money is used to create organizations that draw dissatisfaction and opposition into the 
logic of capital by proliferating “market economies under the veil of partnership between 
the public and private sectors” (INCITE! 2007, p. 9). That is, unequal education is rooted 
in racialized processes of disinvestment, abandonment, and control inherent to processes 
of capital accumulation. The NPIC in education, via Gates and other philanthrocapitalists 
like Eli Broad and the Waltons, redirects indignation and the desire for change away from 
non-reformist reform of the racial capitalist system and channels it instead into reformist 
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reform like charter schools. The nonprofit charters are attractive to parents navigating a 
deteriorating urban educational landscape who want more for their children, and teachers 
oppressed by rigid standards, testing, and accountability regimes and abysmal working 
conditions. By taking in these parents and educators, the NPIC redirects their energies 
into reformist reform which not only fails to confront the logic and machinery of racial 
capitalism, but extends its material and ideological tentacles more deeply into education 
policy and practice.  
In New York City, the charter school movement has advanced the NPIC very 
much along the lines of Gates’ vision of “creative capitalism.” Since the 2010 legislation 
enacted under Governor Pataki’s administration, new charter schools in New York State 
can no longer be run by for-profit Charter Management Organizations (CMOs). The 
existing 9 percent of New York City charter schools run by for-profit companies were 
allowed to remain so. The vast majority of charters either operate independently as 
nonprofits or are run by external nonprofit management networks or Educational 
Management Organizations (EMOs). The three largest EMOs in New York City are 
Achievement First, Success Charter Network, and Uncommon Schools. A recent study by 
the National Education Policy Center (2011) found that some particularly well-endowed 
New York City charter schools receive additional injections of philanthrocapital that 
amount to more than $10,000 more per pupil than the allocations available to public 
schools. New York City’s Fair Student Funding formula was designed to target funding 
to particular students in need, rather than focusing on neighborhood differences. Charter 
schools, however, are not included in this formula, and therefore rely heavily on 
philanthrocapital to remain competitive. The major contributors to CMOs in New York 
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City are “creative capitalists” like the New Schools Venture Fund, the Bill and Melinda 
Gates Foundations, and the Walton Family Foundation. Because of corporate 
philanthropy, the average charter school receives an additional  $1,656 per pupil (Baker 
& Ferris, 2011). In 2008, Achievement First CMO received $1.3 million from the New 
Schools Venture Fund, who also provided $650,000 to Excellence of Bedford Stuyvesant, 
Kings Collegiate, and Williamsburg Collegiate charter schools. Kipp received $5.2 
million from The Walton Family Foundation on top of $2 million from Gates. Walton 
pumped $510,000 into the Harlem Success Academy, and New Schools Venture Fund 
provided $250,000 in seed money for the development of three new Success charter 
schools (ibid). 
The charter school movement has expanded the NPIC, allowing nonprofits to 
provide new opportunities for elite money to reshape struggles for educational equality 
into reform movements that are geared to the needs of racial capitalism. At the time of 
this writing, the NPIC’s role in co-opting civil rights discourse, incorporating discontents, 
and expanding the marketization of education has reached a fevered pitch. The New York 
Times reports, “pro-charter advocacy groups, including Families for Excellent Schools, 
StudentsFirstNY, and the New York City Charter School Center” have rallied their 
resources from their corporate and hedge fund donors and political allies like Governor 
Andrew Cuomo to launch a successful campaign against New York City Mayor Bill 
DeBlasio’s efforts to charge well-funded charter schools rent for locating within city-
owned buildings (Hernández & Craig, 2014). The charter school NPIC facilitates the 
infiltration of public policy by business interests, as elites enhance their capacity by 
holding powerful positions within nonprofit organizations: 
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A lot was riding on the debate for Mr. Cuomo. A number of his largest financial 
backers, some of the biggest names on Wall Street, also happened to be staunch 
supporters of charter schools. According to campaign finance records, Mr. 
Cuomo’s re-election campaign has received hundreds of thousands of dollars 
from charter school supporters, including William A. Ackman, Carl C. Icahn, 
Bruce Kovner and Daniel Nir.  
Kenneth G. Langone, a founder of Home Depot who sits on a prominent charter 
school board, gave $50,000 to Mr. Cuomo’s campaign last year. He said that 
when the governor asked him to lead a group of Republicans supporting his re-
election, he agreed because of Mr. Cuomo’s support for charter schools.  
“Every time I am with the governor, I talk to him about charter schools,” Mr. 
Langone said in an interview. “He gets it” (ibid).  
Austerity under Cuomo has entailed further shrinking of the state in terms of provision of 
services at the same time that his administration has engaged in “targeted 
abandonment”(Harvey, 2006) and policing of the urban core. Fueled by foundation 
money, the private nonprofit sector has taken on a good deal of social provision and 
social controls that this mix of abandonment and control demands. But elites sit on the 
boards of nonprofit organizations as well as the foundations that fund them. By virtue of 
their wealth and social capital, elites like Bill Gates and Eli Broad are able to undermine 
democratic processes and advance new visions and forms of service and social control, 
aligning them with neoliberal values around efficiency, cost-effectiveness, competition, 
privatization, deregulation, and individual responsibilization.  
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Defending the carceral state 
 Drug courts have similarly expanded the role of the Nonprofit Industrial Complex 
within the neoliberal state, creating important links between criminal justice, nonprofit 
advocacy groups, and corporate and elite donors. Through their links to the NPIC, drug 
courts opened new spaces for market economies within criminal justice and crime 
control, primarily for big pharma and surveillance technology companies. Because of 
their dependency on state and corporate funding, drug courts advance the NPIC’s core 
principals of efficiency and accountability over public service-oriented visions of 
systemic change. Furthermore, they have incorporated and denatured the hard-fought 
battles of radical grassroots movements like Drop the Rock into reformist reforms around 
‘alternatives to incarceration.’ As the earlier chapter on drug courts showed, these 
reforms, rather than abolishing prisons and the policing apparatuses that fill them, 
actually realign, refine, and even expand the carceral activities of the state and the 
racialized social controls that accompany neoliberal hegemony.  
Foundations maintain the status quo by undermining the structural 
transformations needed for racial and economic justice. The NPIC is not engaged in overt 
repression, but rather "manages and controls dissent by incorporating it into the state 
apparatus"(INCITE! p. 8) and/or by constraining organizations through the strings 
attached to the private foundation money they so desperately need. Philanthropists fund 
nonprofits as a way to "sublimate revolutionary movements into reformist ones" such that 
these organizations are prevented from working towards systemic, radical change by their 
dependency on state and private funding and the limitations imposed by "funding rubrics 
and structural prohibitions" (Gilmore, in ibid, p. 47). The original goal of the grassroots 
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collective Drop the Rock was to repeal the Rockefeller Drug Laws, but annulment has 
transformed into reform: 
Its primary focus being repeal of the Rockefeller Drug Laws—the State’s 
notoriously harsh mandatory minimum sentencing statutes that apply to people 
convicted of drug crimes—the group became the Drop the Rock Coalition. In 
2009, after years of advocacy on the part of the Coalition and its allies, the State 
enacted significant reforms that represent a true people’s victory and marked the 
beginning of the end of these statutes (Correctional Association of New York, 
n.d.).  
Drop the Rock, originally a grassroots movement, was incorporated into the Correctional 
Association of New York (the CA), a private nonprofit “force for progressive change in 
the criminal justice system” (ibid). The CA is funded in part by the Starry Night Fund 
through the Tides Foundation.  The Tides Foundation seeks to 
break down the walls between entrepreneurs and their efforts to bring positive 
change to their communities. We are all about new ideas, innovation, and 
providing the tools to make these great ideas a reality (“Tides Foundation,” n.d.) 
To that end, Tides has partnered with well-known philanthrocapitalists like the Ford 
Foundation, the Gates Foundation, the W.K. Kellogg Foundation, as well as the Social 
Venture Network, whose “Theory of Change” epitomizes Gates' vision of "creative 
capitalism": 
SVN works to create a just, humane and sustainable world by:  
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• Supporting and promoting innovative entrepreneurs and business leaders who 
contribute to the well-being of their employees, customers, investors, 
communities and the environment  
• Fostering strong connections and collaborations among business leaders and 
entrepreneurs that lead to groundbreaking solutions to social, economic and 
environmental problems  
• Contributing to an ecosystem that enhances and supports these solutions and 
promotes a just sustainable economy (“Social Venture Network,” n.d.). 
Another core donor to the CA is the Jacob and Valeria Langeloth Foundation. The 
Langeloth Foundation, focused on "Correctional Healthcare" and "Chronic Violence and 
Community Health", prioritizes "Programs focusing on fostering collaboration between 
agencies, advancing policy reform and systems change, leadership development, and 
coordinating public and private funding streams"(https://www.langeloth.org/). This 
foundation was chaired by John Langeloth Loeb Sr. -- according to the New York Times,  
"a leading member of the investment community who was long the head of the Wall 
Street firm of Loeb, Rhoades & Company, a predecessor of Shearson Lehman/American 
Express (Pace, 1996). Langeloth was married Francis Lehman, daughter of Arthur 
Lehman of the infamous Lehman Brothers investment banking company (Gelder, 1996). 
It's trustees also included Henry A. Loeb, an investment banker, and John Loeb, Jr., son 
of John Sr. and Francis Lehman, who was also a Wall Street investment counselor 
(“Ambassador John L. Loeb, Jr.,” n.d.).   
The repeal of the Rockefeller Drug Laws would have been a radical, systemic 
transformation that decriminalized drug offenses, emptied and closed prisons. In the late 
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2000s, Drop the Rock celebrated a hard fought battle to reform the drug laws, and a 
significant change that came out of this work was the increased use of and funding for 
drug courts. To the extent that prison abolition and decriminalization are anti-capitalist 
social movements, the links between the CA and the Wall Street foundations that fund it 
help explain the turn to drug court reforms of the Rockefeller Drug Laws. Drug courts are 
reformist reforms that neither confront nor challenge race and class inequalities, or the 
structures that produce them. Drug courts, as shown in chapter 3, articulate a race-and-
class-blind, efficiency-oriented therapeutic solution to mass incarceration and its social 
and economic costs. This “solution” is very much aligned with neoliberal ideas around 
cost-benefit analysis, and functions to expand and refine the rolling out of the carceral 
state to manage and contain the surplus populations created by racial capitalism.    
New York City drug courts are further implicated in the Nonprofit Industrial 
Complex through their support by The Center for Court Innovation (CCI), a public 
private partnership between the New York State Unified Court System and the private 
nonprofit Fund for the City of New York (Center for Court Innovation, 2011). Like the 
foundations behind the CA, the Fund for the City of New York (FCNY), established by 
the Ford Foundation in 1968, is run by elites from the corporate and investment world, as 
well as prominent lawyers, judges, and academics. The chair of FCNY, Vaughn C. 
Williams, is from Counsel, Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meager & Flom., a prominent corporate 
law firm whose  
clients include some of the world’s largest commercial banks, investment banks, 
insurance companies, finance companies, investment and merchant banking firms, 
private investment funds and other institutional lenders and investors, as well as 
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LBO sponsors, private equity funds, hedge funds, strategic buyers, borrowers and 
issuers of securities (Skadden.com, n.d.). 
Another important drug court advocacy organization, National Association of Drug Court 
Professionals (NADCP), is a nonprofit with even deeper connections to the corporate 
world. The NADCP is a non-profit founded in 1994 by a group of drug court judges who 
"tirelessly championed a new justice model that works significantly better than business 
as usual". It claims to have "forever changed the face of the justice system" (nadcp.org) 
through the development of 2,734 drug courts across the country. It also runs the 
nonprofit National Drug Court Institute (NDCI), "the preeminent source for 
comprehensive training and cutting-edge technical assistance to the entire Drug Court 
field" (ibid). There is nothing decriminalizing or abolitionist in the NADCP's rhetoric or 
goals, as their focus is not on the complex interconnections between poverty, race, and 
incarceration. Rather, their focus is on the delivery of justice: 
With its heart and grit, NADCP has greatly influenced not only every Drug Court 
and problem-solving court in the nation, but sparked and advanced enduring 
principles that have forever changed how justice is delivered in the courtroom to 
those who need help (National Association of Drug Court Professionals, n.d.). 
Though the board of directors of this nonprofit consists almost entirely of insider judges 
and lawyers, it also includes retired General Barry R. McCaffrey, president of BR 
McCaffrey Association, a for-profit consulting agency with strong ties to both the 
military and corporate sector, which 
provides strategic planning support to client CEOs, Board Chairmen, and senior 
corporate leadership. We will help build linkages between government and 
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private sector clients; design public relations, media, advertising and legislative 
strategies; and provide client specific analysis of U.S. and international political 
and economic issues (BR McCaffrey Associates LLC, n.d.). 
The presence of the president of such a firm on the board of trustees of this nonprofit is 
indicative of the deep penetration of the drug court reform movement by those with 
substantial stakes in racial capitalism. The drug court NPIC provides an avenue for elites 
to use their wealth and influence to advance race- and class-blind reform to social 
problems that neither threatens existing hierarchies nor the logic of racial capitalism 
itself.  
But the drug court NPIC, like that of charter schools, also creates and promotes 
new markets within the public sector. Domingo Herriaz, director of Government & 
Enterprise Funding for Motorola Solutions, Inc., also sits on the NADCP board of 
directors. Motorola Solutions, Inc. is a for-profit corporation that provides technology 
and services to a wide range of government and private sector organizations: 
Motorola Solutions serves both enterprise and government customers with core 
markets in public safety government agencies and commercial enterprises. Our 
leadership in these areas includes public safety communications from 
infrastructure to applications and devices such as radios as well as task-specific 
mobile computing devices for enterprises (Motorola Solutions, n.d.).  
The connection to Motorola illuminates a new layer of involvement with the NPIC. Not 
only do the nation’s largest drug court advocacy and development organizations represent 
the interests of corporations and finance through their board membership and foundation 
connections, but the presence of Motorola Solutions provides a direct link to the market 
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for technologies used by modernizing police forces, such as vehicle modems police use to 
gather data, as well as the LEX 700 Mission Critical Handheld, which “delivers street 
ready data” to officers: 
Criminals are getting more sophisticated and more dangerous. Disaster can strike 
at any time. To respond effectively, public safety personnel need tools that they 
can count on for up-to-the-minute information and let everyone have the same 
operational view – whether they are on opposite sides of a building or on the other 
side of town (ibid). 
Motorola Solutions also provides state and local police departments with surveillance 
tools based on RFID technology (Radio-Frequency Identification), which allow officers 
to identify and track drug court clients. The traditional use of the term industrial complex, 
e.g. the Military Industrial Complex or the Prison Industrial complex, points to 
connections between government and big business that “determine the course of 
economic development and political decision-making for the country” (Gilmore, in 
INCITE! 2007, p. 42). That is, the term embodies the potential influence of private sector 
stakeholders on the form, content, and intent of domestic and foreign policy. The NPIC, 
through its advocacy work around drug courts and charter schools, advances reformist 
reforms that not only redirect radical movements, but also create new markets. Industries 
whose pecuniary interest lies in the expansion of these new markets will in turn use their 
wealth and influence to finance and champion the nonprofits that are advocating the 
reform. Thus, the profit to be garnered from policing and surveillance technology makes 
Motorola a stakeholder and active participant in drug court proliferation and the growth 
of the carceral state.  
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 Motorola is not alone in its vested interest in the expansion of drug courts and the 
carceral state. As with almost all nonprofits, the NADCP is financed by the philanthropy 
of a host of corporate donors. Big pharma remains a strong supporter of drug courts 
because their embrace of the medicalization of drug use expands the market for drugs 
designed to “cure” addiction. Alkermes, one of the largest donors, is a pharmaceutical 
company that ranks its development of drugs for treating opioid and alcohol dependence 
among the “five key commercial products that are the drivers to propel our company’s 
growth” (alkermes.com). Corporate sponsors Siemens, ThermoFisher Scientific, 
Advanced Computer Technologies (ACT), Immunalysis, Forensic Fluids, Integrated 
Management Solutions (iMS), DTPM, Call2Test, and eLab Solutions develop and sell 
diagnostic drug testing technology and laboratory equipment relied on by drug courts as 
they monitor their clients’ progress. CRC Health, another donor, is a private for-profit 
healthcare provider specializing in substance abuse treatment programs amenable to the 
therapeutic jurisprudence of the drug court paradigm. Finally, R.A.D.A.R.  System, Total 
Court Systems, BI Incorporated and Scram Systems sell surveillance equipment. For 
instance, BI offers a tamper-proof ankle bracelet with a built in GPS for monitoring the 
movement of drug court clients who might be restricted from traveling to certain parts of 
the city or on house arrest (bi.com).  
Conjuncture within the Nonprofit Industrial Complex 
Tabb (1982) speaks of economic restructuring as a “single reality” of creation and 
destruction, and the Nonprofit Industrial Complex that has sprung up around charter 
schools and drug courts is both produced by, and seeking to mitigate, crises engendered 
by neoliberal creative destruction. If, as Hall et al. (1978) and Clarke (2010) argue, a 
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crisis is a point at which different tensions, antagonisms, and contradictions come 
together, the NPIC too embodies this conjuncture. The NPIC was a response to multiple 
crises that accompanied the dismantling of welfare state and the rise of the neoliberal 
state, and drug courts and charter schools are two key sites, within the larger state 
apparatuses of education and crime control, where this industrial complex is perhaps 
most clearly pronounced.  
The shift to neoliberalism has brought with it, first and foremost, a number of 
economic crises. The NPIC emerged out of the austerity that was visited upon New York 
City, and the devastating cuts the city and state made to social welfare. Nonprofits 
stepped in to manage the social instability caused by round after round of austerity, 
disinvestment, and dispossession. They provided much needed social services to 
vulnerable populations of poor people of color living in the deteriorating urban core. In 
doing so, they militated against the potential racial crisis created by civil rights 
movements and urban upheavals, and helped maintain the modicum of social stability 
that racial capitalism needs to function. The growth of nonprofits in New York City also 
absorbed and professionalized grassroots radical organizations and movements like the 
Small Schools Movement and Drop the Rock, incorporating them into the architecture of 
the state and the logic of racial capitalism. Activists became salaried professionals, and 
the scope of change that organizations were able to work towards was constrained by 
limits imposed by government grant requirements and the power of foundation donors. 
Furthermore, the state and elites are able to use the NPIC to mitigate their own crisis of 
political legitimacy by co-opting the civil rights rhetoric of these and other movements 
and using it to frame reformist reforms that actually maintain status quo power relations. 
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A more traditional industrial complex built up around this sector as elite foundations 
pumped billions into nonprofits to expand their control over the form and content of 
social policy as well as to open new markets and spaces for profit extraction. The opening 
of new markets, as David Harvey (2003) points out, is a key strategy in dealing with 
crises of overaccumulation in which capital lies dormant with limited opportunity for 
profitable investment. The NPIC, as exemplified by charter school and drug court reform, 
embodies the “complex links" that make up these multiple crises, and reflects how the 
state and capital realign themselves in shifting strategies to manage crisis (Hall et al., 
1978; Clark, 2010). The NPIC is a key area of conjuncture in how education and drug 
policy reforms have been imagined and deployed by the state and powerful elite actors as 
solutions to the bundle of crises entangled within the dynamics of racial capitalism.  
Towards a Conclusion: Official Antiracism and the Neoliberal Subject 
 This dissertation has focused on neoliberalism as a historically specific political 
project for restructuring society in order to establish new conditions for profit 
accumulation. It has examined the discursive deployment of neoliberalism in education 
and criminal justice as a set of market discourses braced by racial ideologies around the 
culture of poverty and criminalization; it has also analyzed how the conjuncture of 
capitalism and racism shapes the content, form, and intent of education policy, drug 
policy and reform. In this final section, I wish to conclude this critical policy analysis 
with a consideration of the relationship between education, drug policy, and the official 
anti-racism of the state.  
 Official antiracism, according to Melamed (2006), is a way of thinking about the 
race paradigm taken up by the state- that is, how the state frames racial inequality, and 
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the kinds of the solutions it puts forth. Official anti-racism is bound up with neoliberal 
discourse around individualism, free markets, and non-interventionist government- a 
discourse that has become “hegemonic,” having “persuasive effects on ways of thought 
to the point where it has become incorporated into the common-sense way many of us 
interpret, live in, and understand the world” (Harvey, 2005, p. 3). By prescribing limits as 
to what is good, possible, and real in the world (Therborn, 1980), official antiracist 
discourses merge with neoliberal ones, and orient us towards certain conceptions and 
forms of racial and economic justice and away from others. If, as Harvey (2005) reminds 
us, the role of the state is to provide an institutional framework that supports and protects 
neoliberal projects of capital accumulation, then the official antiracism of that framework 
must encourage a way of thinking about racial inequality that somehow supports and 
protects disinvestment in the urban core and the extensive dispossession and policing of 
poor people of color. Melamed (2006) uses the term neoliberal multiculturalism to 
describe the management of neoliberalism’s racial contradictions. Neoliberal 
multiculturalism 
sutures official anti-racism to state policy in a manner that hinders the calling into 
question of global capitalism, it produces new privileged and stigmatized forms of 
humanity, and it deploys a normative cultural model of race (which now 
sometimes displaces conventional racial reference altogether) as a discourse to 
justify inequality for some as fair or natural (p. 14).  
For Foucault, structures themselves cease to contain power but rather provide connected 
stations or sites for dominant logic to gain power by circulating through all corners of 
everyday life. Thus, traditional public schools, charter schools, prisons, and drug courts 
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circulate the hegemonic declaration of race-neutral policies while giving these ideals 
local concrete applications, thus forming human subjects at any site as “both objects and 
instruments” of the “exercise” of power (Foucault, 1977, p. 70). That is, this discourse 
both acts upon people and constitutes them as agents of the values promoted to them, so 
as to orient thought and action to support this particular historical phase of racial 
capitalism.  
 Drug and education policies, as well as drug court and charter school reforms, 
have carved out “new categories of privilege and stigma” that work upon individuals and 
groups as “racial procedures” (Melamed, 2006, p. 2) that shape understanding in order to 
rationalize the racial organization of the political economy (Leonardo, 2009). The 
Rockefeller Drug Laws and the ensuing drug war criminalized people of color at the 
same time that they restored white supremacy to the offensive after its defensive setbacks 
during the liberation-oriented Civil Rights and Black Power events of earlier decades. 
The official antiracism of the state was articulated within racially coded “law and order” 
rhetoric that simultaneously positioned people of color as the targets and the beneficiaries 
of this initiative because it claimed to make neighborhoods safer for poor people of color 
by eliminating the scourge of drugs, crime, and gangs.  But, in addition to laying the 
foundations for mass incarceration, such a criminalization project discredited the 
demands of the civil rights movement for economic and racial justice, and turned many 
middle-class and working-class Whites against the welfare state and the war on poverty 
by blaming urban crises on impoverished African-Americans. Criminalization objectified 
urban poor people of color as threats to themselves and their neighborhoods (among other 
things), and thus positioned them as the legitimate targets for the intensified policing and 
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mass incarceration that would come as the drug war exploded in the 1980s and 90s. 
Criminalization recentered whiteness as the decent backbone of society, in contrast to the 
deviance of the urban (read Black) drug dealer, “welfare queen,” and predator responsible 
for derangement and harm in society. Furthermore, to the boon of elites, in order to 
“preserve their subjective advantage,” White laborers chose whiteness over the long-term 
class interests that a multiracial campaign for economic justice represented (Leonardo, 
2009, p. 50). Cross-racial collaboration, perhaps capital’s oldest foe, from Bacon’s multi-
racial rebellion in 1676 to the abolitionism of the 19
th
 century to the Civil Rights 
Movement of the 1960s, was undermined by the wedge of racism. 
 At the same time, the Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA) and its 
various reauthorizations lent a similar materiality to hegemonic racial representations. 
Through education policies ranging from ESEA of 1965 to NCLB in 2002 and Race to 
the Top in 2009, urban poverty was continually re-imagined and treated as a symptom of 
a widespread culture of poverty among African Americans and Latinos. Poor youth of 
color were represented as underachievers at the low-end of the so-called “achievement 
gap”; their deficiencies were the first designated cause of their educational failures and 
inability to rise out of poverty. In a later phase, the dominant narrative would expand to 
finger teachers with low expectations and parents with poor family supervision as the 
culpable deficits targeted by policy. The practices that emerged from these discourses 
have had material consequences for poor youth of color in New York City, who face a 
narrowed curriculum of basic skills, high teacher attrition rates, rote test prep, high rates 
of suspension, zero-tolerance policing in schools, and disproportionately high dropout 
rates. Test scores and graduation rates are reconstructed into a discourse around the 
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“achievement gap,” the narrowing of which emerges as a form of official anti-racism that 
crowds out discussion of the impact of structural racism and macroeconomic policy on 
schooling. Again and again, through criminal justice and education, neoliberal subjects 
are oriented away from critiques of racial capitalism, and towards explanations of 
inequality that emphasize individual and cultural (read racial) deficits.  
 Similarly, reformist reforms like drug courts and charter schools are the building 
blocks of a vast discursive terrain set against structural critique and collectivism. They 
encourage the individual responsibilization of risk, and are engaged in the production of 
neoliberal subjects: self-surveilling, self-managing “entrepreneurs of ourselves” 
(Foucault, 2010). Drug courts offer a solution to problems of drugs, crime, and the costs 
of mass incarceration by governing an increasing number of people through a mix of 
coercion and what Nikolas Rose (2007) terms “ethopolitics” or “attempts to shape the 
conduct of human beings by acting upon their sentiments, beliefs, and values- in short, by 
acting on ethics” (p. 27). Mass incarceration is expensive, and its costs and racial 
disparities have gained much attention lately in the mainstream media and from 
politicians like Andrew Cuomo who feel its political and economic strain. Drug courts, as 
fiscally appealing adjuncts to the carceral state, combine the threat of incarceration with 
therapeutic jurisprudence in order to enforce the need for clients to take on “reflexive 
practices which maximize self-improvement” (Mackenzie, 2008, p. 515). Official anti-
racism is articulated as coerced self-help, as self-reliant individuals, under the guidance 
of a benevolent but tough-loving judge, improve their lot through pure grit and 
determination. Incarceration is depoliticized, deracialized, dehistoricized. There are 
neither ideological nor material dimensions to one’s vulnerability to arrest and 
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incarceration; rather, arrest, incarceration, and/or graduation from drug court are 
outcomes determined by the extent to which individuals take responsibility for the risks 
they themselves have created by virtue of their deviance. As with charter schools, 
individual choice is the palliative by which structurally configured risk is attenuated.  
 Both drug courts and charter schools articulate an official antiracism grounded in 
the expansion of choice. Charter proponents like Arne Duncan and others have gone so 
far as to claim school choice as the “civil rights issue of our time.” It remains to be seen 
whether drug courts, given the increasing unpopularity of the drug war and the 
unprecedented success of Michelle Alexander’s (2010) best-selling critique of racialized 
mass incarceration, will make similar claims around being the antidote to the “New Jim 
Crow.” Regardless, both reform movements couch their coercion in an oddly race-blind 
rhetoric of choice-as-antiracism. Drug courts lean on a mix of therapy and prisons to 
coerce individuals into taking responsibility for the risks associated with choosing in the 
marketplace of behaviors. Charters similarly lean on the muscle of the state, as high 
stakes testing, punitive accountability mechanisms, and school closures coerce families 
into the educational marketplace where they must take responsibility for finding a quality 
education for their children. Within this paradigm of official antiracism, economic and 
racial justice vis-à-vis education are reframed as the injection of choice and competition 
into the public school system. As the state increasingly divests itself of responsibility for 
providing quality education to youth of color in poor neighborhoods, official anti-racism 
takes shape as school choice. Within such an official anti-racism, however, parents of 
color must take responsibility for protecting their children from the risks associated with 
bad schools by choosing good ones. School choice is antiracism repackaged into a form 
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of “benign neglect” that braces up abandonment by incorporating families further into the 
atomizing logic of neoliberalism. 
 Furthermore, the persistent rhetoric linking human capital development to global 
competitiveness means that parents and youth are responsible not only for protecting 
themselves from the risks associated with a sub-par education, but also must take 
responsibility for the risk their potential loss of human capital poses to the global military 
and economic dominance of the U.S. In 2012, U.S. Education Reform and National 
Policy, a report authored by a task force chaired by former New York City school 
chancellor Joel Klein and former Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, linked school 
choice with national security, stating that "Educational failure puts the United States' 
future economic prosperity, global position, and physical safety at risk." Pinpointing the 
low test scores and high dropout rates of African American and Latino students, the 
report notes that  
Human capital will determine power in the current century, and the failure to 
produce that capital will undermine America's security… Large, undereducated 
swaths of the population damage the ability of the United States to physically 
defend itself, protect its secure information, conduct diplomacy, and grow its 
economy. 
The risk posed by “undereducated swaths” of African American and Latino youth can be 
diminished by the expansion of charter schools, for “enhanced choice and competition… 
will fuel the innovation necessary to transform results." Here again we see what Melamed 
(2006) refers to as the “suturing” of “official anti-racism to state policy in such a manner 
that hinders the calling into question of global capitalism” (p. 14). School choice is a 
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form of official anti-racism that shifts onto the very shoulders of the dispossessed 
individual responsibility for the risks engendered by their own dispossession. 
 To become dominant, or “strong”, Bourdieu suggests that neoliberal theory must 
appear “desocialized and dehistoricized at its roots” and must ensure for itself “the means 
of making itself true and empirically verifiable.” It therefore becomes “an immense 
political project” that “aims to create the conditions under which the ‘theory’ can be 
realized and can function” (Bourdieu, 1998, p. 2). The official anti-racism of drug courts 
and charter schools suggests that this is also a racial project. These reforms rationalize the 
risks and harms spawned by racial capitalism by reframing them as issues of individual 
responsibility occurring in an open marketplace of choices. They mobilize an official 
anti-racism to deracialize (Melamed, 2006) conditions that are in reality produced by the 
interplay of capitalism and racism.  
 Certain understandings of race are constructed through criminalizing, 
stigmatizing, and deficit-oriented discourses, and these understandings are both produced 
by and reflected in the form and intent of education and drug policies, and their attendant 
reforms. Education and drug policy share a deep embeddedness within the ongoing 
reconstruction of privilege and stigmatization that keep the larger neoliberal project 
churning along. They join together as interconnected material and ideological projects 
that brace up this historically specific phase in racial capitalism known as neoliberalism.  
Conclusion 
 This dissertation has argued that the institutional spheres of education and 
criminal justice are not as separate as they may seem. Indeed they by and large fall under 
different academic gazes, and involve different sets of professionals and other actors 
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thinking about, working in, and otherwise navigating the limits and possibilities of 
different public and private sector landscapes. I’ve tried to show how education policy 
and drug policy are related within the “big picture” of the racial capitalist dynamics of 
neoliberal urbanization in New York City. Education and drug policies have been treated 
as core constitutive elements within the broader neoliberal project of creative destruction. 
They are part and parcel of the neoliberal project to enhance the class power of elites and 
reinforce racial hierarchies. They have worked in tandem to transform the welfare state 
into a neoliberal institutional framework better suited to accommodate new forms of 
capital accumulation and provide the social control such accumulation requires.  
 Following Foucault, Steven J. Ball (1993) reminds us that we need to attend to 
“the way in which policy ensembles, collections of related policies, exercise power 
through a production of ‘truth’ and ‘knowledge’, as discourses” (p. 7). Citing Foucault 
(1977, p. 49), Ball reminds us that discourses are “practices that systematically form the 
objects of which they speak.” Thus drug and education policies, as a policy ensemble, use 
discourse to establish regimes of truth  “about what can be said, and thought, but also 
about who can speak, when, where and with what authority” (p. 7). Education and drug 
policy, and their respective reformist reforms, discursively construct what Freire (1970) 
refers to as “limit situations” that shape how humans “come to define the world and their 
situation and possibilities in it in a particular way” (Therborn, 1980, p. 10). They orient 
us towards certain ways of thinking about ourselves, the world, and our place in that 
world. Extending Foucault’s (1977) argument about the disciplinary power of prisons 
beyond the prison walls, this dissertation contends that neoliberal education and drug 
policies discipline large numbers of people by working within, but also across and 
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outside of, the generally perceived limits of their institutional spheres and gazes.  
 What then is to be done? In one of her last personal communications to me, Jean 
Anyon wrote “I think that part of the political economy of NYC is the need for a work 
force that is disciplined to blame itself for its joblessness” and poverty (September 2, 
2013). This dissertation has focused on how drug laws, prison building and filling 
projects, education policies, the standards-testing-accountability regime, and reformist 
reforms like drug courts and charter schools, have served together, both materially and 
ideologically, to manage surplus populations and mitigate crises within a particular 
historical period of racial capitalism. An important function of this ensemble of cages and 
classrooms has indeed been to individualize blame- that is, to depoliticize, dehistoricize, 
and deracialize joblessness and poverty. Returning to Freire’s (1970) concept of limit 
situations, I’d like to posit that as critical educators we must begin to look at the carceral 
and the educational as limit situations that are bound up together, intertwined- and that 
their strength as oppressive forces in society emerges from their braided nature, the same 
way that the strength of a rope does. Jean Anyon was always quick to point out that 
contradictions are opportunities for resistance and social movement building, and the 
educational-carceral nexus described here is no more immune to contradictions than it is 
natural and immutable. Contradictions, once uncovered, can become sites for deep 
critical inquiry, and, eventually, through a praxis of reflection and action, can mobilize 
into projects for economic and racial justice. But first, to draw out the contradictions, 
there must be dialogue- that crucial democratic and loving practice Freire called “naming 
the world.” It is my hope that this dissertation will stimulate dialogue, perhaps among 
those who have never spoken, so that new, different braids can form, because strength 
 260 
from below grows in the same way.  
 
“The domination implicit in dialogue is that of the world by the dialoguers; it is conquest 
of the world for the liberation of humankind.” 
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